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examine

I

theorist

who

she or he

is

illegitimately

a

Ann Ferguson

problem or dilemma of legitimation faced by the

critical

takes as the object of his or her critique a totality of which

a part.

The dilemma

exempt her

critical

is

must

that the theorist

either

theory from the determining influences of

the totality or lose normative authority. The critics

I

examine

in detail are:

Adorno and Horkheimer; Kant; Hegel; feminist standpoint epistemologists,
in particular,

I

Sandra Harding;

Irigaray; Foucault;

and Arendt.

conclude that a purely theoretical or epistemic ground

legitimacy of totalizing critique

is

for the

impossible; philosophical critique must

involve an extra-rational faith or a political commitment.

However,

I

also

argue that the project of theoretical grounding should not be abandoned.
continue this project by drawing out of the

some

critical theorists

I

examined

preliminary concepts and strategies (such as mimesis, hysteria, free

action, and psychoanalytic practice) that

may,

serve to provide a theory of the legitimacy of

IV

after further

critical

development,

philosophy.

I
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CHAPTER

I

THE CRISIS OF REASON AND THE DILEMMA OF CRITIQUE
According to
critique.

been

"Philosophy

is

at its

western

is

of the philosophical

tradition in philosophy

specifically

period. This

on critique as

not because

method inherent

in

it

fail

I

2
.

In this

positive as

has been manifest

in

in

I

will

the modern

to recognize the critical attitude and

all

reality

of their philosophical thought), but

philosophy,

in its

and

because the

unique preoccupation with questions

methodology and epistemology, can be seen as

offering self-conscious

and sophisticated reflection upon the capacities and problems
Furthermore, the modern period

itself.

from

a

powers

of critical reason to

life

all

tradition

lilies Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy
Press, 1983),

human

spheres of

which the premodern

of critique

philosophy can be seen to

in

premodern philosophical Weltanschauung

those areas of

focus

the philosophies of the Ancients (especially Socrates

appearance informed

modern period

thought of the

dissertation,

and Plato, whose reliance on the distinction between

of

most

agree. Certainly a critical attitude toward received
views has

moving force behind much

a

entire

more

I

Gilles Deleuze,

.

in its

differ

extension of the

functioning, including

had

left to

the authority

(New York: Columbia

University

page106.

2

For a study which focuses on critique as fundamental to philosophical
thought throughout the tradition, where it has been instantiated in various

analyses of alienation, see Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination, (New
York: George Braziller, 1973).

1

of religious

and

political institutions. 3

Modern philosophers threw

yoke of authority and insisted upon autonomously exercising
critical faculties in

reliable)

politics

order to gain scientific

knowledge and

(i.e.,

systematic, certain,

and law, and ethics. 4 Motivating the

name

critical

a few, has

knowledge could be achieved only by means

inquiry.

own

their

to determine practical questions about society,

Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, to
that

off the

The most prominent voices

philosophies of

been the assumption
of a process of critical

of philosophical modernity

up the task of revealing received views,

traditional practices,

have taken

and

institutions to be illegitimate.

There

is

employment
modern

the

3

another reason that

of critique.

period

is

I

am concerned

Many prominent

coming

with modernity's

philosophers have argued that

to an end. 5 This state of affairs gives rise to

The 18th century Enlightenment was known for this confident extension
in the rise of modern science and in bourgeois political revolutions.

of

reason

Kant's famous three questions — 'What can know?,' 'What ought to do?,'
'What can hope?' can be seen to incorporate this attitude of critical autonomy
4

I

I

I

in all

5

spheres.

Many

explore

its

philosophers have recently either

made

this claim or

legitimacy. See, for example, Jean Francois Lyotard,

attempted to
The Postmodern

Condition for the paradigm statement. According to Lyotard, the basic
is a lack of faith in "metanarratives," or large-

characteristic of postmodernity

scale theories which purport to explain

all

of physical or social reality (e.g.,

Marxism, Christianity, Psychoanalysis). am, for the moment, leaving the
question as to whether there is a qualitative difference between modernity and
postmodernity open. do believe that a large number of current thinkers seem
to have a more cynical view of the value and capabilities of reason to improve
the general quality of human life than did most thinkers of even a century ago.
Whether it would be reasonable to draw a sharp distinction, however, between
modernism and postmodernism on this point, tend to doubt. (Would we have
I

I

I

2

an apparent paradox. For

it

is

by making use of various forms of the

concept of critique that the so called "post-modern"
thinkers are claiming
to

have transcended, surpassed, outgrown,

or deconstructed

philosophical modernity. Critique therefore
appears to be one

concept which has transgressed the boundaries of
to

have survived the "paradigm

into post-modernity.

for

it

itself,

is

at the

Thus, the concept of critique

place of origin to
that critique has

perhaps even

same

place of origin and

shift" out of philosophical

both immanently embedded

and

its

in

become? Are

earlier) origin

the tradition to which

else

6
.

What

there vestiges of

involved

modernity and

itself entails

time, as critical of that tradition,

become something

in its

is

its

modern

this

it

it

paradox,
applies

transcends

its

"something else"

modernist (and

current uses, and

if

so,

why

are these vestiges not repudiated along with the critique and repudiation
of other aspects of modernist reasoning? This paradox suggests the need
to subject the

Toward

concept of philosophical critique

this end,

I

would

like to

examine

itself

a basic

to critical scrutiny.

dilemma

or

problem

to classify Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as postmodernists, for they

were hardly
Habermas) that
there is a more gradual trend of deepening skepticism going on which is an
(dialectical) evolution out of the past deployment of critique and the
strengthening of reason's autonomy. intend to clarify this issue more in the
optimistic about the status quo?)

I

rather believe

(somewhat

like

I

dissertation.
6

borrow the terms "immanent" and "transcendent" from the existential
phenomenologists, especially Merleau-Ponty, who use these terms to describe
the structure of human consciousness which is both embedded in the world and
I

able to gain the perspective of distance

upon

3

it.

which

is

engendered by the attempt

at critique,

with a view toward

determining whether the currently employed strategies
or forms of
critique are successful in escaping the
identified in the traditional

In this first

critique,

theorist.

will

I

it,

describe the larger problem of the

then intend to examine this dilemma as

Crisis of

has

of the concept.

and elaborate the consequent dilemma facing the
I

itself,

crisis

pertains to the paradoxical structure of

it

Adorno and Horkheimer's

The

modern uses

chapter,

of reason, specifically as

problems which

critical

it

is

critical

exemplified

in

analysis of Enlightenment rationality.

Reason

The basic problematic

of critique

can be seen as

(in

my

view) an

important — in fact, the most significant — aspect of what has commonly

been referred to as the

"crisis of

of modernist critique itself

crisis in

which,

I

am

modern uncovering

reason ." 7

Ironically,

it

which has been responsible

arguing,

it

too

is

implicated. For

it

has been the work
for the current

has been the

of the various aspects of reason's lack of "purity"

and autonomy which has also rendered dubious

critical

thought's

capacity to pass judgement on the legitimacy of others. This modernist

7

See, for example, Sabina Lovibund, "Feminism and the 'Crisis of

New

Review no. 207, September/October, 1994; Elizabeth
Grosz, "Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason," in
Feminist Epistemologies edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, (New
Rationality'

Left

,

,

York: Routledge, 1993).

4

trend

is

easily recognized in the increasingly accepted idea
that thought

always "situated"

in

and conditioned by extra-mental factors. This

modern development can

plausibly be seen as starting from the extreme

isolation of reason, (supposedly)

accomplished

from the concrete, empirical, and bodily
ending with
to be

of the

ways

political, bodily, or

its

the radical abstraction

of Descartes'

ego cogito, and

dependence upon

historical, social,

unconscious phenomena. This development

particularly acute in nineteenth century thought,

stress on reason as historical, and

work

in

which "pure reason" has increasingly come

in

seen as compromised by

economic,

was

all

is

in

in

the Hegelian

the culmination of this trend

in

the

of the "philosophers of suspicion ," 8 Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud.

Twentieth century philosophers have thus found
defensible to

assume reason

it

less

to be operating autonomously, and today's

critical theorists,

from the Frankfurt School to feminist

to alert us to the

ways

in

classic

work

On
of

critics,

continue

which our basic structuring concepts and

categories have been shaped by

experiences.

and less

human

and embodied

institutions

the Anglo-Analytic side of the theoretical

such thinkers as Quine,

analytic/synthetic distinction, and Kuhn,

in

in

field,

the

now

deconstructing the

demonstrating the social

influences shaping scientific theories, contributes to this development by

questioning the very idea of beliefs

8

This phrase

is

commonly

whose

truth

is

a product of necessary

attributed to Paul Ricoeur.

5

reasoning and therefore beyond the reaches
of skeptical scrutiny.

It

is

hardly necessary to run through a detailed
litany of the modern and post-

modern work which tends

show

to

the situated nature of thought and

reason.

The

point which

accomplishment

I

have chosen as

a clearly visible instance of the

of the limiting of the capacity of critical reason,

response to the application of critique to
procedure),

reason

means

out

is

the critique of Kant,

its

in

itself (a self-reflexive

whose

valiant attempt to chisel "pure

mired predicament within the empiricist epistemology, by

of the use of the scalpel of critique, serves as a classic

demonstration of the paradoxical position
continue to find themselves.

I

in

which

critical

philosophers

believe that the "transcendental ideality"

of Kant's basic ontology set the stage for further considerations of the

manner and extent

of the

human

contribution to the construction of the

very object of knowledge. With the "thing-in-itself" cast irretrievably out
of cognitive bounds,

of the status of

it

was

only a short step to a renewed problematizing

knowledge.

If

the object of knowledge

is in all

product of mental activity enacted upon a sensible manifold,

cases

is

it

a

not

possible that that mental activity could be otherwise? Thus, at least

some

thinkers have proposed that the possibility of "alternative

conceptual frameworks" begins with Kant. Kant's sophisticated and
subtle arguments succeeded

in

making

6

a

form of idealism an inevitable

consequence

of continuing to believe

in

the possibility of scientific

objectivity itself. Furthermore, Kant’s analysis
of the workings of the

mechanisms

of perception, cognition, and reflection
begins with our

first-order

encounter with sense-data, thus demonstrating that our

mental functioning

is

conditioned (by both empirical and transcendental

factors) from the ground up, so that cognitive
experience can never be
entirely "pure.” Kant therefore "saved" natural scientific
objectivity only

by reinterpreting

its

To ground cognition and knowledge

nature.

transcendental ego, which

itself

cen never be on object of knowledge

casts aspersions on the instrument of

critical

knowledge

be completely satisfying to the skeptic. The door

opened by Kant

for a

in a

is

itself

,

and cannot

thereby further

wide variety of attempted proposals regarding the

actual ground and source of "knowledge," and the degree of "objectivity"

which

we
The

areas of

are able to attain.

idea of "pure thinking" has by

human

questioned

Keller,

knowledge and ideology

Haraway), to social science

critique), to logic

the primary level of perception

phenomenological psychology).

we

sociology

(Gilligan),

(e.g.,

down

to

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology,

(e.g.,

It

(e.g.,

and abstract reasoning

Nye, Lloyd, Godelier, Sohn-Rethel), to moral reasoning

thinking beings

in all

cognitive endeavor from natural science (e.g., Kuhn,

Feyerabend, Harding,
of

now been

seems

that

in

our functioning as

are variously anchored to and determined by the body

7

(Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Bordo), the
unconscious (psychoanalytic
theory), material

economic

activity (Marx), lived experience
(Husserl),

language (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, ordinary
language
philosophy), and political

power

(Foucault), to

name

just a

few

of the

proposed grounds of thought. This far-reaching and varied
philosophical

development paves the way
activity

— critique

of purely

for

viewing

all

and

beliefs

included— as ultimately grounded not

intellectual

in

universal laws

autonomous reason, but elsewhere.

The Structure
The

of Critique and the Critic s

crisis of reason, as

it

more

Dilemma

specifically pertains to critique,

takes the following form. Critique requires a perspective which

transcends the object of

critique, but

cases, cannot account for
Ironically,

critical

argue that

all

theory

is

institutions

is

illegitimate.

illegitimate only in

in

critical

reason — are

their critique (e.g. socio-ideological

such as patriarchy, material-economic arrangements,

seen as the determining
theoretical

cases

scope. Thus, theorists

perspectives — including that of

economies, neural-chemical processes,

own

a significant class of

and must be considered

held to be universal

determined by the object of

their

in

the transcendent-critical perspective

where the

who

itself,

which,

totality)

linguistic practices, or

libidinal

whatever

face the dilemma of either exempting

pronouncements from

8

critical

scrutiny or admitting

is

that the theories they offer are also
relative to the structure of

domination that they have found. For

this

type of theorist, any degree of

transcendence or self-exemption from the determining
constraints of that

which s/he

is

criticizing constitutes

an illegitimate

to contradict the critical claims that

agency),

is

determined by the

fundamental point of the

all

consciousness

which

totality, a claim

theory.

critical

move which

Those

(or subjectivity, or

precisely the

is

critical

theorists

not respect this prohibition are subject to charges of
pragmatic
9

contradiction and self-refutation
universal

in

scope, unless the

.

But unless the

threatens

critical

who do
self-

claims are more

philosopher can justify a more

critical

comprehensive vision than that which s/he

is

criticizing,

the force and

legitimacy, the epistemic or moral superiority, of the critique

is

unfounded. As Richard Bernstein explains, "Critique always presupposes

some

ideal in the

name

of

which

we engage

in

critique

— however we

9

The basic form of this argument that charges self-refutation is quite clearly
in Hilary Putnam's Reason. Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), as a refutation of relativism. Putnam traces the
argument to Plato, so it's clear that it has been around for quite some time.
Some contemporary uses of this same argument can be found in Jurgen
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity trans., Frederick
Lawrence, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) where he uses the argument against,
most strikingly, Derrida, but others as well, including Adorno; Thomas
McCarthy, (see "The Politics of the Ineffable," Philosophical Forum v.XXI, Nos.
exposited

.

,

.

1-2, Fall-Winter,

1989-90, pp. 146-1 68,

for a discussion of self-refutation,

Freedom and
Reader editor, David Couzens Hoy, (New York:
Blackwell, 1986), which offers a critique of Foucault along these lines.

again, with respect to Derrida; and Charles Taylor, ("Foucault on

Truth," Foucault:
Basil

A

Critical

,

9

conceive of this

ideal

and whatever status

can be no such thing as

totally

immanent

we

claim for

critique

11

it

." 10

Thus, there

Self-critique

.

is in

every case the critique of one aspect of
a whole by another which

transcendent to the object of critique because
of participation

in

the value or values

in

the

it

is

claims a greater degree

name

of

which the

critique

is

being conducted. Similarly, what Seyla Benhabib
calls "defetishizing
critique,

critique

which simply

lays out alternative possibilities to a belief

or practice, without arguing for the moral
or epistemic superiority of the
alternative, entails an appeal to transcendent values,
since to see a belief

as limited

in

scope due to the fact that there

is

an alternative of equal

value or plausibility presupposes an act of transcendence out of
the
particular belief structure

in

which had previously appeared

to be universal

scope, as well as a commitment to the superior value of a more

10

Richard Bernstein, "Metaphysics, Critique, Utopia," Review
Metaphysics December, 1988, page 257.

of

.

n The Frankfurt
School example of "immanent critique" will be discussed in
depth below in Chapter One of the dissertation. In short, my argument will be
that although Adorno and Horkheimer recognize their necessary immanence to
the Enlightenment rationality that they are attempting to critique, it is this very
immanence which ultimately prevents their success. Although Adorno and
Horkheimer recognize the dialectical reciprocity of the progressive and
regressive aspects of Enlightenment, their critical practice is an attempt to make
use of and extend the progressivity, in order to identify and eliminate the
regressive and barbaric elements. However, insofar as immanence can be
maintained, the repressive elements cannot be left behind. See Theodore
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment translated by John
Cumming, (New York: Continuum, 1986).
,

10

comprehensive view,

i.e.,

the view which encompasses both alternatives,

as opposed to the view which sees only one possibility. 12

The necessary elements
a

problem or

crisis in

of critique consist both of a recognition of

the object of critique, and the application

appeal, to an ideal standard or criterion according to which the

of, or

critical

object can be judged and found wanting. This analysis of critique

is

lent

support by the word's etymological connection to both the terms
'criterion'

critique

the

is

crisis,

which

and

'crisis'.

to see these

the

critic

entails the

13

One way

two aspects

must have an

employment

been engendered out

of understanding the

as

in

dilemma

of

conflict. In order to recognize

insight of the deficiency of the object

of a criterion;

of the totality

which

however,

is in

if

the criterion has

crisis (as is

the case of

the critics of modernity, or of reason), the criterion should not be relied

upon. However,
itself,

if

the

critic

turns her

critical

skepticism on the criterion

s/he ends up without any normative standard, and without any

means

for

making

critical distinctions.

Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
12

,

three terms, 'critique', 'criterion', and 'crisis' come from the Greek,
divide, judge, discern'.
'krisis' and 'krinein', which mean 'to choose, separate,
Benhabib and Bernstein comment on the connection of 'critique' with
13

AII

Both

’crisis'

but

Benhabib,

fail

mention the equally significant connection with
page19, and Bernstein, Ibid., page 257.

to

Ibid.,

11

'criterion'.

See

The Epistemological Form

Dilemma

of the

This problem or dilemma of critique

which

is

manifest

the criterion

or

in

dilemma

of epistemology."

that

is

inquiry into the nature of

same problem

as that

The epistemological form

what we possess

at the start of

knowledge cannot be assumed

merely apparent, knowledge.
of

the

modern epistemology as the well-known "problem

the dilemma of critique

means

is

We

knowledge. That some

criterion

is

needed

if

certain

of

any

to be true, but

have, as yet, no standards or

which to distinguish knowledge from the

of

criteria

by

false claims to

knowledge

is

to be

obtained has been a standard philosophical position since Plato, whose

"paradox of learning"

(

i

-

e

. ,

in

the

Me no

is

resolved by recourse to a "myth"

the "myth of recollection") which denies the possibility of a state of

absolute ignorance. 14

On

this account,

which distinguish true knowledge from
other words, we,

is,

in

and, furthermore,

some

we

we

necessarily presuppose criteria

a false claim to

sense, always already

knowledge.

In

know what knowledge

have no choice but to trust that our

presuppositions are legitimate.

But with the "epistemological turn" of modern philosophy, an
appeal to an irrational and unexplained ground of knowledge

14

As

was

Chapter 2, Hegel's solution is similar to Plato's in that he
too denied that total ignorance can ever be the starting place of coming to
know. Rather, for Hegel true knowledge or science exists from the beginning in
the simplest, most naive pose of consciousness. The criteria for knowledge are
therefore necessarily present within the first acquaintance of consciousness
with

its

I

will

argue

in

object.

12

considered inadequate. The question and status of the
criterion was then

taken up with renewed vigor. Descartes' solution to
this problem was to

attempt to obtain a truth of which he could be certain, and
then to

deduce from that instance
which he then

of

knowledge

distinguishing features,

its

inferred to be the sufficient conditions for

The epistemic marks by means

of

its

certainty.

which Descartes concluded that he

could be certain of the truth of his instance of knowledge were nothing
other than the clarity and distinctness with which his insight impressed
itself

of

upon him. Thus, Descartes believed that he had wrested the

knowledge from an indubitable instance

solved the problem. But
illegitimate.

in

it

of

knowledge, and thereby

can be easily argued that this solution

Descartes must have presupposed his

knew? And

A

if

clear

so,

if

how

model

how

not (echoing Meno),

of the epistemological

in

discussions of rationalism and empiricism

rival

foundationalist epistemologies

is

epistemologies.

is

that he

Each theory of knowledge offers
to avoid being

What

is

seldom noticed

that each of these

also a theory of critique, as a theory of

to distinguish real from merely apparent

method

know

form of critique can be seen

the early modern period's

offers a

could he

its clarity

could he claim to be starting from scratch?

in

how

is

from the outset

criteria

order to have recognized the cogito as true on the basis of

and distinctness. For

criteria

knowledge

or false belief.

a critique of received opinion;

duped by

13

false claims to

each

knowledge.

Rationalism assumes that knowledge

is

a

whole (Descartes'

knowledge") based ultimately on self-evident
present before the

mind's eye." Critique

is,

"tree of

intuitions immediately

on

this view, a

checking knowledge claims against the touchstone of

process of

intuitive self-

evidence, rejecting those claims that don't measure up. Empiricism,
on
the other hand, measured knowledge claims against the incorrigibility
of

sensory evidence. What characterizes foundationalist styles of
as such,

is

critique,

the employment of values or criteria which are held to be

absolute or transcendent to the

crisis in

the object of critique. The criteria

are held secure during the critique and exercise a normative role over that

which they are used to
empiricism

illustrate

legitimate. But the failures of rationalism and

the impossibility of holding the normative criteria

exempt from the operation

of critique. Rationalism,

legitimacy only to the transcendent

equation, resulted

in

a circular

new knowledge which
was compelled

component

in

of the

attributing

knowledge

system which excluded an openness

to

could be derived from experience. Thus, Descartes

to introduce the "deus ex

machina"

of

God

in

order to

allow for the possibility of warranted knowledge of the external world.

Empiricism, on the other hand, resulted

in a

skepticism about such

pragmatically necessary and taken-for-granted fundamental concepts as

the existence of the
as with Berkeley and

self.

Furthermore,

Hume,

when taken

to

belief in the existence of

14

its logical

extreme,

even the material

world (empiricism

s alleged

the early epistemologies,
criteria for

in

knowledge from

strong

suit)

was seen

to be unjustified. Thus,

claiming to have found
critical

ways

skepticism resulted

in

to

exempt

their

crippled and

one-sided systems, which failed to be able to legitimate
instances of

knowledge that they needed. Thus, there was

movement from

a logical

foundationalist critique, which employs universal and necessary
or
indubitable standards, to

immanent

critique,

which recognizes the

impossibility of exempting the standards themselves from the need for
critical scrutiny.

Critique as Practical/Political

It

should be evident that there

is

a purely epistemological aspect to

the problem or dilemma of critique, for as

must have knowledge
of critique. In this

I

have stated above, the

of, or insight into, a crisis or

way, the dilemma

problem of

similar to seeing

it

the object

also a practical-

is

way

an activity and
of viewing critique

on the model of what the Ancient Greeks called

"techne," a purposive

human

Greek analysis, every techne
goal, the object

is

critique, for critique

behavior, and not merely an ideational state. This

is

in

of critique parallels the

epistemological problem of the criterion. But there
ethical aspect to the

problem

critic

upon which

activity, a craft, or a

is

it

skill.

According to the

characterized by three aspects:

operates, and the

15

method

a

or

its

aim or

knowledge

which accounts
nature of the

for its success.

in

natural science and the clash
rise to

have thus
is

far

been discussing the

the goal or aim of critique?

philosophy can be seen as the quest for certainty.

This desire, motivated historically

gave

We

method. What, then,

critical

The modern period

15

in

large part by the

between

scientific

successes of

and religious

beliefs,

an increased attention on the part of philosophers to

questions of method. 16 The profound distrust of received views

engendered by the
early

modern

scientific refutation of

much Church

period, led to the requirement that

teaching

method

offer a

in

way

adjudicate between conflicting knowledge claims. Hence, method
required to be

critical.

that the critic desires.

But

it

was

not knowledge, merely for

to

was

own

sake,

As we have already seen with Descartes, the

epistemic certainty toward which the
desire for

its

the

critic

autonomy and freedom from

aims

externally

is in

the service of her

imposed domination by

the authorities of religion, tradition, and power. Furthermore, critique

aims to motivate change

(in

beliefs, policies, institutions, or actions)

on

the part of others. Thus critique always has an agenda to change

consciousness, and frequently behavior, and

15

in this

respect critique has

See, for example, Plato's Gorgias, translated by Donald

J. Zeyl,

(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987).
16

epistemology as a discipline can be seen to have begun as late as
the Nineteenth Century as a reflection on modern scientific success; see George
Canguilhem, Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), page 1.
ln fact,

16

a

been an important motor of philosophical and
well as a fundamental

theory to praxis.

autonomy, and

It

way

in

which thought

political

development, as

relates to "real life," or

therefore these practical-ethical values-freedom,

is

which may be seen to be the deeper motivation

justice

for acts of philosophical critique.

There

also another sense

is

which

critique

is

inherently action

rather than merely thought. All critique participates

in

the ethical-political

realm of

life,

for critique

is

in

fundamentally an act of resistance —

rejection of illegitimate authority and an exercise of the critic's

autonomy — which

at the

conditions for that

autonomy and freedom

evident

in

same time

establishes and enlarges the

Descartes' epistemological work,

revolutionary rejection of

all

as authentic critique

is

possible,

moment — a moment which
moment

original critical

and

is,

is

is

same aspect

"ontological event,"
being. (Although

freedom comes

it

all

self-consciously

installs

the

it

should be

forms of critique as

must contain

original

well. Insofar

a transcendent

and free from determination. This

critic at a

distance from the object of

thus essentially free action, as well as an instance

of theory. This aspect of critique

This

in its

is

therefore, responsible for the normativity and authority of

the critique. Critique

17

This feature of critique

previous authority, but

recognized as an essential feature of

critique,

17
.

I

in

am

of critique

— critique

as free action — can therefore

would allow us

to characterize

it

as an

the Heideggerian sense. Critique brings freedom into
is the only way in which

not claiming that critique

into being.)

17

also be seen to be an instance of
18
political ."
For

is

its

political is

the spontaneous act of beginning anew.
Philosophical

critics, in their rejection of

new

calls "the

Arendt, the basic existential category of the

which

"natality,"

what Hannah Arendt

received opinion and authority, inaugurate a

beginning, thereby establishing their

own freedom and

a

space

for

exercise.

follows that the object upon which the activity of philosophical

It

critique

claims

19
.

performed

is

will

be beliefs, or apparent and untested knowledge

Furthermore, the most forceful instances of critique

not only to beliefs which

we

principle capable of holding,

in

fact hold, but to those

and thus

will

which

will

we

are

in

be concerned with the

conditions for the possibility of knowledge and belief

(e.g.,

our minds,

reason, language, principles of justice or knowledge, social and
institutions

apply

political

and practices). Thus, even apparently "purely philosophical"

(and not just obviously "political") critics — those

who

take the

philosophical tradition, knowledge, metaphysics, or the faculty of reason

18

Hannah Arendt, The Human

Press, 1958) and The Life of the

Condition, (Chicago: university of Chicago

Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

discuss Arendt's conception of political freedom and
to philosophical critique in Chapter 5 of the dissertation.

1971).

19

I

will

its

relevance

When we

perform philosophical critique upon socio-political institutions or
practices with the aim of gaining knowledge, it is perhaps more accurate to say
that the object of our critique

is

the belief

practice.

18

in

the legitimacy of the institution or

as the objects of their critiques-are engaged

itself

in political

action, and

function to engender change.

This aspect of critique — critique as praxis — must not be lost sight
of, for

we

it

turn

is

frequently the ethical-political dimension of critique to which

when

seeking justification and grounds for the critique. Thus

at

the end of Descartes' epistemological inquiry, the theoretical certainty

which grounds
faith rather

his post-critical

knowledge

than reason, for this certainty

of the external world rests on

is

underwritten, according to

Descartes, by none other than the hand of God. Similarly, Plato's solution
to the epistemological problem of the

practice, wherein the possibility of

demonstrated, rather than
slave

20

Meno

turned to the plane of

knowledge was

rationally argued,

by the

practically

tutorial

with the

20
.

We

can also see the

practical/political

aspect of critique to be at play

in

other Platonic dialogues. Socrates, in the Gorgias, claims "I am the true
politician," for he saw his work, indeed he saw philosophy, to be a political,
rather than a theoretical enterprise. Furthermore, this view of the
Socratic/Platonic dialectic allows for an understanding of the functional
significance of the frequent use of myth in the dialogues. Myths are used as an
alternative to purely rational or theoretical

means

for causing the ideational

and

behavioral changes in interlocutors, listeners, and readers which were the
frequent goal of the dialogue. Furthermore, as we have already seen above,
with Meno, myth often functions as an alternative to theory as a ground for the
possibility of the critique.

19

The Dilemma as a
But as

we have

aspect of critique
to the

Dialectic of

dilemma

is

Theory and Practice

seen above,

precisely that

of critique.

this

transcendent and normative

which

is

To ground the legitimacy

ethical-practical nature as free action falls

kind of fundamental critique with which
critical of

seen to be

sway

we

of critique in

are concerned

is

necessarily

when we seek

theoretical grounding and legitimation for our critical activities

we

are again brought to the

thought which cannot be considered above the
influence and determination cannot prove

The question

of grounding then

seems

theory
for

taint of illegitimate

human freedom

to be possible.

to falter on this choice

way

between

to each other,

sufficient.

The dilemma
It

in

same quagmire,

the practical and theoretical, with both aspects giving

and neither being

its

to the dilemma, for the

the very possibility of free action. Yet

rather than action,

according

in crisis

of critique

is

a

dilemma

of grounding or justification.

can be seen as one mode of the expression of

philosophical dualism. Dick

Howard

identifies the

general form as the choice between

concepts — normativity and genesis

a deep-lying

dilemma

in its

most

two explanatory
21

According to Howard,

.

all

of our

explanatory attempts appeal to one or the other principle. Yet appeal to

21

Dick Howard, From Marx to Kant

Press, 1985) and
Press,

1

The

.

(Albany: State University of

Politics of Critique

.

988).

20

New

York

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

one without the other

is

not possible, for they require each other;

normativity grounding genesis, and vice versa. The bipolar and

ambiguous structure
also be

viewed

insight are

these

of critique, as

in light

it,

can

of this opposition, for the critic's criteria and

engendered out of the

criteria

have been here developing

I

must claim

totality

which s/he

is

critiquing, yet

to have normative force over that very totality.

This general opposition or dichotomy, according to Howard, has taken
various forms

in

the history of theory: the

split

between theory and

practice, critique and criticism, and philosophy and politics,

Howard argues
pole

is

that the dilemma

irreducible to the other.

grounding, and vice versa.
solution to the

that

spawn

dilemma

If

is

necessary and that each explanatory

Thus

political action requires philosophical

Howard

of critique.

among them.

is

correct, then there can be no

Our attempts

to critique the totalities

our very ability to critique must be seen as theoretically

without ground. But before giving up on the possibility of theoretically
justified critique, there are instances of global critique

examined.

I

will

which must be

begin with a classic instance of a critique which

struggled self-consciously with the problem of normativity and genesis,
or

transcendence and immanence, and which claimed to have found

way

of achieving transcendent normativity by

immanence — the

critique of

means

Adorno and Horkheimer.

21

of maintaining

a

The Critique

of Enlightenment

According to Adorno and Horkheimer, Enlightenment
"totalitarian," in that

it

encompasses

be used to refer to and to

criticize

all

22
it

.

enlightened reason entails their belief
itself of

is

thought and language which may

Their attempt to elude this trap of

in

reason's

own

ability to

those barbarous elements which do not measure up to

standards. Thus they engage

in

"immanent"

critique,

purge
its

own

hoping to extend

the non-dominating, non-oppressive elements of reason, while leaving

behind the tendencies toward oppression. Although

I

will

argue that

it

is

not possible to eliminate completely the oppressive aspects of

enlightened reason,

intend to follow Adorno and Horkheimer

I

attempt to broaden and transform the concept of reason

which may serve to

liberate

and suppressed. This

some

of

in

an

itself, in a

way

what reason has previously denied

possibility arises

from the uncovering by Adorno

and Horkheimer of reason's necessary involvement with myth, magic,
and mimesis. They show that myth and reason are not completely
separable from one another, nor are they essentially different, but are
rather dialectically identical, the

one giving way

to the other, and the

one, as they demonstrate through a reading of Homer, "expounding and
elucidating" the other

22

23

23
.

Both mimesis and rationality embody an attitude

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

22

.

,

page 46.

of domination over nature, but perhaps

mimesis contain something

it

is

myth and

possible that

else, as well, that

can serve as a glimpse of

liberatory redemption 24
.

Adorno and Horkheimer write

in

the introduction to the Dialectic of

Entigh ten men t:

We

— and

are wholly convinced

principii—\ha\ social freedom

thought. Nevertheless,

we

is

therein

lies

our petitio

inseparable from enlightened

believe that

recognized that the notion of this very

we have
way

just as clearly

of thinking,

no less

than the actual historic forms-the social institutions — with which
it

interwoven, already contains the seed of the reversal

is

universally apparent today.

If

accommodate

this recidivist element,

own
left

fate.

to

its

If

reflection

on

how

is

then

it

seals

consideration of the destructive aspect of progress

enemies, blindly pragmatized thought, loses

transcending quality and,

But just

enlightenment does not

its

relation to Truth

this required reflection

upon

its

its

is

its

25
.

own

regressive elements

possible? Adorno and Horkheimer are quite aware of the paradoxical

nature of this task, yet they attempt

it

anyway.

How

is it

that they see

the regressive aspects of enlightened thought to be identifiable and
eliminable by enlightenment thinking itself? "Social freedom," they argue,
requires enlightened thought, yet enlightened thought "contains the seed

24

My

to sketch

some new

use by more
25

foreshadow my attempts in later chapters
concepts and theoretical tools and to explore their

discussion of this point
critical

will

recent (especially feminist) thinkers.

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

23

,

page

xiii.

What

of its reversal."

exactly do Adorno and Horkheimer understand by

the concept of enlightenment?
For

Adorno and Horkheimer, 'enlightenment'

refers to a type of

reasoning and not just to the Western historical period (Eighteenth

Century European culture) which
this

type of thinking

26
.

is

considered to be the apotheosis of

Enlightenment

is

seen as constituting the basic

cognitive orientation of the entire Western tradition of philosophical

thought, beginning with the emergence of reason out of supposedly prerational

myth

Horkheimer,
fear by

this

27
.

project of enlightenment, according to

Adorno and

the "disenchantment of the world" and the elimination of

is

means

The

of the increase

knowledge

is

patriarchal,

in

knowledge. The attitude inculcated by

one

of domination and sovereignty over

nature, while the essence of this thought

is

technology, or the

ability to

manipulate, control and change nature. According to Adorno and

Horkheimer,
Bacon's view was appropriate to the
prevailed after him.

and the nature

scientific attitude that

The concordance between the mind

of things that

he had

in

mind

is

of

man

patriarchal: the

See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), page148. Also see Martin Jay,
The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).
26

,

.

the case, then postmodernity, if successful in transcending and
rendering illegitimate modernity's concepts of reason and rational values, must
also be seen as a critical overcoming of the entire western tradition. Indeed,
some so called "post-modern" critical philosophers do see themselves as having
gone beyond the metaphysical totality — e.g., Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida.
27

lf

this

is

24

human mind, which overcomes
a

superstition,

disenchanted nature. Knowledge, which

obstacles:

.

.

.

Technology

is

is

is

to hold

sway over

power, knows no

the essence of this knowledge

28
.

But don't Adorno and Horkheimer themselves bring a
technological, instrumental and patriarchal posture to their
inquiry? They

attempt to learn the essence of enlightenment, so that they may
develop
a strategy for the fulfillment of its positive goals,
its

defects. "The

prepare the

it

way

accompanying

enlightenment

is

critique of enlightenment

for a positive notion of

from entanglement

in

blind

and the elimination of
is

intended to

enlightenment which

will

release

domination ." 29 The critique of

carried out for the intended purpose of furthering

enlightenment. This purposiveness of the critique

thus already

is

suspiciously entangled with the object of the critique. The outstanding
characteristic of enlightenment thought

power,
its

its

tendency and

object. Since critique

ability to

is

is its

Baconian instrumental

manipulate, dominate, and put to use

necessarily purposive and instrumental,

must be considered an instance

of,

what

is in

it

too

this case, its object. Thus,

instrumentality per se cannot be totally repudiated and transcended by

Adorno and Horkheimer, unless they
activity. Is there a solution to this

28

29

are likewise to repudiate their

apparent paradox?

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page

4.

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page

xvi.

25

own

Habermas has

also reflected

Adorno and Horkheimer. As he so
As

force-that

its critical

ideology critique applied to
the self-destruction of the
the

moment

itself.

critical

of description

critique that has

problem

this

quite

aware

the work of

it

is

the

To be

disclosure of

fr/73 /

sure, this description of

capacity

still

power and thereby

to

itself

paradoxical, because

is

has to make use of the

been declared dead.

It

denounces the

Enlightenment's becoming totalitarian with

was

in

clearly describes the problem,

instrumental, reason assimilated

relinquished

in

upon

its

own

Adorno

tools.

of this performative contradiction inherent

in

totalized critique. 30

According to Habermas,
apply

reason to

critical

reflection,

it

is

the insistence of Adorno and Horkheimer to

itself,

thereby engaging

in

which causes the problem and which

illegitimate.

a

second order

is, in

his opinion,

Furthermore, according to Habermas, this historical

progression from legitimate and useful "ideology critique"

which demonstrates the
irrational

power) to

illegitimate

(i.e.,

critique

entanglement of a theory with

"totalizing critique"

(i.e.,

object the procedure of ideology critique

critique

itself) is

which takes as

its

unnecessary and

requires a "one-sided" and "oversimplified" reading of the culture of

modernity

in

order to

make

it

appear to work.

Yet the drama of enlightenment
ideology critique itself

first arrives at its

comes under

climax

when

suspicion of not producing

(any more) truths — and the enlightenment attains second-order

Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), page119.
30

26

reflectiveness.

Then doubt reaches out

to include reason,

standards ideology critique had found already given

and had simply taken

ideals

Enlightenment takes

even

in

relation to

at their

this step

own

its

Habermas' suggestion

—

it

whose

bourgeois

in

word. Dialectic of

renders critique independent

foundations." 31

proposed solutions to

similar to the

is

Russell's various paradoxes of reference, which simply proscribe selfreferentiality in certain instances 32 But
.

Adorno and Horkheimer?
necessary to engage

in

flawed. The

rise of

it

was

open to

this possibility really

Adorno and Horkheimer believe

did

critique at

According to Habermas,

Adorno and Horkheimer

Why

is

such

a totalistic,

"meta"

it

level?

the horror of recent history that led

to believe that enlightened reason

German fascism and western

was

that any source of hope for social liberation

was

itself

totalitarianism indicated

to be

abandoned; the

Marxist historical dynamic had failed to bring about lasting revolution.

How

had the Marxist ideology

European culture and

critique resulted in Stalinism?

rationality

Adorno and Horkheimer thought
totality

How

had

produced Auschwitz? For these reasons,
it

necessary to attempt

and essence of reason. This insight

into

a critique of the

Adorno's and

Horkheimer's motivation allows us to see perhaps more clearly the

Jurgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse pagel 16.

31

,

32

tells

There

is

of course also the well

the doctor that

"it

hurts

when

I

known
do

joke, according to

this," to

don't do that."

27

which the patient

which the doctor

replies "well,

insufficiency of genetic explanation to provide theoretical
grounding.

Although

we

can certainly understand the

desirability of a critique of the

kind of thinking that could produce atrocity, and

say that the attempt

is

justified, at the

in this

sense

we

same time we must admit

could
that

the lack of theoretical understanding of the mechanism whereby such a
critique

its

is

results.

possible leads to skepticism with respect to the legitimacy of

The question remains whether Adorno and Horkheimer

able to provide an adequate theoretical explanation of that

and so to ground the conclusions of

are

mechanism

their critical project.

Their attempt to uncover the irrational within the very structure of

the rational traces this entanglement to the beginnings of Western
Civilization in the

work

Homer, which they consider to be "the basic

of

text of western culture."

The Odyssey

is

therefore read as a narrative of

the coming into existence of the individual subject, with

and atomistic attributes of

self-identity, self-reliance,

process of individuation

at the

is

same time

a

all

his

bourgeois

and autonomy. This

process of tearing oneself

out of the world of animistic superstition governed by invisible and
undifferentiated elemental forces. This struggle, as Adorno and

myth

always already

Horkheimer show,

is

rational science;

explains, confirms, presents reality, and

it

a dialectic, for pre-rational

sets off the process of enlightenment.

is

in

so doing

Myth and magic see more

it

in

nature than meets the eye, and according to Horkheimer and Adorno this

28

more

the precondition for language, since

is

distance necessary between a thing and

enlightened reason
its

shown

is

its

it

provides the objectifying

name. On the other hand,

to revert increasingly to

myth and magic.

In

fundamental principles of the interchangeability of objects and
the

repeatability of events (the "principle of

reasoning loses

its

immanence," 33 enlightenment

grasp of the very nature which

sought to

it

understand and dominate, and becomes once again estranged from
totality

which

originate

it

finds fearsome and oppressive. Both science and

in fear,

a

myth

according to Adorno and Horkheimer, which they

attempt to assuage by recourse to explanation.

The
the other,

Homeric

dialectic of

is

shown

myth and magic, on the one hand, and reason, on

to be manifest

in

many forms throughout

the

narrative. Firstly, both antipodal elements exist formally, as the

mythical content of the Odvssey

Apollonian form of the epic.

In

is

organized and mastered through the

terms of content as well there

is

much

in

the text that contains a similar dualistic admixture of the magical and the
rational.

The notion

of the gift, for example,

is,

according to Horkheimer

and Adorno, "halfway between barter and offering," and thus makes use
of the prerational

concept of

equivalent exchange.

33

34

34

sacrifice as well as the

The mythic power

of the

modern notion

gods

is itself

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page 12.

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page 49.
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of

divided

between the

older, cthonic deities,

to the elemental forces they

than identical.
of

humans

in

And

of course

evoke
it

is

and the newer gods, whose
is

more distanced and symbolic

power

the

rather

gods over the minds

of the

the form of superstition and fear against which
our hero,

the representative of a demythologized rationalism,
of reason by

relation

Odysseus

is itself

impure. The battle

is

pitted.

Yet

use

this

waged by Odysseus

free himself

from enslavement by the power of myth draws upon that

very power,

in

the fundamental use he

makes

to

of mimetic artifice and

deceptive cunning. Odysseus fools the Cyclops and cheats the Sirens
by
exploiting a basic dualism inherent

in

the

first

glimmers of enlightened

reasoning — the distance between meaning or intention, and
expression. Thus, Odysseus,
literal

truth of his

is

song without paying the
its

claiming to be "Nobody” speaks the

name, yet gains advantage from the ambiguity

meaning. Similarly, he

law, but not

in

its

intent.

older, darker world,

of

able to win from the Sirens the prize of their
price of

madness by following the

Odysseus outwits

by using

their level of

his

enemies,

letter of

who

the

represent the

enlightenment against them.

Odysseus' use of both mystification and instrumental

rationality exploits

the weaknesses of both and pits their strengths against each other.

Adorno and Horkheimer thus

reveal him to be an

immanent

Odysseus' example of turning mythic enlightenment against
thereby propelling

itself

critic.

But

itself,

out of the sheer darkness and terror of myth

30

is

in

the direction of further enlightenment, one that can be followed
by

contemporary

critics,

such as Adorno and Horkheimer? And

could this mean, since
to

we

have succeeded beyond

reality?

It

is

live in a

all

time

when

if

so what

enlightened reason appears

expectation and hope

in

demystifying

science, the very flower of disenchanted reason, rather than

superstition and

myth which now dominates human consciousness and

behavior, at least within the cultural milieu that has produced the horrors
to

which the
In

critique of

Adorno and Horkheimer respond.

pointing out this dualism of the prerational and rational at the

heart of the "bourgeois" Odysseus' cleverness, Adorno and Horkheimer

demonstrate the already purposive-rational character of mythical thinking;
enlightenment

is

present within myth from the beginning. This admixture

of reason and superstition

which characterizes Odysseus' adventure

indicates another aspect of the paradox of the critical perspective utilized

by Adorno and Horkheimer.

In

seeking to uncover the origins of the

narrowing of reason to instrumentality, Adorno and Horkheimer analyze
the development of enlightenment out of myth

in

such a way as to

support their theoretical assumptions that the process of disenchantment

from myth and superstition

employment

is

one

of continual and increasing

of reason as instrumental.

and Horkheimer to be "always already"

31

Odysseus

is

shown by Adorno

a bourgeois subject. This

problem

is

seen by Seyla Benhabib as one of viciously circular reasoning on the

Adorno and Horkheimer.

part of

.

.

.

The

interpretation of

fear of losing itself

a self in

otherness, a self aware of the dangers to

in

his continuing identity

one whose

Odysseus already presupposes

posed by the urges within. Yet

this self

is

identity formation already reveals a pathological

resistance against the blurring of boundaries. Odysseus fears

merger and seeks autonomy, and attains autonomy only

expense

Humanity's

of self-repression.

original fear

at the

from nature

is

already viewed by Horkheimer and Adorno as a fear of merger

and a pathological resistance to otherness. They project back to
the beginnings of

human

subjectivity pathologies

themselves diagnose as belonging to
for the fear of otherness

the

rigid authoritarian

violently asserted.

personality.

Thus
rationality

It

becomes

as

if

historical

pathological only

in

Odysseus prefigures the

the case of

authoritarian

35

in their

attempt to capture the emergence of instrumental

from out of

its

other,

Adorno and Horkheimer return

beginning wherein the dialectic of enlightenment

Adorno and Horkheimer

fail

to see

is

already

to a

in full

at its

own

actual birth eludes the dialectical analysis. Yet

origin.

it

is

The moment

easy to see that

an inevitable consequence of their methodology of immanent

Adorno and Horkheimer

35

swing.

beyond enlightenment reasoning

which appears to be already present

is

development,

whose ego boundaries must be

personality

is

its

which they

of

its

this

critique.

are motivated by a critical view of disenchanted

Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia page168.
,
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reason and

seek

its

its

correlative subjectivity-that of bourgeois

origin in

what

manifestations of the
hardly surprising that

is

commonly accepted

to be

one of the

same western reason they wish
in their

analysis they

would

autonomy. They
earliest

to critique.

find exactly

It

is

what they

expect. Not only have Odysseus' adventures been presupposed
to be a
starting point for the dialectic of enlightenment, but the

immanent

methodology

of

employed by Adorno and Horkheimer could not

critique

possibly reveal anything else. This methodological circularity, although

understandable,

troubling

is

of the dialectic of

if

what

alternative type of rationality.

revealed

in

sought

is

a solution or a

myth and enlightened reason. Immanent

appears incapable of escape from

dichotomous

is

this dialectic, for

it

critique

other to the

enlightenment

is

the analysis of Odysseus' "adventures with the dialectic."

Both myth and enlightenment are present, and both are intertwined

many

of

out

cannot envision any

No concretely developed

possibilities of either superstition or

way

in

Odysseus' actions, but Adorno's and Horkheimer's analysis

is

unable to demonstrate a radically different rationality that can be held out
as a normative standard which could serve as an alternative to either the
instrumentality or the barbarism (or the barbarism of
instrumentality — e.g., the "efficiency" of the death camps, or the mind-

numbing pleasures

of the "culture industry")

critique. Insofar as

it

is

which

it

is

their

the aim of Adorno and Horkheimer to

33

concern to

demonstrate

a dialectic of

Odysseus succeeds.

enlightenment and myth,

their analysis of

Insofar as this demonstration itself purports
to be a

critique, in its revelation of rationality's dark
side as complicitous with

myth and magic, questions remain. The
alternative driving this critique
critique relies

instrumental reason

in its

On what grounds

either

the

first

unclear.

on two assumptions,

myth-driven enlightenment

We

is

is

have seen

in

is

legitimacy, as well as the utopian

for

The normative force

which no argument

given — that

is

bad; and, conversely, that narrowly

opposition to myth and magic

condemnation

likewise bad.

is

justified or justifiable?

the analysis of Odysseus the demonstration of

"thesis" of the text, that

"myth

is

already enlightenment." The

other side, so to speak, of the dialectic of enlightenment
of

of the

Adorno and Horkheimer's second

is

the argument

thesis that "enlightenment reverts to

mythology ." 36 This second thesis can be seen as

a

demonstration of the

revenge that subdued nature has taken upon humanity. Enlightened
subjectivity, as

we

from nature, begun

have seen, constitutes
in

terror as a

inevitable

consequence

demonstrated

36

in

was
is

separation

response to the fear of the vast powers

of "circumambient" nature. Yet, as

although this separation

itself via a radical

Adorno and Horkheimer demonstrate,

originally a defensive

response to

a reversion to terror. This thesis

terror, its

is

the second "excursus" of the text, which examines the

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

34

,

page

xvi.

way

in

which bourgeois Kantian reason and morality

instantiation

This

reason, pinpointing the

rigidification of

moment

of this

by reason. Since reason's function

is

amounts

effect of levelling

individual

all

and organize the

connection and unity of

mature autonomy prescribed by Kant has the

differences

in

the particular objects of knowledge as

the "highest" manifestation of consciousness attainable by the

knowing

subject.

To

experience to order culminates

mathematical law. But
significance.

this

its

in

is

socio-historical

the knowing subject loses

immediacy

bring the diversity of perceptual

the purely formalistic knowledge of

type of knowledge

Knowledge which

the context of

all

empty

is

of content and

stripped of the meaning

it

has within

development reduces to tautology, and
capacity

critical

in

the face of the

of the given. Thus, not only the object, but the subject of

knowledge becomes empty, as

What appears
subjection of

well.

to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the
all

reality to logical

formalism,

obedient subjection of reason to what

37

Kant. Kant's

in

to the individual's rule

to systematize

activities of the understanding, to provide for the

principles and facts, the

37
.

reason into instrumental

accomplishment

definition of 'enlightenment' as maturity

in

paradigm

the coldly calculative protagonists of Sade’s
writings

in

excursus" traces the

well as

find their

Slavoj Zizek

makes

a similar point

is

is

paid for by the

directly given.

when he argues

.

.

.

The

that the film character

of Hannibal Lecter is the paradigm instantiation of Kantian morality. See Slavoj
Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989).
.
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task of cognition does not consist

in

mere apprehension,

and calculation, but

in

the determinate negation of

classification,

each im-mediacy. Mathematical formalism, however, whose

medium

is

number, the most abstract form

of the immediate,

instead holds thinking firmly to mere immediacy. 38

Furthermore, since empirical facts belong to the realm of practice

they derive from experience with physical

reality

(for

and can only be tested

by experimental means), Kant's characterization of legitimate knowledge
as phenomenal or scientific further supports the Baconian equation of

knowledge and power. Kant thus provides transcendental ground

for

reason's instrumental nature, according to Adorno and Horkheimer.
Enlightened maturity becomes, on this view, success at survival, and the

promise of autonomous freedom held out by reason

merely an abstract

is

generalization from the hierarchical domination of social reality. Thus, the

unifying purpose of reason can only endorse and derive from the social

status quo.

Even

if

the secret utopia

fortuitous distinctions
interest,

in

the concept of reason pointed, despite

between

reason— functioning,

systematic science — serves to
interest.

It

individuals, to their

in

compliance with ends, as

level

come

that

same

No one

is

mere

identical

other than

to be: a useful, successful, or frustrated

vocational and national groups. He

38

down

a

allows no determination other than the classifications

of the societal process to operate.

has

common

Adorno and Horkheimer,

is

member

one among many

Dialectic of Enlightenment

36

what he

,

page 27.

of

representatives of his geographical, psychological and
sociological
type. 39

Kant

s

transcendental proof provided a linkage between reason and

purpose

in

such a

way

that Sade's characters can be

shown by Adorno

and Horkheimer to portray the epitome of the Kantian enlightened
individual.

What Kant grounded

transcendentally, the affinity of knowledge

and planning, which impressed the stamp of inescapable

expediency on every aspect
wholly rationalized, even

more than

empirically

Moreover,

a

in

of a bourgeois existence that

every breathing-space, Sade realized

century before sport

this instrumentality

Kantian rationality gives

was

rise to a

is

was conceived. 40

carried over into morals, for

purely formal morality which has lost

the capacity to ground concretely normative judgements. Sade's Juliette

engages

in

acts of cruelty, sexual excess, and criminality,

all

the while

maintaining her enlightened maturity and never flinching before the
possibility of her

maxim becoming

enlightened reason points up

universal law. This moral poverty of

its failure

the promise of which had motivated
sacrifices

— e.g.

its

to provide the utopian freedom,

development and offset the

the self-denial, the distancing from the natural, the

sensual, the base. Even Juliette, to

whom

all

things are permitted, does

"Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page 84.

40

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page 88.

Adorno and Horkheimer,
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not experience the sensual pleasure of her
indulgences, but attains only

the formal intellectual satisfaction of the bourgeois.
.

.

Juliette

.

embodies

(in

psychological terms) neither

unsublimated nor regressive

libido,

but intellectual pleasure

in

regression — amor intellectualis diaboli, the pleasure of attacking
civilization

with

its

consequence. She

own weapons. She
is

a proficient

favors system and

manipulator of the organ of

rational thought. In regard to self-control, her directions are at

times related to Kant's as the special application
proposition.

is

to

its

basic

41
.

.

The increasing instrumentalization

of reason

becomes incapable

of

purging, harnessing, or even of negatively evaluating the barbaric

impulses which remain embedded
reason

is

in

a radically other nature

from which

profoundly alienated. Furthermore, reason's very alienation from

nature increases the tendencies of the bourgeois subject toward
barbarism. This

is

due to the huge psychological cost

distancing from nature. Reason must differentiate

of this self-

itself

from the

natural,

the bodily, and the irrational. But nature, as the necessary substratum of

reason's very existence cannot be annihilated, but only oppressed and
denied.

Its

power

phenomenon

unknown

is

thus increased,

a classic instance of the Freudian

of the "return of the repressed," as reason fears

source. The fear

is

past from which reason has

41

in

Adorno and Horkheimer,

it

as

its

that of backsliding into a dark and shameful

managed

to

escape only barely, and with

Dialectic of Enlightenment

38

,

page 95.

great struggle. Thus, any reminders of reason's proximity
to nature evoke

and hatred, which quite often can and

terror, anger,

will

explode into

atrocities.

Wholly to expunge the odious overpowering longing to return to
state of nature

the cruelty produced by an abortive civilization:

is

barbarism, the other face of culture.

allows of no exception. The

".

.

Them

.

destruction

will to

all!"

is

Annihilation

totalitarian.

so far," says Juliette to the Pope, "as to wish Tiberius that

mankind had but
severing

it

at

a

a single head, that

one blow!" The signs

uncoordinated movements, animal

The

I

"I

go

all

might have the pleasure of

of powerlessness,
fear, confusion,

sudden

awaken the

justification of hatred for

woman

that

represents her as intellectually and physically

inferior,

and bearing

thirst for blood.

the brand of domination on her forehead,
for

Jews.

Women

is

equally that of hatred

and Jews can be seen not to have ruled

thousands of years. They

live,

for

although they could be

exterminated; and their fear and weakness, the greater affinity to
nature which perennial oppression produces

element which gives them

pay

life.

them,

when they

nature

They

their fear.

identify

is

who must

from nature, and

themselves with

42

the cause of this dialectical reversal, whereby dominated

nature once again overpowers reason?
of rationality to instrumentality, or

consequence

the very

hear their victims utter over and over again the

cry that they dare not themselves emit.

What

is

This enrages the strong,

for their strength with an intense alienation

must always suppress

42

in

of the

is

Is

it

to the

modern narrowing

this result an inevitable

development of reason

Adorno and Horkheimer,

due

in

general? According to

Dialectic of Enlightenment

39

,

page

1

12.

Seyla Benhabib, there

two excursuses. On

is

a tension

between the views expressed

this view, the first

western reason

second excursus places the blame

for the terrible

radical instrumentalizing of reason

accomplished

in

general; while the

consequences on the
in

modernity

43

in

have

its

the earliest emergence of reason out of myth. This

emergence was based on
witnessed

We

.

already seen that for Adorno and Horkheimer the dialectic had
in

the

excursus considers the dialectic

of enlightenment to be a result of

beginnings

in

subjectivity's self-separation from nature as

Odysseus' adventures. But

if

the separation from nature

is

already sufficient to launch the dialectic, can there possibly exist a form
of rationality and subjectivity

and barbarism? Odysseus'
instrumental.

which can elude the regression

rationality

Can there ever be

was

already purposive and

a rationality

which

Adorno and Horkheimer use immanent

criteria

draw from

its

itself.

standards. Adorno's reflections upon this topic

44

way

Immanent

of letting

critique

its

object the standards

between

set for itself and the distance that exists

43

noninstrumental?

from the outside with which to evaluate

object, but rather attempts to

clarify

is

critique as a

the contradictory nature of the object express

does not import

myth

into

in

itself

it

has

and those

Negative Dialectics 44

the nature of immanent critique. There Adorno points out the

Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia

Theodor W. Adorno Negative
York: Continuum, 1 987).

Dialectics

40

,

.

translated by E.B. Ashton

(New

difference

between

own methodology and

his

that of previous

philosophic systems. Adorno rejects thinking which
attempts to bring the

concrete and particular into the order of a system which
operates
according to general principles. This type of thinking, which
Adorno
identity thinking,"

reality

smooths over the differences and tensions inherent

by subsuming

all

particular objects under universal laws.

way, contradictions are apparently resolved
at a higher level)

calls

and

their critical force

is

(or,

as

thereby

in

In this

Hegel, synthesized

in

nullified.

The

result

is

an illusory vision of a unified whole; the reconciliation of contradictory
particulars provided

is

a false

consciousness. Adorno and Horkheimer,

in

refusing to bring the particulars under the rule of a unifying theory that

points unambiguously to

its

culmination

in

a single telos (as do, for

example, the Marxist or Hegelian versions of

history), allow the

contradictions to speak for themselves. Their negative power
rather than suppressed. Thus, Benhabib

is

a tension

reality of a

is

between the two excursuses,
reason which

is

correct

in

for there

is

accented

her insight that there

is

a tension in the

both instrumental and simultaneously non-

dominating, both myth-driven and opposed to myth. Furthermore, the
contradictory nature of reality pervades the particulars

down," so

"all

the

to speak, to their smallest "atomic" level, for, as

way

we

have

seen, early instances of myth and magic are already purposive (as

41

is

so that the contradictory poles of myth and reason can
never

nature),

be entirely separated, even analytically. And as
discussed,

critical

reason, even as

it

we have

already

attempts to be non-oppressive,

contains elements of instrumentality, for

it

too

is

motivated and

sustained by purpose.

The

critique presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment

accomplished by means of
contradictions.
other. This

a pointing

up and sharpening of

Adorno and Horkheimer

method can be seen

is

pit

the particulars against each

to be critical praxis insofar as the

acceleration of the enlightened awareness of contradiction propels the
dialectic forward.

possession of

Thus they write

itself

that "Enlightenment which

is in

and coming to power can break the bounds

of

enlightenment ." 46 This assistance given to the dialectic presupposes that
the dialectic contains within

itself

overcoming. Thus the job of the
without forcing a resolution

47
.

the possibility of

critic is to reveal

The

its

own

self-

the contradictions

text therefore rejects totalization,

45

There is obviously plenty of instrumental rationality in nature, as any
viewer of television nature shows knows. Turtles bury their eggs; animals hide
their nests; brightly colored animals mimic their surroundings to avoid becoming
prey; traps are

laid, etc.

It

is

therefore just as impossible to expunge nature of

instrumentality as vice versa.
46

47

Adorno and Horkheimer,
This

method

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page 208.

of pitting the particulars against each other can be seen

Adorno' analyses of "emphatic" art works. See Aesthetic
Theory translated by C. Lenhardt, edited by Gretel Adorno, and Rolf Tiedmann
(London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
especially clearly in
,

42

even formally,

for

it

comprises a series of essays rather than an

architectonic system with a single logical structure.
is

given; the text ends with fragments

aware that the repressive aspects

48
.

No grand summation

Adorno and Horkheimer

are fully

of reason are also necessarily

contained within enlightened reason. For they believe that
"The only kind
of thinking sufficiently hard to shatter

destructive.

49

myths

is

ultimately self-

But the self-destruction of enlightened reasoning contains

the possibility of a future transcendence to non-oppressive, liberatory
rationality

50
If

.

reconciliation

aspects

is

instrumental reason "shatters myth," perhaps a "mimetic

which extends and develops reason's non-oppressive

possible, after

all.

Although

this possibility

cannot be

theoretically justified or guaranteed within the terms of

Horkheimer's work,

We

it

is

the only hope with which they are

critical

reason

that no transcendent normativity outside of the status

justified.

left.

have thus seen how, according to Adorno and Horkheimer,

purely theoretical grounding for the possibility of

in

Adorno and

Any employment

of reason

is

48

is

a

elusive,

quo can be

marred by the dark side of the

The first fragment is significantly titled, "Why it
the answers" Dialectic of Enlightenment page 209.

is

better not to

know

all

,

49

Adorno and Horkheimer,

Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

page

4.

50

Thus, Martin Jay points out that the Dialectic of Enlightenment represents
a dialectic of hope and despair. See Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), page 242.
,
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dialectic, so that to isolate the

reason appears impossible.

We

nondominating, non-oppressive aspect of

have also seen

that, for

Adorno and

Horkheimer, Kant's critiques can be seen as marking the triumph of
reason’s instrumentality.
critical

If

this

is

so,

perhaps the liberating aspect of

reason (Vernunft) can be more readily apparent within the concept

of reason

upon which, and with which, Kant enacts

his procedure.

I

would therefore propose that before following Adorno and Horkheimer

all

the way, and giving up on the possibility of a purely theoretical solution
to the problem of critique, and correlatively but

more importantly, the

actuality of a resistant critical reason that can fully transcend and

domination,

reason and

we
its

oppose

explore Kant's procedure of the critique of reason by

resulting product

in

a theory of reason's limitations

capacities. This exploration will be taken up

44

in

the next chapter.

and

CHAPTER 2
THE DILEMMA OF THE KANTIAN CRITICAL SUBJECT
AND THE
HEGELIAN ALTERNATIVE OF IMMANENT CRITIQUE

We
immanent

have seen that
critique

was

philosophical totalizing
critique

their

critic,

were considered

however, as

we

for

means

of attempting to elude the bind of the

from the object of critique

have seen, resulted
(critical

knowledge found by that

was concerned

of

since the standards and criteria for the

to derive

the instrument of critique

critique

Adorno and Horkheimer the strategy

in

reason), as well as the post-critical

elements of barbarism which the

to eliminate or transcend. Thus,

Adorno and

a reconciliation with the partly mythical

and nonrational aspects of nature as
aspects of reason. Their critique

This,

an inability to purge completely

critique, of the

Horkheimer ultimately appeal to

itself.

is

a solution to the unenlightened

ultimately grounded

in

a faith in the

(possible) progress of the dialectic they identify as governing reason's

evolution through the opposing tendencies of enlightenment and myth,

and

their

own

attempt to nudge that dialectic along by pointing out and

sharpening those tensions. But perhaps this strategy
reluctance to step outside the dialectic

it

is

too timid

in its

studies, even for a critical

moment.
As we have seen
critical

dilemma

is

in

to focus

Chapter One, one

on the

critical

45

way

to understand the

perspective, the subjective

position from which a totalizing critique

problematic. Viewed as such, the

respect to the status of her

own

is

conducted, as paradoxical and

finds herself

critic

critical

a bind with

pronouncements,

exempt these pronouncements from the

neither

in

for

she can

rigors of critique, nor

trust the legitimacy of these claims insofar as they,
too, are under

suspicion and should therefore be held
a

more

in critical

suspension. But perhaps

detailed focus on the critical perspective and the subject's

capacity to conduct critique

will yield a

way

out of the dilemma.

respect, Kant's critique of the instrument of knowledge
relevant. Kant closely and critically

and

in

so doing

subject of

was compelled

critical

knowledge.

becomes

examined the subject who knows,

to consider explicitly his

In

In this

what way

own

activity as

did he see himself as attaining

the necessary transcendence out of the object of critique

in

order to be

that object's judge?

The
reflexivity

ability of

— is

consciousness to grasp

itself

— consciousness'

seen as essential to the production of knowledge

Kant and Hegel.

It

is

this reflexivity

consciousness to engage

for both

which, for both philosophers, allows

in critique.

This reflexivity of consciousness can

also be seen as underlying the problematic and paradoxical structure of

philosophical critique as

it

necessarily

assumes perspectives which

both immanent within and transcendent to
chapter

will

be to

show

the

way

in

its

object.

My

aim

are

in this

which both Kant and Hegel make use

46

of the

ambiguous structure

elaborated
failures in

I

consciousness which

which each

epistemology becomes caught.

critical

therefore argue that the "empirical realism" which Kant

claims to justify depends upon a view and strategy of

consciousness which constitutes
strictures

a

critical

pragmatic contradiction of the very

on legitimate knowledge that

his epistemological theory

establishes and his empirical realism requires.

Kant

I've

Chapter One, and to identify the particular tangles and

in

will

of critical

What

I

mean by

this

is

that

illegitimately, in his theoretical-critical practice, steps outside of the

bounds
theory

of

knowledge which

itself

makes

his critical theory

this explicit, for the

sets up will be, even

in

draws. Furthermore

bounds

of

his

knowledge which Kant

empirical consciousness, transgressed. Kant's

realism holds only for a particular and proscribed perspective of cognitive

consciousness, yet this proscribed perspective presupposes
transgression of

its

own

boundaries — a transgression for which

ultimately unable to account, and which

will

it

explicitly repudiates.

is

it

Thus,

I

argue that Kant's attempt to examine "the instrument" of cognition

prior to putting

a

a

way which

it

to use itself surreptitiously uses that very instrument

his theory explicitly claims to

see, Hegel's criticism of Kant

is

be illegitimate. As

we

in

will

also along these lines. But Hegel believes

that he can avoid the mistakes he identifies

phenomenological approach which

relies

47

in

Kant by means of a

on the immanent

critique

intrinsic to the

will

process of coming to know.

interpretation of Hegel

argue, however, that his epistemological progress over
Kant

proclaimed success

grounding

in

knowledge)

is

view

knowledge which

or the

profess.

the

My

I

illusory,

and that he too

therefore intend to

critical

dilemma which
In this

I

chapter

amount and type

a greater

show

immanent

focus

in

dissertation

is

for a theoretical

with what the

concern

is

activity.

Although

it

may

critic

is

fail

because

know

to elude

be primarily on the

will

my

the epistemological

in

prime concern

grounding of the possibility of

can

him to

critique leads

Chapter One.

manifestations of the paradoxical nature of critique
writings of Kant and Hegel. This

of

that both Kant and Hegel

have elaborated

my

his

to ground either the point of

fails

his faith in

(i.e.,

we

can achieve

the

critique;

my

own

with respect to her

be that the best

in

will

be a

theoretical statement of the necessity and logical priority of a practicalethical foundation for the critical capacity,

the standard of truth and knowledge that

it

I

is

to theoretical reason as

intend to look

first.

Thus my

inquiry into the legitimacy of the critical capacity should begin with the

similar

attempts of others to uncover that which

know. However, as
forgotten that there

which

will

identify a

I

have argued

is

always

necessarily assert

way

in

critical

Chapter One,

in

a practical-ethical

itself in

what

48

should not be

component

follows.

which Kant’s epistemology

it

reason can

I

will

falters in

to critique,

therefore

what can be seen

to be an ethical mis-step. Hegel, on the
other hand,
ethical

does not keep the

and epistemological as separate as does Kant, so
that Hegel sees

cognitive perspectives to be simultaneously ethical-practical
attitudes.

Thus

to discuss Hegel’s epistemology

to be already within the circle of

system. Since according to Hegel, the "path to science"

his totalistic

already "science
critical

is

reason

in

itself," his

is

understanding of and methodological use of

one area of

his

system should be

in

accord with the

whole.

Authorization and Limitation
Kant's task

between the

in

in

the Critique of Pure Reason

the Critique of Pure Reason 51

precritical positions of

particular, the theories of Leibniz

was

to navigate

both rationalist dogmatism

and Wolff), and empiricist skepticism

(Hume). The problem with rationalism, as relevant to the
is its

assumption of

a

critical

too transcendent point of view which led

claim the ability of reason to

(in

know

dilemma,
it

to

things-in-themselves (including such

things as God, the soul, and the totality of existence). Empiricism, on the

other hand, denies the ability of reason to go beyond

phenomena

at

all,

so that the

first

principles of

(or

transcend) the

even empirical

knowledge, insofar as they attribute necessity and universality

to

lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp
Smith (Toronto: Macmillan, 1929; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).
51

,

49

phenomena
Empiricism

(e.g., all

is

events have a cause), are considered

therefore completely mired

phenomenal realm

illegitimate.

immanence

in its

of sensation. Kant's critique

is

within the

therefore double-edged:

against the inflated claims of rationalism, he must limit
reason to
realm; at the

same

time, against empiricism, he

its

own

must establish and

authorize reason's appropriate power as a "lawgiver to nature."
Critique

must both proscribe and

prescribe; remain within

immanence) and establish propriety over

its

bounds (maintain

its

realm (attain transcendence

as sovereign authority and normativity).

Kant's answer to
scientific

Hume's

skeptical denial of the possibility of

knowledge took the form

that pure concepts or "categories"
intuitions in order for us to

of a demonstration or "deduction"

must be applicable

have conscious awareness

Kant, the faculty of knowledge

is

the understanding,

bring unity to the manifold of sense.

sensibility

does not receive a unity

or

to our sensible

at

all.

whose

According to
function

What Hume had argued was
necessary connection of

intuitions (or "impressions"), but rather

apprehends

a manifold.

is

to

that

its

Thus

it

is

the mind's job to connect together our sensible intuitions according to

concepts.

Hume

concluded from

this that the

combinations of

impressions supplied by the mind were merely subjectively valid — a
of mental habit or

result

custom — and therefore couldn't guarantee the

necessity or universality which

we

attribute to them. But for Kant, our

50

mental structuring concepts are rules which
govern the mind's
bringing the intuitions apprehended by
sense together

in

such

activity of

a

way

that

these intuitions refer to an empirical object
This mental activity of
unification,

which Kant

calls "synthesis,"

is

thus responsible for the

objective validity of empirical knowledge, for

according to Kant,

when we have

according to the rule which
Understanding

is,

is its

we know

synthesized

representations

concept.

to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge.

This knowledge consists

in

the determinate relation of given

representations to an object; and an object
of

its

an object,

which the manifold

of a given intuition

unification of representations

demands

the synthesis of them. Consequently

it

is

is

that

the concept

in

united.

Now

all

unity of consciousness
is

consciousness that alone constitutes the

in

the unity of
relation of

representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity

and the fact that they are modes

of

knowledge; and upon

it

rests

the very possibility of the understanding. 52

Kant's deduction argument, simply put,

is

that

if

we

are to be

conscious of mental representations as representations of our
consciousness, then

we must

own

apply the categories of the understanding,

by means of an act of synthesis, to the

flux of intuitions

which constitute

the manifold of sense. The rock-bottom premise of this argument

undeniable (even to Hume) fact that consciousness

is

Kant, Critique

,

page B137.

51

the

a unity. But

consciousness, as awareness of mental representations,

52

is

is

awareness

of

a

manifold of intuitions from sense

(e.g., hot,

humid, heavy, soft buzzing,

light blue, etc.).

My

to an

these representations are to be recognized
as contents

of

"I

my

think"

if

awareness must therefore

each representation

relate

consciousness. Thus the unity of consciousness
presupposes an

act of synthesis which grants unity to
the manifold.

proposition that consciousness

is

a unity

is

analyzed by Kant

transcendental deduction (CPR

A

analytic

presupposes the synthetic act

of bringing intuitions together in relation
to the

fundamental synthesis

The

in

"I

the

think." This

first

edition

95-130), which constitutes the

subjective side of Kant's deduction argument. The three
mental

syntheses identified therein 53 along with the transcendental unity

of

apperception as their ground and source are the "subjective grounds" of
the necessary connection of appearances.

must

On

the objective side, there

also be an "affinity" of the manifold of sense, to allow that

it

capable of being combined by the threefold synthesis. Kant argues

B edition deduction

(also

known

as the "objective deduction,"

129-169) that the syntheses are performed
rule

which grants necessity

to the

manner

in

CPR

be
in

the

B

every case according to a

of combination of the

intuitions. This necessity of following a rule

comes about by means

of

the intentional or referential function of the mental syntheses which refer

53

Namely, the "synthesis of apprehension

in intuition," the "synthesis of
imagination" (which "runs through and holds together" the
contents of the manifold), and the "synthesis of recognition in a concept."

reproduction

in

52

my

representations back to their object which

source of their objective

The

validity.

rules,

is

presupposed to be the

which are the concepts

or

categories of the understanding thus confer
objective validity on the

knowledge

of objects of empirical intuition.

Thus Kant claims
empirical sciences,

to be able to salvage objective validity
for the

whose

legitimacy had been destroyed within

Hume's

skeptical analysis. Positively, Kant's critique
establishes the

understanding's jurisdiction over

Humean

empiricism

drawing

critique as

is

its

not without

The negative function

employment can only be

of

something be given up. Since the

for the synthesis

understanding on a manifold which

phenomena.

price.

its

limits requires that

concepts or categories are rules

legitimate

proper realm. But Kant's victory over

performed by the

receives from sensibility, their

it

to gain

knowledge

of empirical

Intuition brings a manifold of sensibility to the

understanding, which proceeds to synthesize this manifold according to
its

concepts. Thus the concepts

They

[i.e.,

whereby

elsewhere
therefore,

refer only to sensible objects.

the categories] are merely rules for an understanding

whose whole power
act

may

it

consists

in

thought, consists, that

brings the synthesis of a manifold, given to

in intuition,

which by

to the unity of apperception

itself

54

which must be given

Kant, Critique

,

—a

knows nothing whatsoever,

combines and arranges the material
intuition,

is,

to

it

page B145.

53

of

it

the

from

faculty,

but merely

knowledge, that

by the object. 54

in

is,

the

Furthermore, since objectivity
synthesis,

we

is itself

a

product of an activity of mental

cannot claim that empirical objects are
in-themse/ves as

they appear to us.

What has been

possibility of gaining

knowledge

sacrificed by Kant's critique

of things-in-themselves. Kant

committed to the position that the categories

the

is

thus

is

of the understanding

cannot legitimately be applied beyond the realm of
sense. Nor can
"ideas" of reason,
result of

whose

function

is

to synthesize and organize the

understanding s conceptualized knowledge according to

of combination, apply to objects not previously given

its

rules

and

in sensibility

synthesized according to the understanding's concepts. The idea of

noumena,

or non-sensible objects

known by an

intellectual intuition, thus

functions as a limiting concept which sets the upper boundary on our
possible knowledge.

The

Reflexivity of

Consciousness

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

in

As we have seen, knowledge,

for Kant, involves the

relating of its representations to an apperception of

Consciousness must be able to recognize

hence
All

it

must be

able to relate each of

its

its

its

own

mind's active
unity.

mental contents as

representations to an

knowledge, according to Kant, involves the

its

'I

own,

think'.

logical possibility of self-

conscious awareness of that knowledge as a content of consciousness.
Cognitive consciousness

is,

for Kant, inherently self-relational; the

54

mind

must be

able to refer to

own

its

mental contents

able to grasp those mental contents as states of

such a way as

in

its

own

The deduction arguments have shown that knowledge
grounded

"transcendental apperception," which

in

mind to think
reflexivity of

itself

is

to be

consciousness.
ultimately

the ability of the

is

as a unitary consciousness, or to self-reflect. This

consciousness

is

important for Kant

in

terms of both the

content and method of his epistemology. As regards content, not only

does the doctrine

56
,

"

55

require that consciousness has the

more importantly, the theory

ability to intuit itself, but,

mental synthesis

sense

of "inner

which

is

of threefold

crucial to Kant's transcendental deductions,

consists entirely of an account of continual cognitive self-relating. This

account narrates the act of cognition, describing the mind's work upon
its

disparate contents, as

it

them together, and

brings

through a "higher" procedure yields
recognition

in

a concept,

consciousness

is

a

new

each turn

synthetic unity, culminating

in

and empirical knowledge. Cognitive

thus seen to operate

are epistemic activities

at

at different levels for Kant; there

which Kant shows to take place necessarily

"beneath" empirical consciousness, as the necessary conditions of
cognitive experience.

It is

consciousness' reflexivity which

links

these

different levels or perspectives of mental functioning together and

55

56

See

e.g., Kant, Critique

Kant, Critique

,

pages

,

pages

A 33-B49-50,

A 97-104.
55

B 153-7.

which

allows consciousness to

move through

the various levels of acquaintance

with empirical objects from the most immediate intuition of sensory

phenomena

most sophisticated

to the

syllogistic reasoning

about them.

Methodologically, Kant's reliance on the reflexivity of

consciousness

is

also crucial to his epistemological enterprise. Kant's

theory

comes

this to

be possible, the epistemological mind must be able to

its

own

to understand intuitions to be "appearances."

nature as contributing to

therefore identifies and

its

makes use

cognitive consciousness; one,

In

order for

upon

reflect

apprehension of intuitions. Kant

of

two

different perspectives of

more immediate, the

more

other,

reflexive;

both of which contribute to his epistemological understanding of
empirical cognition

57
.

account Kant gives
of the

forms of

When
of the
in

I

in

These two perspectives can be seen

in

the

the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the functioning

sensibility.

say that the intuition of outer objects and the

mind

alike represent the objects

time, as they affect our senses, that

mean

work

at

to say that these objects are a

and the mind,
is,

mere

self-intuition
in

space and

as they appear,
illusion.

For

appearance the objects, nay even the properties that

in

we

I

do not

an
ascribe

to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since,

however,

in

the relation of the given object to the subject, such

properties depend upon the

mode

of intuition of the subject, this

later, these two perspectives can be seen to
will
of cognitive consciousness which
perspectives
correspond to the two
we"
"phenomenological
the
identify in Hegel's epistemological method, namely,
and the consciousness which is its object of study.
57

As

will

be discussed

I

56

object as appearance
itself.

to be distinguished from itself as object in

is

58

In this

textual passage Kant identifies

cognitive consciousness. From within the

distinguishes illusion and object, for
properties as "actually given."

It

is

it

two

levels or perspectives of

first level,

consciousness

regards the empirical object and

this distinction

its

between object as

given and subjective representation, or between reality and appearance,

which the mind draws as

it

apprehends

intuitions,

which defines the

realm of experience for this ordinary level of consciousness. This
to distinguish allows this ordinary empirical perspective to

standard of objectivity, and so to attain what

knowledge. However, there
consciousness operative
or critical consciousness.

objects

in

is

this

To

to be conscious of their

is

subject. Thus, empirical consciousness,

to a

its

more

mode

is

the epistemological

upon the "givenness"

mode

of relating to the

when

reflexive epistemological point of

of a

level or perspective of

passage, and this

reflect

make use

regards as objective

it

another "higher"

ability

it

of empirical

knowing

self-reflects, gives

view from which

it

way

considers

of apprehension of intuitions. Epistemological consciousness

is

then forced to consider these intuitions to be appearances, rather than
things

in

themselves, for they are

the subject's

58

mode

Kant, Critique

,

now

understood to be dependent upon

of sensible intuition. This higher order,

page B69.
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epistemological and

critical

consciousness

is

less limited than the first-

order empirical consciousness with which Kant's reflections
began, for
this critical perspective

sees the

reality of empirical

consciousness to be

a reality only in relation to the perspective of empirical
consciousness.

This higher order perspective

transgresses the limits of
perspective which

is

its

is

attained only as consciousness

previous perspective and reflects upon this

then the object of the

new

attention. Thus, the self-conscious reflection

perspective's conscious

upon

its

passive

mode

intuition brings

consciousness to a different order of awareness, one

which sees the

reality of its prior state as limited.

therefore enlarges

appearance and
in-itself.

Thus

its

The new perspective

bounds by drawing another

reality, that

distinction

between

between the empirical object and the object

for Kant, cognitive

consciousness operates as a

continuum, whose different levels or positions on the scale of
different perspectives from

afford

it

differ.

What

is

grasped as

reality at

which
one

its

reflexivity

intentional objects likewise

level of

consciousness

59
be appearance from the more transcendent perspective which

apprehend the lower order awareness along with what
for that

is

of

is

is

is

seen to
able to

objective reality

lower order. To the perspective of empirical consciousness which

immanent

to empirical reality,

phenomena

are real, independently

lt is important to differentiate the terms 'transcendent' and
'transcendental'. Kant uses the term 'transcendental to refer to the conditions
for the possibility of experience; while 'transcendent' simply means 'beyond' or

59

'

'outside of'.

58

existing objects. But as cognitive
consciousness attains transcendence

from that more immanent perspective by
assuming
epistemological pose, empirical objects are

a self-reflexive

now understood

to be

appearances. Kant

s doctrine of

external objects

space and time are appearances dependent upon
our

mode

in

of sensibility,

is

the "Transcendental Aesthetic," that

therefore an epistemological truth

known

only to a

higher order of cognition than the everyday empirical
consciousness

which

is

immanent

to empirical reality as

time. Kant's critical epistemological

same

logic of critique

which

I

circumscribed by space and

is

it

method

is

have elaborated

therefore structured by the
in

the previous chapter.

Both the immanent pose of empirical consciousness and the transcendent
perspective of the self-reflexive epistemological consciousness are

necessary to Kant's enactment of

critique.

One

of the

ways

Kant experiences, interprets, and attempts to avoid the

can be seen as he assumes

two versions

in

turn each of these

in

critic's

which

dilemma

two perspectives

in

the

of his "refutations of idealism."

Immanence and Transcendence

in

the Refutations of Idealism

Kant's "transcendental idealism"

(i.e.,

the theory that empirical

objects, space and time as their forms of intuition, and the categories of

the understanding as their structuring concepts are not things

in

themselves, but rather appearances resulting from the spontaneous

59

activity of the transcendental mind), as

we have

seen,

preserve the objective validity of empirical knowledge.
Pure Reason, Kant attempts

two

was

intended to

the Critique of

In

different "refutations" of the charge

that his theory constitutes an idealism of the sort that would render

empirical

knowledge merely subjectively

idealism given

in

valid.

60

the fourth "paralogism" of the

Kant explicitly distinguishes
calls "empirical idealism"

In

the refutation of

first

edition Critique

his "transcendental idealism"

on precisely

.

from what he

this score. "Empirical idealism"

is,

according to Kant, the view that external objects cannot be known with
certainty, since they are not perceived immediately, but

must be

inferred

to exist as the causes of our immediately perceived mental

representations. Empirical idealism's error, as Kant explains

it,

lies in its

presupposition of a "transcendental realism," which regards space and

time as existing
objects,

in

themselves, as conditions for the existence of external

which also

sensibility.

61

Thus,

exist

in

in

themselves and independently of our

our terms, Kant's criticism amounts to charging the

empirical idealists with an illegitimately transcendent perspective which

would allow them

to

know space and

time

"in

themselves."

60

Kant's main target here is Berkeley, and to a lesser extent, Descartes.
Although Descartes was not technically a metaphysical idealist, his
epistemological rationalism entailed the position that ideas are known more
directly than physical objects. Additional confusion on this issue is due to the
fact that Kant's position attempts to be idealist in epistemological terms (and
indeed only transcendentally, but not empirically); while metaphysically, Kant
necessarily committed to an agnosticism.
61

Kant, Critique

,

page A 369.

60

is

Kant sees
an empirical
objects. This

his "transcendental idealism,"

for

with respect to the existence of external

realist position

is

however, as allowing

because Kant's

position, in regarding

be merely the forms of our sensible

intuition,

space and time to

does not regard sensible

objects to be things-in-themselves. External objects are, on this view,

merely appearances, and thus nothing more than our mental
representations. Thus our minds are just as capable of having direct

access to external objects as to any of our representations of our

The appearances

inner mental states.

of inner

own

and outer sense are on an

equal epistemic footing according to Kant, since both species of

appearance are immediately perceived. There
infer the existence of external objects as the

representations, as

is

done according

is,

therefore, no need to

causes of our mental

to the empirical idealists.

appearances, empirical objects are known directly as
synthesized by the mind.

In

concepts are

their

the act of mental synthesis, governed by the

categories of the understanding, the mind directly apprehends
for this object

which

is

is

As

none other than that which corresponds

the form or rule for the act of mental synthesis.

its

object,

to the concept,
62

Thus, for Kant

the empirical distinction between objectively valid judgment and merely
subjective illusion

62

is

preserved.

According to Kant,

".

.

manifold of a given intuition

.

is

an object
united.

is

that

in

Critique,

61

the concept of which the

page B137.

From perceptions knowledge

can be generated, either

of objects

by mere play of imagination or by

way

process there may, no doubt, arise

of experience;

and

in

the

illusory representations to

which the objects do not correspond, the deception being
attributable

sometimes to

and sometimes to an
deception).

a delusion of imagination (in

error of

judgment

To avoid such deceptive

according to the

rule:

Whatever

according to empirical laws,

is

is

(in

dreams)

so-called sense-

illusion,

we have

to proceed

connected with a perception

actual.

63

Empirical error and subjective illusion are thus distinguished from
empirical

knowledge on the basis

understanding

64
.

Since experience

of

compliance with

is,

a rule of the

as the "Analytic" has

shown and

discussed above, the result of mental syntheses according to
empirical error

is

easily

accounted

incorrectly applying the rules

(i.e.,

for as a

rules,

matter of not following, or

the concepts and principles of the

understanding). This distinction between empirical knowledge and
subjective illusion could not be maintained by empirical idealism,

according to Kant, because the empirical
realist,

63

64

demands

that

Kant, Critique
ln

,

knowledge be

idealist,

as a transcendental

of things-in-themselves

65
.

page A376.

the above case the rule cited

is

the second postulate of empirical

thought, Critique page B266.
,

argument to show that what he
Putnam,
calls "metaphysical realism" leads inevitably to skepticism. See
1981).
Press,
University
(Cambridge
Reason. Truth and History
65

Hilary

Putnam gives

a strikingly similar

62

as

Transcendental realism

.

.

finds itself obliged to give

.

inevitably falls into difficulties, and

way

to empirical idealism,

in

that

it

regards the objects of outer sense as something
distinct from the

senses themselves, treating mere appearances as
self-subsistent
beings, existing outside us.
clearly

things,

we may
it

is still

On such

view as

a

however

this,

be conscious of our representation of these
far

from certain that,

if

the representation exists,

there exists also the object corresponding to

it.

In

our system, on

the other hand, these external things, namely matter, are
their configurations

that

is,

in all

and alterations nothing but mere appearances,

representations

immediately conscious.

in

us, of the reality of

which

we

are

66

Empirical idealism cannot distinguish experience from illusion according
to Kant for

it

can never be certain that the independent

seeks

it

is

is

as

represented

in

reality

which

it

our mental perceptions. Kant's position, on

the other hand, preserves the empirical distinction between

real

externally existing object and merely subjective appearance precisely

because

it

takes empirical objects to be appearances,

in

the

transcendental sense, rather than things-in-themselves. Thus, according
to Kant's first edition "refutation of idealism," the distinction

empirical reality and subjective illusion
distinction

between appearance and

empirical level of consciousness,

is

is

grounded

in

between

the transcendental

thing-in-itself. Realism, at the

therefore

made

possible by an idealist

perspective at the transcendental level, one which takes the objects of

66

Kant, Critique

,

page A372.

63

its

experience to be relative to
edition refutation,

is

The second

Thus Kant

s

mode

of perceiving them. Kant,

in his first

speaking from this transcendental perspective.

edition refutation, however, takes a different
level of

consciousness as primary.
conscious of

its

my own
premise

It

begins from the premise that

existence as determined

is

"I

am

time" Critique B275).

in

(

of an act of self-reflection, or an experience of an

intuition of the self. Kant's

argument then draws from

this

premise the

conclusion that external objects must exist. Kant argues as follows:

have an awareness of myself as an existence

aware

of

in

time, then

I

must

If

I

also be

something permanent which could serve as substratum against

which change would be perceptible. 67 Whatever
cannot be

in

me,

i.e.,

it

cannot be part of the

this

self

existing in time, for this self-perception can be

permanent

which

made

I

is,

it

perceive as

only on the

condition of this something permanent. This permanent cannot then be a
representation, for to understand
to see

it

merely as

as contingent upon the self which

as a mental state of that
ability to

it

make

same

self, rather

I

a representation

would be

have temporally determined,

than as the condition for the

a determination of that self.

67

According to Paton, this follows from the proof for the "first analogy,"
which argues that all perception of determinations in time requires a
representation of the permanent substratum which underlies change. Since time
itself cannot be perceived (since time is not an object), the permanent in
appearances must be the object itself. H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphvsic of
Experience 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1951), vol.2, pages 278-279.
.

64

This permanent cannot, however, be something
only through this permanent that

my

existence

in
in

me, since

time can

be determined. Thus perception of this permanent

it

is

itself

possible only

is

through a thing outside me; and consequently the determination

my

of

existence

actual things

in

time

which

I

According to Kemp-Smith,

more

offers a

two

is

possible only through the existence of

perceive outside me. 68

this

"realist" position

second edition refutation of idealism
than the

Thus, he concludes that the

first.

refutations are directly contradictory; the

position leading to a

first

Berkelean idealism, and the second, as the more mature,
resulting

an empirical realism

in

69
.

critical position,

But, notice that this necessity of the

existence, rather than merely of the mental representation of external

objects

is

demonstrated from the perspective

The conclusion
myself

in

of this refutation of idealism

time, then

I

of an empirical

that

is

must grant the existence

if

I

am

awareness.

to determine

of empirical objects

outside myself. Both the determination of self and the awareness of
empirical objects existing outside myself occur within the field of

awareness
assuming

of empirical consciousness. Kant begins this refutation by

in

the

first

person

consciousness which places

68

69

Kant, Critique

,

am

("I

conscious

existence

its

in

.

.

.

")

the level of

time, and

is,

therefore,

pages B275-276.

Kemp-Smith, A Commentary

pages 312-313. Strawson similarly is unable
space and time with his claim that
the causes of our mental
to
be
perceived
outer objects are immediately
representations of them. This view will be discussed more fully below.
,

to reconcile Kant's doctrine of the ideality of

65

immanent

in

the present experience. This perspective

is

no longer the

higher order level of transcendental reflection which Kant
adopted
first

edition refutation. Rather,

immediacy, to

intuit

it

of ourselves

the

represents an attempt to grasp

the sensation of a present mental state. The

existence of objects as a necessary presupposition of our

aware

in

is

be

ability to

an empirical and not a transcendental existence.
,

The "actual things" which

are

shown

to exist are not things-in-

themselves, but are empirical objects, which exist as such for empirical
consciousness. Thus, rather than being

in

contradiction, the

refutations differ because they are written from

view.

In

the

first

two

two

different points of

edition refutation, Kant concluded that empirical objects

do not require any

inferential mediation in order to

be perceived, for

their

immediate relatedness to empirical consciousness has been established

on the basis of

their

being understood by transcendental idealism

to

be

appearances. The second edition argument, however, begins from the

premise of Descartes, from within the perspective of ordinary, precritical,

empirical consciousness as

assumption

of the point of

view

it

grasps

itself

70
.

It

is

Kant's

of empirical consciousness

which allows

would appear that am claiming something paradoxical here— that there
an immediate awareness of self, or that the least reflexive conscious posture
already self-reflective. Indeed, this is exactly correct; the immanence and
70

lt

is
is

I

transcendence of consciousness coexist
or as Hegel would put it, consciousness
shall see, this realization

is

all

the

way down

to the lowest level,

already self-consciousness. As
basic to Hegel's attempt to go beyond Kant's
is

philosophy.

66

we

him to conclude that empirical objects necessarily

exist (for

it

is

certainly

not the case that to the transcendental-epistemological
point of view,
empirical objects are "permanent things outside
me," for this point of

view grasps the

ideality of

space and time, and thus of

all

spatio-

temporal appearances, including that of the phenomenal
empirical

self).

Bad Faith as a Strategy of Avoidance 71

Seen

the above way,

in

we

can

now

ask whether Kant's

"refutations of idealism" really refute the position that they profess to.

Each refutation gives
leveled position

72
.

a different

view

of

what

is

essentially the

Because empirical objects are appearances

same

bi-

(an

observation only accessible to the perspective of transcendental
epistemology),
in

we

perceive

them immediately,

as already there, present

the world prior to our conscious attention (an observation from the

perspective of an act of empirical consciousness). Thus Kant's position

71
l

is

borrow the term 'strategy of avoidance' from Dick Howard whose use
be discussed below. See Howard, The Politics of Critique
,

of

it

will

.

72

Although agree with Kemp-Smith that the second edition refutation
demonstrates our acquaintance with empirical objects to be even more
immediate than our intuitions of self, while the first only claims that outer
I

known as those of inner sense, think that this difference
basis of the different perspectives of the two
on
the
is
refutations. From within empirical consciousness, one experiences external
reality as preexisting any conscious thought; however, from a transcendental
point of view, it makes sense to say that all intuitions in space and time are
appearances, without articulating the different ways in which empirical
consciousness may experience an appearance. Thus the two views are
combined coherently in my reading of Kant's position as bi-leveled. See Kempintuitions are as well

accounted

Smith,

I

for

A Commentary

.

67

two-tiered, a

becomes

transcendental idealism" and an "empirical realism." Kant

a realist only insofar as he

is

able to leave behind the

perspective of the epistemologist, and adopt the more immanent pose
of
empirical consciousness. But the idealist position which he claims to
refute

is

an epistemological and metaphysical position. Berkeley never

attempted to deny the claim that empirical objects appeared to ordinary

consciousness as
in

real

and independently existing. There

which Kant's "refutation"

more

is

a

way

to escape

of cognitive consciousness

in

it

thus a sense

of an avoidance or dissolving of the

problem, for Kant does not confront idealism on

demonstrates

is

its

by circumscribing

relation to

own

terms, but

a limited perspective

which empirical objects have the

ontological status of independent reality. But the empirical realism of the

second edition refutation,
be viewed

in

terms of

its

if

it

to supply an

answer

to Berkeley,

must

significance for the higher-order epistemological

perspective. Since the realism

immanent

is

itself

describes the epistemic situation

to the empirical, not to the second-order epistemological

consciousness,

it

fails to

refute the empirical idealist charge. Kant's

position thus takes advantage of the ability of consciousness to take on

points of view which can be increasingly reflexive and more self-aware,

or, like

empirical consciousness,

more immersed

in

immediacy. The

limited experience of empirical consciousness thus supplies, for a higher

order epistemological perspective, the solution for a problem which crops

68

up

for that epistemological understanding. Empirical

itself

consciousness

is

not

skeptical of the external existence of empirical objects. Idealism

rather a higher order position attained by reflection

is

upon the operation

of

empirical consciousness. Kant's epistemological consciousness,
therefore,

must cross

into the empirical

experience, and then recross the
the epistemological,

in

limit

consciousness

in

order to gain

which separates the empirical from

an act of self-reflection,

in

order to gain the

epistemological significance of the experience. But this "double crossing"
into the

immanence

of the empirical perspective and

transcendence of the epistemological represents

back out

into the

a strategy of avoiding

the problem posed by idealism. Kant answers the charge that he

by displacing

idealist

his idealism to a higher plane,

accusation either solely
within

(

in

reference to (the

the B edition) the more immediate

which Kant's idealism

is

visible

is

A

is

an

then answering the

edition refutation) or from

level.

The perspective from

kept out of the discussion; while the

realism which he professes to uphold only operates at a level other than

the one at which the charge

is

made. Kant thus "dodges" the issue

of

idealism.

This avoidance of the problem of idealism follows a similar logic as
that traced by Sartre

in his

analysis of the existential-psychological

69

phenomenon

of

bad

faith," or self-deception

possible for self-consciousness to oscillate

transcendent perspectives
itself.

According to Sartre

between

its

phenomenon

only

in

in

Being and Nothingness

all

intellect"

when

to her physical self

when she

bad

faith

is

The upshot

is

conscious being, which

it

ourselves.

of Sartre's

Thus

"condemned

amusing analyses

Similarly,

its

incumbent upon each

we

for Sartre

to freedom.

lost sight of

own

is

that

radical

no preexisting essence or blueprint
is

self-

fears that her intellectual

motivated by consciousness' fear of

ungroundedness — there

is

her suitor responds to her

performance has been too successful and that her suitor has
her as a sexual being.

in

woman who

her bodily being as a sexual object. She then shifts her

awareness

is

immanent and

several concrete hypothetical cases. Thus, for example, a

being romanced "becomes

it

order to avoid unpleasant truths about

in

Sartre analyses this

73
.

for

of us to create for

are without excuse or ground, and thus

"

Kant escapes from the (perhaps uncomfortable)

transcendental truth of his idealism — a position which would render

knowledge merely subjective and thus ungrounded—
awareness to claim

a (familiar, comfortable,

thus denying idealism

at the empirical level.

and

into empirical

solid) realist identity,

But Kant simultaneously

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness translated by Hazel Barnes (New
York: Washington Square Press, 1965), part 1, chapter 2.
73

,

70

denies that the realism applies at the higher
level at

level,

even though

this

is

the

which any idealism which he ostensibly refutes must be

understood to operate. What remains to be shown here

is

that each

perspective — the empirical and the transcendental — necessarily has

access to the point of view of the other, so that the escape

immediacy

of the empirical perspective

"forgetting."

Thus empirical realism

Furthermore,

it

is

for

is

is

a purposive

based on bad

Kant the higher-level position

transcendental story) which

and feigned

faith or self-delusion.

the

(/'.e.,

supposed to guarantee

is

into the

or

ground the

lower-order realism. Since Kant denies the actual (metaphysical) truth of
his

transcendental idealism, for he denies the legitimacy of metaphysical

knowledge, thus

how

are

we

his idealism

is

not metaphysical, but transcendental,

to understand this grounding as secure?

If

Kant cannot

establish the actual truth of the transcendental-idealist position,

metaphysical claim that empirical objects

really are

(i.e.,

the

mere appearances,

rather than things-in-themselves) then the empirical realism which

depends upon the transcendental idealism
Thus, the transcendental truth
empirical realism, for

its

own

is

for its legitimation collapses.

illegitimate in its function as grounding

status as knowledge must be considered

problematic according to the requirements of Kant's theoretical critique.
Kant's transcendental idealism credits

itself

with establishing the

legitimacy of empirical realism, yet the empirical realist point of view

71

is,

from either

own

its

or the idealist perspective, merely apparent;
while the

transcendental idealist position
criteria for legitimate

Kant

If

realism

is

fails to

have established the legitimacy

even prima facie

plausibility,

then

it

real.

Each claim must be "true"

appropriate perspective.

consciousness which
objective

its

own

is

In fact, for

of empirical

cannot be more

true to say that empirical objects are appearances than

they are

meet

knowledge.

s claim to

to hold

insecure and

is itself

it

is

to say that

or legitimate relative to its

Kant,

it

is

the empirical

the basic level of consciousness from which

knowledge may be attained

(

i.e

the understanding legislates

in

the faculty of knowledge; reason and the imagination do not alone

provide knowledge without the rules of the understanding being applied
appropriately).

It

is

therefore paradoxical and perhaps ironic that Kant's

theory demonstrates the

presupposes and

is

way

in

which

this empirical

dependent upon operations

consciousness

of consciousness

which

transgress the limits of the empirical perspective, and which do not
regard empirical objects to be independently existing

them

but

know

to be only "in-themselves" for a particular level of consciousness.

Furthermore, empirical consciousness
to

realities,

itself is

shown by Kant

necessarily

have a degree of awareness of these presupposed transcendental

operations

if

it

is

even to have experience of empirical

empirical consciousness

must be

able to transcend

72

its

reality.

limited

For Kant,

perspective, for

its

some degree

awareness

we have

of

seen

in

consciousness of objects necessarily presupposes

the unity of apperception

into three

The

whereby consciousness

in

relates the intuition to

order to bring the intuition into

reflect different levels of

own

knowledge. The mind must be aware

synthesis which

performs, for

it

of

each

as expressed ultimately

in

the

level of

that awareness which relates the

is

level of unity of representations already attained to a higher

form of unity

think' of apperception, thus resulting

'I

conceptual cognition.

The word 'concept'

[Begriff]

might of

itself

suggest

this remark.

For this unitary consciousness [dieses eine Bewusstsein]

combines the manifold, successively

intuited,

often be only faint, so that
is,

not

in

we do

not connect

is

what

and thereupon also

reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness

that

it

may

with the act

any direct manner with the generation of the

representation, but only with the

outcome

[that

which

is

thereby

represented]. But notwithstanding these variations, such

consciousness, however

without

it,

indistinct,

must always be present;

concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are

altogether impossible.

74

Kant, Critique

,

field

mental awareness

prior to full-blown

it

its

Critique analyzes this general process of synthesis

moments which

itself,

As

the "Transcendental Deduction," a sensible intuition

involves mental synthesis,

of experience.

of the relation of those objects to itself.

74

page A104.

73

in

Thus we see that the mental operations which take place
"beneath" the experience of empirical consciousness contain an

awareness

of the contribution

made by

the mind to

its

Underlying the experience of empirical consciousness

process of cognitive development.

In

own

is

experience.

a transcendental

the second edition refutation, Kant

argued from within the experience of empirical consciousness

for the

immediacy

The

of the mind's acquaintance with empirical objects.

premise of this refutation

original

is

an act of self-intuition, an

assumption of the perspective of empirical consciousness which takes
itself

as

its

intentional object. But this awareness, according to Kant,

presupposes

a

representation

mental act of temporal determination, whereby the mental
is

related to time as the form of inner sense

accordance

in

with the rules for the temporal synthesis. Consciousness must be aware
of

its

act of temporal synthesis as rule governed,

representation as existing

in

if

it

is

to recognize the

an objective time order. Consciousness must

therefore have, at a pre-experiential level, an awareness of
contribution to

its self-intuition.

This pre-experiential cognitive

development continues, according
intuition of self to

places

it

in

its

to Kant, as the

mind regards the

be dependent upon the act of mental synthesis which

objective time. Consciousness at this level searches for the

unconditioned and objective
representation, which

it

now

reality

which makes possible

its

own

self-

regards as conditioned appearance. The

74

objective cause of consciousness' self-representation
exist prior to

and hence independently

empirical mental functioning which results

is

mind

s

in

final

which

first

stage of pre-

conscious experience thus

made, positing empirical objects, now

considered to be the independently
prior to the

considered to

of the mental synthesis

brings an intuition of self to consciousness.
The

occurs as this causal judgment

is

real,

as temporally and ontologically

representations, which are

now understood

to be

effects of those empirical objects.

But given this necessary pre-experiential awareness on the part of
empirical consciousness,

it

is

no longer clear

the empirical consciousness must

experience

is

itself

how

Kant can maintain that

be convinced that

of a preexisting and independent reality.

consciousness, as

it

does Kant. Thus,

it

will

synthesized a given manifold, and thus
It

empirical

at the

transcendental

appear to an empirical consciousness

seeking epistemological understanding that

appearances.

The

own

seeks self-knowledge, must come to the same

conclusion about what has necessarily taken place
level as

its

its

it

must have transcendentally

empirical objects are really

cannot then be true on Kant's theory to say that the

empirical consciousness appears, even to

access to external

reality.

itself,

to have immediate

The transcendental account

will

be accessible

to empirical consciousness, for empirical consciousness has been

to

have a necessary degree

of

awareness

75

of

its

transcendental

shown

preconditions

in

order to be able to distinguish subjective representation

from objective experience. Empirical consciousness must therefore be

aware that

it

has, at the pre-empirical level, performed a synthesis of a

manifold under the direction of the causal

between

illusion

and objectively

the distinction

rule, for

valid perception requires a recognition

that the synthesis of representation has been rule-governed.

The

empirical consciousness cannot be a completely closed sphere, but

is

necessarily open to the "experiences," so to speak, of the perspectives
of consciousness

which

lie

beneath or beyond

it

as

its

transcendental

presuppositions. But then the legitimacy of cognitive consciousness'
claim to empirical knowledge
perspective, grounded
itself

in its

is,

for

denial or

ability to

view

to contain an

its

own

exist within

from within

in its

its

own

having "forgotten" that

it

has

element of "bad

faith," for

causal syntheses produced

that

its

experience

is

its

Empirical consciousness has the

it

is

open

to

experience, yet

it

it

to

know

partially blind.

its

pretends to believe
is

a

spectrum of consciousness; however,

to maintain (or pretend to) a realist self-understanding,

choose to remain

that

independently given. Empirical consciousness

particular point along a continuous

is

it.

self-certainty as based on this forgetting, and thus

own

it

or

contributed to the creation of the objective time-order and the

phenomenal objects that

if

it,

it

must

Thus there can be no completely closed

empirical consciousness to which external reality

76

is

indubitable, so that

Kant

attempt to circumscribe

s

realism

must be considered

true

is

a perspective of

illegitimate

consciousness

which

for

and based on empirical

consciousness' act of self-delusion.

Enter Hegel

As we
activity of

shall see, Kant's

consciousness

is

understanding of the transcendental

formally similar to the dialectic of

consciousness described by Hegel, whereby
gives

way

seen,

in

to a higher position of knowledge. But for Kant, as

distinction from Hegel, the continuous

consciousness, from less to more self-aware,

from less to more
levels of

lower order awareness

a

truth.

we

have

spectrum of

is

not considered to ascend

Kant privileges the empirical perspective; other

conscious activity are open to truth only

proper relation to empirical

reality.

For Hegel,

it

is

if

they can claim the

not the empirical

consciousness, but rather the highest point on the spectrum of reflexive
consciousness, which grasps the
transcendental perspective
the empirical puts Kant

in

is

fullest truth. Kant's denial that the

acquainted with a more truthful

a difficult situation,

recognize.

77

reality

which Hegel was able

than
to

In t ^* e

Kant

Phenomenology

s epistemological

of Spirit

assumption
ability to

is

i.e.,

human

instrument, that

it

fails to

it

is

to begin

its

work with

a

study of

view professes

doubt the truth of

its

beliefs that cognition

in

order to examine

complete independence of the true

unattainable, even though this cognition

(

an obvious criticism of

it,

own
a

is

to

doubt

assumptions.

medium

reality

which

itself to

point of this

,

is

be

real or true

argument

impossible, for the skeptical position must always posit
true.

Thus, according to Hegel,

it

critique one's cognitive "instrument" without at the

as

we have

seen

in

is

and

justification, for

how

75

its

is

its

that

true,

is

own

not possible to

same time

using

it,

Chapter One, critique always requires the

positing of a criterion or standard
truth. Cognition,

or

held to be

complete skepticism, or skepticism which presupposes nothing as

for,

its

and that cognition

must take

Phenomenology page 47: #74-75). The

assumptions to be

its

possible to set ourselves, as skeptical examiners,

apart from this instrument
in

is

self-refuting, for although this

reach truth,

in

cognition. Hegel argues that this natural

These assumptions include the

exists

Hegel,

method, discusses the "natural assumption" that

philosophy s proper procedure
instrument,"

75
,

faculties,

could

it

if

it

is

ever to be able to discern the

cannot be set aside to await

ever receive such justification

G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology
Clarendon Press, 1977).

of Spirit

78

,

if

rational

the criteria

translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford:

for

knowledge, the epistemic marks of self-evidence,

principles of reasoned

argument are not

to be

mistake

itself a

Meanwhile,

if

work

itself,

skepticism

critical

the fear of
in

falling into error sets

up

a mistrust of

the absence of such scruples gets on with the

and actually cognizes something,

hard to see

is

it

why

we

should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust. Should

we

not be concerned as to whether this fear of error

the error itself? Indeed this fear takes
fact

—

on what

is itself in

specific,

it

need

is

not just

something-a great

for granted as truth, supporting its scruples

of prior scrutiny to see

if

it

deal

in

and inferences
is

true.

To be

takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an

instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there
difference

is

the search for knowledge.

in

Science, which

fundamental

employed? Hegel therefore

turns the tables on Kant, asking whether a totally

not

or the

between ourselves and

this cognition.

is

Above

a
all,

it

presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition

on the other, independent and separated from

something

real; or in

which, since

it

is

the truth as well,

what
truth.

other words,

and yet

is

presupposes that cognition

it

excluded from the Absolute,
is

it,

is

surely outside of

nevertheless true, an assumption whereby

calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the
76

Hegel thinks that the impossibility of a presuppositionless
beginning

between

is

not a problem for his

epistemology, for he sees a

natural consciousness, insofar as this attitude

knowledge claims

76

own

Hegel,

at

all,

makes any

and true knowledge. Since consciousness

Phenomenology page 47, #74.
,

79

link

is self-

reflective, since

beginning,
for

in

carries

it

its criteria

for

knowledge with

the simplest most naive pose of consciousness. The

knowledge

is

presupposed characterization

a

know,

am

I

of

simultaneously claiming to

turn requires that

I

know,

Thus consciousness
knowledge as

criteria

are, therefore, necessarily present within the first
claims

consciousness to possess knowledge, since

claim
to

itself,

True knowledge or science according to Hegel exists from
the

it.

of

knows

it

in

some

able to use

is

a telos to guide

its

knowledge

what knowledge

know

sense, what
its

implicit in a

that

it

is

I

is.

If

I

claim

know, which

in

to have knowledge.

presupposed standard of

search. The fact that cognition begins

within a perspective which already contains a determination of truth, and
is

possessed of an "instrument" which cannot be set

aside,

is

to Hegel

that which grants the possibility of arriving at unconditioned knowledge.

Due

to consciousness' self-reflexive structure,

exceed

grasp

its

calls "the

until

it

has

Absolute," which

its

fully actualized itself

is

a

knowledge

reach

will

always

by attaining what Hegel

of the whole. Hegel therefore

places positive value on the perspectival nature of cognitive

consciousness, for

it

is

consciousness' original orientation, and the

presuppositions about truth contained therein, which ultimately lead
true and complete knowledge. But

Does Kant attempt

same time

using

it?

is

not,

what

to

Hegel's criticism of Kant warranted?

to critique the object of

If

it

restrictions

80

knowledge without

at the

does the "instrument"

impose on Kant's methodological perspective?
legitimate according to the standards for

his perspective itself

Is

knowledge

which

at

his

epistemological inquiry finally arrives, or does his
epistemological

perspective transgress the limits of cognition which his
theory

determines?

Kant's Transgression

That Kant believed
critique the faculty of

it

both necessary and possible to examine and

knowledge

necessary, according to Kant,
error

which could

result

in

is

is

upon

this enquiry,

is

priori.

77

which should be

entitled not a doctrine,

we

are

now engaged.

not to extend knowledge, but only to correct

supply a touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of

knowledge. Such

may

a critique

is

is

all

it,

Its

and to

a priori

therefore a preparation, so far as

be possible, for an organon;

subject-matter

was

from the "dogmatic" employment of reason to

but only a transcendental critique, that

purpose

critique

order to guarantee freedom from the

produce metaphysical knowledge a
It

A

uncontroversial.

.

.

.

what here constitutes our

not the nature of things, which

is

inexhaustible,

but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of
things; and this understanding, again, only

knowledge. These a

priori

in

respect of

its

a priori

possessions of the understanding, since

they have not to be sought for without, cannot remain hidden

from us

.

.

.we are concerned only with the

of pure reason itself. Only insofar as

77

See, for example, Kant, Critique page
,

81

we

critique of the faculty

build

upon

A12 = B26.

this

we

foundation do

have

a reliable

philosophical value of old and

Until, therefore, the faculty of

new works

for estimating the

in this field.

78

knowledge could be legitimated by means

which would determine

of a critique

touchstone

its

proper domain,

it

would be

necessary to tread carefully, to avoid using the faculty of knowledge
dogmatically

Kant

in

way

a

s intention to

productive of any

new knowledge. 79

faculty of

knowledge could be determined

however,

this intention

epistemology,

in

new knowledge

avoid the production of

is

It

was thus
the

until after

to have passed inspection;

problematic for Kant. Kant's transcendental

studying the operations of mental synthesis performed

by the understanding,

is

a reflection

upon the understanding's use

of

concepts as applied to an immediately given sensible manifold.

How

this reflection possible? For,

to yield

knowledge,

it

appears that

if

it

must employ the very

studies, for the understanding

alleged intention

knowledge
is

is

faculty

until its abilities

achieved. Even

78

79

Kant, Critique

,

which

it

the faculty of knowledge. But Kant's

have been determined by the

thus from the outset an ambiguity with respect to the

is

is

to refrain from the actual use of the faculty of

is

mind to gain knowledge of
it

this epistemological reflection

is

if

we

itself

and the status

of this

critique.

ability of

There
the

"knowledge" once

consider Kant's critique to be using primarily

pages B26-27 = A13-14.

See, for example, Kant, Critique pages
,

82

A

xii,

and B 22-23.

the higher level faculty of reason rather than the understanding, as
various textual passages suggest, 80 the reflexivity problem remains, for

reason

in this

There

case

is,

is still

being applied to

itself.

however, one advantage which may be made

comprehensible and of interest even to the most refractory and
reluctant learner, the advantage, that while the understanding,

occupied merely with

upon the sources

of

its

its

empirical

employment, and not

own knowledge, may

quire satisfactorily, there

is

knowing what
without

its

it

own

enquiries which

Kant,

in

is

that

indeed get along

yet one task to which

that namely, of determining the limits of

may

lie

its

within and

reflecting

it

is

not equal,

employment, and

what

it

is

that

of

lies

proper sphere. This demands just those deep

we have

instituted.

81

the very next paragraph, denies the legitimacy of the

"transcendental" employment of the understanding, which he equates

with the application of the concepts and principles of the understanding
to things-in-themselves.

82

Thus

it

would seem

that, although

it

is

perfectly appropriate to regard empirical objects as the causes of our

representations of

80

See

B749

for

them

at the empirical level,

it

is

illegitimate to

make an

example "The Doctrine of Pure Reason" Critique, pages A721,
passages which suggest that Kant's critique is a self-reflective use

for

of

reason rather than merely the understanding.
Also see Gilles Deleuze for a lucid and masterful interpretation of the
confusing issue of the various faculties of reason and their relationships to each
ctrine
other in Kant's writings. Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Do
nf the Faculties translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
,

81

82

Kant, Critique

,

page A238 = B298.

Kant, Critique

,

page A239 = B298.

83

analogous inference from the perspective of

a transcendental inquiry

and

to regard things-in-themselves as causes of appearances.
But this
restriction

is

problematic

when we

consider that Kant's critique offers a

transcendental account of faculties, syntheses, judgments, principles,
rules

and concepts whose function

is

to bring about, to synthesize, the

realm of appearances and our objective knowledge thereof. Kant's
transcendental account of the functioning of empirical consciousness

appears to be the same account given by the empirical
that, for Kant, the

mind's use of

a causal inference (from

representation to object) appears to

transcendental

must come

level.

its

to the realization that

own

itself to

in

its

take place at the

experience

accordance with

perceptions as secondary

in

except

mental

Thus empirical consciousness, when

synthetic activity which,

take

idealists,

is

it

self-reflects,

the result of a

a causal rule,

is

forced to

the objective temporal order,

and as therefore causally dependent upon the externally existing objects.

A

pre-experiential

shown

employment

of the concept of causality has been

to be necessary as the ground of the original and immediate

experience of objects as already there, temporally

prior to empirical

awareness. This transcendental employment of the understanding's
category of causality allows empirical consciousness to view empirical
objects as real and as the causes of mental representations. External

objects are known, at the level of empirical experience, immediately

84

because the transcendental understanding determines that something
given from without must have caused

its

for Kant, as the empirical idealists held,

mental representations. Thus,

an acquaintance with the mind's

inner contents logically precedes empirical

(although this logical order

when

is

knowledge

of objects

then reversed by the pre-experiential mind

the mental representations are themselves placed

in

the objective

temporal order of experience and considered to be effects of the
empirical objects as their cause). Kant's transcendental account thus

appears to require an illegitimate extension of the category of causality

beyond the

possibility of experience.

causality

embedded

is

the theory

in

As we have
itself

seen, this use of

as part of the explanation of

the workings of the transcendental mind.

But this illegitimate transcendental employment of causality

is

also

methodologically employed as part of the explanation for the grounding
of empirical realism by the transcendental account; for the transcendental

theory

is

Kant's story of the pre-empirical mental operations of synthesis

which causally contribute
Kant's theory violate

its

to our empirical experience. Not only then does

own

strictures

on legitimate knowledge, but

appears that his progress over the empirical

We

have to ask, as did the empirical

idealists

is

merely

its

illusory.

idealists at the empirical level,

whether the mind operating transcendentally could not have
created the totality of

it

representations.

85

It

entirely

again appears that Kant has

merely displaced the idealism and skepticism
which he has claimed to

The transcendental

refute.

ground the

story, as

we

have seen,

possibility of objective empirical

a description of the

if

it

is

to explain and

knowledge, must be taken as

behind the scenes mental activities which function
to

cause the appearances to empirical consciousness. Thus the
theory must
apply the understanding's concepts

transcendental operations.
in

How

(for

example, of causality) to these

then can Kant claim the right to engage

transcendental critique?

Analytic Entailment as Another Strategy of Avoidance

Kant's critique gives us a cognitively significant discourse about
the transcendental functioning of reason and

its

various faculties.

discourse should not be understood to be knowledge,

If

this

lest a transgression

of the theory of

knowledge be

how

provide a foundation for empirical knowledge? Kant's

then can

it

apparent answer

knowledge, but
understanding

knowledge a
faculty

is

is

is

what

that the transcendental story

is its

is

not

significance and

itself

synthetic

merely an analysis. Thus, although the empirical

capable, at

priori

entailed, just

its

extreme

limit, of

achieving synthetic

about the forms of possible experience

which examines the understanding

itself

may

in

general, the

yield only analytic

propositions.

Accordingly the Transcendental Analytic leads to this important
conclusion, that the most the understanding can achieve a priori

86

is

to anticipate the form of a possible
experience

general

in

and the proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously
claims
to supply,

knowledge

in

systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori

of things

general (for instance, the principle of

in

causality) must, therefore, give place to the

mere Analytic
Thus, the

of pure understanding.

Transcendental Aesthetic,"

modest

title

of a

83

in its

analysis of sensibility, entails

the theory of space and time as the pure forms of
Likewise, the "Transcendental Analytic,"

in its

possible intuition.

all

deduction of the

functional necessity of the categories of the understanding for empirical

awareness, analytically arrives
If

Kant

is

at the theory of transcendental syntheses.

correct that "transcendental analysis"

knowledge

a critique of the faculty of

in

such

a

may be used

way

that the

understanding need not be self-referentially employed

which

is

in

the very manner

to be the object of investigation, he has successfully eluded one

horn of the

An

to produce

critic's

dilemma, and perhaps Hegel's criticism

analysis of experience

is

ill-founded.

not a transgression of the limits of

is

experience, but merely a drawing out of the implications of that

knowledge which we already appear

way

to critique the instrument of

that instrument. But

As we have
understanding at a

83

Kant, Critique

,

is

this

level

knowledge without

answer

seen, Kant

to possess. Kant has then found a

was

really

illegitimately using

open to Kant?

forced to posit operations of the

beneath empirical consciousness, as the

page A247 = B303.

87

necessary preconditions of our experience of objective

wants

reality.

as Kant

If,

to claim, our understanding of these pre-experiential
operations

is

no more than an analysis of the experience of empirical
consciousness,
he cannot draw by analysis any account which

is

less

open

to doubt than

the experience which he seeks to justify. Since prior to Kant's

epistemological inquiry the legitimacy of empirical knowledge
that which

is

held

in

if

premise possible for

consciousness

is

analytic

allow Kant the use of the most incorrigible

his

deduction arguments, the premise that

experienced as a unity, 84 the transcendental account

of that premise than

it

already

is.

certain the truth

Furthermore, as Kant makes clear

discussion of the "paralogism of rational psychology"
"I

its

we

which he demonstrates as following cannot make more

414), the

precisely

question, he cannot then rely upon empirical

experience as an established premise to support the truth of
entailments. Even

is

(

Critique

.

in his

B407-

think" of self-apperception which serves as the basis for the

deduction arguments must be understood not as an
analytic proposition.

Thus the premise

intuition, but as

of the deductions

is

an

not, strictly

speaking, an instance of knowledge, but a mere thought. Further

entailments of this thought can therefore never attain the status of

Kant scholarship; some
we do possess
commentators
the
math.
See
legitimate synthetic knowledge a priori in the form of
Prolegomena for the clearest textual support. follow Robert Paul Wolff and
others in reading Kant as arguing from the more foundational premise of the
unity of consciousness. See Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity.
84

This reading

is

of course controversial

think that Kant's premise

is

in

the proposition that

I

88

knowledge.

If

the thought of the

inference to the existence of an
additional inferences to

'I

I

think'

does not securely ground an

which

thinks, then

knowledge?

If

how can

it

ground

the mere appearance, thought, or

mental representation of empirical knowledge

is

not good enough for the

epistemological skeptic (such as Hume), then neither should be the
logical entailment of that

appearance. Since, as Kant famously shows

the "Transcendental Dialectic," "existence

is

in

not a predicate" which can

add synthetic content to our concept of an object, no argument can take
us from a concept, or mental representation, to an actuality. Mere logic

cannot ground synthetic knowledge
is

in

the

way

which the skeptic who

in

unsatisfied with an idealism can accept. Kant's argument therefore

amounts

to the following: the transcendental

experience of empirical consciousness of
that, at

some

(apparently) deeper,

meaning

itself

of the apparent

as a unity appears to be

more transcendental

level, (apparent)

syntheses of the (apparently given) manifold (apparently) take place.
Kant's empirical realism therefore collapses back into an idealism which
holds the entire realm of experience of empirical consciousness to be an

appearance.
Furthermore, the transcendental story
empirical perspective arrives

wonder why the
deeper

in its self

is

a

meaning

Once

reflections.

empirical consciousness does not

belief that objects are

appearances as the

89

itself

at

which the

again,

we must

accept the

"real truth," but holds,

as Kant claims, to an empirical realism. The empirical
idealists were

wrong, according to Kant, because they believed that legitimate

knowledge must be
knowledge

of things-in-themselves. Kant denies the possibility
of

of things-in-themselves, and so relies

necessity and universality
distinguishing

it

in

upon the concepts

of

order to justify empirical knowledge by

from empirical

illusion.

However,

at a higher level of

and 'necessity' must be taken to mean

reflection, 'objectivity'

'synthesized by the mind according to rules'. But the knowledge that

actual syntheses according to actual rules have actually taken place

cannot

itself

be certain, for the epistemological theory follows, as an

analytic entailment, from the apparent experience of empirical reality.

Empirical

knowledge

necessity. But

its

how

is

is

therefore grounded

this

apparent independent

in its

apparent objectivity and

grounding any more secure than a grounding

reality

in

(which the empirical idealists already

had)? Thus, Kant's attempt at avoiding the charge of self-refutation with
respect to his

own

theoretical position requires that he

epistemic access to an independent

undermines

reality,

his ability to offer a theory

deny

his

own

but this denial then

which has

sufficient certainty and

substantiality to ground our (merely) apparent empirical

knowledge

85
.

has been suggested that perhaps we should see the transcendental story
analytic entailment of empirical consciousness, but as a hypothetical
an
not as
induction from the possibility of empirical knowledge. But this doesn't change
the basic criticism. In fact, this interpretation is one that was commonly
attributed to the Critique, although other defenders of Kant (such as R.P. Wolff,
85

lt

see Kant's Theory of Mental Activity see
)

90

it

as only operative

in

the

Other Commentators

My
critical

analysis of the

in

which Kant

method, as well as to ground

knowledge
matter.

ways

As

to

its

fails to justify his

his result (in the

appropriate sphere), offers one

I've already pointed out,

my

way

own

confinement of
of looking at the

interpretation has been

necessarily limited to a portion of Kant's philosophy. Indeed, other

commentators have
inconsistency

in

identified additional areas of contradiction

Kant's

critical

enterprise which can be attributed to the

fundamental tension between the dual requirements
transcendence) of a critique of reason by

examine several

Kant

commentators

(of

itself. In this

of these interpretations with a

significance these

and

immanence and

section,

I

will

view toward the

attribute to the various

ways

in

which

fails at his critical project.

Prolegomena, where Kant employs

it

for the

purpose of giving

a popularly

the transcendental deductions are merely attempts to
accessible exposition.
explain how knowledge is possible, given the already presupposed premise that
empirical knowledge is firmly and factually in our possession, then Kant s
speculate on
project is not to legitimate or ground that knowledge, but only to
If

why we do indeed have it. The critical force of
answer to Humean skepticism is thus forfeit.
91

Kant's epistemology as an

Strawsonian Discipline
P.F.

Sense

86
,

Strawson,

attempts

in his

extremely

influential study,

a reading of Kant's Critique of Pure

The Bounds

nf

Reason that

separates out the unpalatable "metaphysics of
transcendental idealism,"

and keeps only the arguments and doctrines that
Strawson considers
acceptable

those which identify the structural necessities and

preconditions for empirical knowledge

in

the presupposed concepts of

the understanding, as well as Kant s specification of the
requirements for

meaningful discourse, or what Strawson
signification.

calls

Kant's "principle of

According to Strawson's reading,

boundary between the realms
demonstrating the lack of
things-in-themselves.

Kant becomes a

On

this principle

of meaningful discourse and

ability to verify

this reading,

logical positivist.

draws the

nonsense by

metaphysical claims about

metaphysics

Strawson

is

meaningless and

realizes of course that this

is

not Kant's intention; nevertheless he holds that Kant's contribution can
best be understood

in this

manner. Strawson therefore rejects

entirety Kant's transcendental idealism,

which he reads as

phenomenalism. 87 Strawson sees Kant's idealism as

86

in its

a disguised

entailing a

P.F.. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's
Reason (London: Methuen & Co LTD, 1966).

Critique of Pure

.

87

Phenomenalism

is

the theory that physical objects are nothing more than

constructions of sense data; thus our mental representations are accorded more
reality and logical priority over those objects. Major proponents of

phenomenalism have included Berkeley
(at

some

(on

times).

92

some

interpretations),

and Russell

metaphysical position such that Kant holds not merely that

know

we

supersensible

reality,

but rather that “reality

can have no knowledge of

it."

Kant has violated the terms of

his

88

Given

own

is

we

cannot

supersensible and

this reading,

it

is

theory of knowledge

obvious that
(for, of

course, Kant should not claim to have any knowledge of the nature of
ultimate reality), but Strawson's analysis

general criticism

is

more

interesting than this

particular accounts of the variety of

in his

inconsistencies and failures which Kant's insistence on maintaining the

transcendental idealist posture

entail.

Strawson's reading of particular inconsistencies

in

Kant's theory

takes as basic the “principle of significance," which he attributes to Kant
as one of Kant's major insights. The

transcendental idealism as

way

which Strawson sees

itself a violation of this principle

to

embody Strawson's understanding

to

Strawson,

a basic

in

can be seen

of the nature of critique. According

mistake Kant makes

is

to misunderstand the realm

of application of a reality/appearance distinction. Transcendental

idealism, according to Strawson, parallels a legitimate and natural

epistemological

draw

reasoning, but

must be met according

distinction

must have access

it

between

a meaningful distinction

criteria

88

line of

simply goes too
reality

to Strawson.

to

,

93

order to

and appearance, two

The

critic

two standpoints —one

Strawson, Bounds page 38.

far. In

who draws
will

such

be the view

a

to

which the object merely appears

requirements of critique, this
other

will

be what Strawson

is

the

(in

our model of the structural

immanent standpoint); while the

calls "the

corrected view"

(for us, this is

the

transcendent and normative perspective). Furthermore, these
two
standpoints must connect

in

such a way that identity of reference can be

established, so that the object as appearance and the object seen
by the

corrected view are guaranteed to be the
of the

same

object. (In our discussion

immanent and transcendent perspectives used by

important to establish that the empirical consciousness
the transcendental consciousness

in

order to claim, as

Kant,

it

was

was connected
I

to

did, that the

transcendental consciousness should have been taken by the empirical

consciousness as

its

own

"corrected view.") As Strawson points out,

these two requirements for the meaningful use of
distinction are

met

in

empiricists as Locke,

a reality/appearance

the account of sense-perception given by such

who

apply the distinction within experience to

objects of the senses versus objects of epistemological theory and of
natural science.

which are the

The former have "secondary"

qualities

such as

color,

result of the interaction of the object with our perceptual

apparatus. But science and epistemology can discern the objects
"real" constitution with only their "primary" qualities

perceptions

89

89
.

in their

which cause our

These requirements are not however met, according

See Strawson, Bounds pages 250-253.
,

94

to

Strawson, when

we

attempt to apply the distinction beyond the realm
of

possible experience as, he claims, does Kant, to
argue that

spatio-

all

temporal objects, even those of scientific theory, are
appearances, while
the real reality
talk,

is

beyond the

according to Strawson,

Stemming from

trouble.

possibility of our acquaintance. This type
of
is

nonsense and gets Kant

this initial crossing of the

into

all

boundary

sorts of

into the

transcendental, other incoherences arise.
That Kant

fails

to satisfy the conditions for a significant

application of the contrast

things as they

between things as they

appear— that, indeed, he

of significance both

in his

violates his

and

really are

own

principle

application of this contrast and

in

the

associated use of the concept of cause — is, perhaps, a point
evident enough.

we

We

are left with the task of trying to explain,

can, the striking parallel which

more

we have

if

noted and the even

striking failure of that parallel, the extraordinary

transposition of the whole terminology of things affecting
faculties

of

which takes that terminology

its intelligible

employment,

The extraordinary generality

viz.

entirely outside the range

The spatio-temporal range.

of Kant's thinking

is

.

.

.

constantly

90

Further inconsistencies in Kant's theory are seen by Strawson as resulting
from the basic absurdity of transcendental idealism. For example, Strawson
points out the problem we've already discussed in the above section on the

"Refutations of Idealism" of reconciling the claim that external objects are only
representations and the claim that we are immediately conscious of external
objects as independently existing. Although Strawson sees the solution
offered that each claim
that this

is

comes from

a different perspective, he

sufficient to diminish the inconsistency. Given

the connection between the

two perspectives

my

I

does not

have
feel

interpretation of

of consciousness,

and

my

consequent charge of bad faith on the part of the empirical consciousness, and
Kant himself, end up, although by a different route, in agreement with
Strawson that the inconsistency remains.
I

95

straining against
intelligibility.

In

what he himself recognized as the

limits of

91

an attempt to rehabilitate Kant and render his work
useful and

meaningful for contemporary philosophy, Strawson's interpretation
isolates

what he considers

to be the positive and insightful aspects of

Kant's critique. The relevance of this attempt for our purposes

Strawson can be seen as

offering a

way

to

make Kant's

is

that

critical

enterprise successful at eluding the critical paradox of self-refutation.

According to Strawson,

we must

metaphysics. But then are

idealist

simply ignore the transcendental

we

left

with anything resembling a

secure foundation for knowledge? Or have

we

not given up on the

authoritative and normative functions of critique and resigned ourselves
to the anxious uncertainty of skepticism and self-doubt?
believe,

Kant's

is

the

critical

present

(i.e.,

latter; for,

as

epistemology

I

have already argued above,

is

merely that of

The answer,
if

I

the force of

a logical analysis of our

before the critique) state of cognitive consciousness then

our epistemic certainty after the analysis cannot be any greater, for the

entailment

is

dependent on the premise. Although

logically

tempting to follow Strawson

in

it

may seem

excising from Kant everything that

violates the requirements on legitimate knowledge, to do so

would be

lose the normative force of the theory. Without the transcendental

91

Strawson, Bounds page 255.
,
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to

account of the synthetic

activity of the transcendental mind,

and the

epistemological- transcendental perspective according
to which space

and time are forms

of intuition, Kant

may no

longer be guilty of self-

refutation, but neither could he claim the victory over
of his

Humean

skepticism

"Copernican revolution." Thus Strawson's way of solving the

problem of inconsistencies

in

Kant's

critical

achievement which motivated the theory

in

theory sacrifices the
the

first

place.

The

authorizing and normative aspect of critique, the transcendent ability of
critique to establish legitimacy by setting standards,

Strawson

s reading, as

it

insists too rigorously

is

forfeit

on

upon the maintenance

an immanent posture which restricts even the epistemological

of

critical

perspective to the empirical as the sole arena of meaningfulness.

The Transcendence
Deleuze,
Kant's

in

of Theory: Deleuze

Kant's Critical Philosophy

critical project

directly

which can be seen

opposing horn of the

critical

in

92
.

offers a

way

of reading

our terms as embracing the

dilemma as that taken by Strawson.

Rather than insisting upon the necessity of immanence of the

critic in

object of critique, and thereby losing the capacity to achieve the

92

Gilles

Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, translated by Hugh

Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (Minneapolis: University
Minnesota Press, 1984).
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of

the

transcendence which the positing of

critical

emphasizes the transcendent capacity
reason

is

seen to be

itself

aesthetic, or practical
critical

such

way

a

subordinate to reason

modes. Deleuze engages

in its

in

that theoretical
ethical

and

a reading of the entire

corpus, seeing the variety of rational faculties that Kant

investigates as operating

a hierarchical

in

this reading will necessarily

Critiques"

Reason

Practical

Critique of

(

)

The

93
.

Thus, according to Deleuze, Kant's

Critique of Pure

find their

Judgment)

harmony. Theoretical reason on

be limited and must yield to the higher

authority of reason as judge

two

in

standards requires, Deleuze

Reason and The Critique

completion and ground only

in

first

of

the third

(

The

.

Deleuze's understanding of the faculties

in

Kant sees them as

being ordered according to the principle of reason's natural and proper
interests. Deleuze, quite rightly, points out that Kant's critiques stand

against empiricism's position that reason

it

is

only nature

in

the form of

human

is

purely instrumental and that

desire and instinct that can have

interests and range over ends. For Kant, reason's interests are served by

93

Among contemporary

is becoming increasingly
that
know to work this
committed
attempt
and
popular. The most rigorous
view out, not only as an interpretation of Kant, but also as an independently
argued ontology of human being, can be found in Hannah Arendt's The Life of
the Mind To our great misfortune, she died leaving the third and according to
her own admission, most fundamental, functional capacity of reason— that of
judging — incompletely analyzed. Other readers of Kant who see theoretical
reason as grounded in the aesthetic and/or the political (for Arendt, aesthetic
judgment is the political faculty) include Howard Caygill, Susan Meld Shell, and
Kimberly Hutchings.

readers of Kant, this view

I

.

98

Its

various faculties; for example the speculative
interest

met by the

faculty of

knowledge

94
.

is

given to be

Furthermore, within this functional

division of faculties according to their ends,
there are additional faculties

depending upon the source of the mental representation
each provides.
Thus, for example, the faculty of knowledge comprises
the faculty of
sensibility

(which provides

and the active faculties of

intuitions),

imagination, understanding, and reason. The various faculties
have an

optimal manner of relating to each other, one which
highest, or

which

is

most autonomous way, the

to be served.

On

this point,

will

larger interest or

we

meet

in

the

end of reason

can see (as Deleuze points out)

that Kant's epistemological theory (as embodied

in this

faculty

psychology) differs from rationalism (as well as empiricism) by holding
that reason's true ends are given not from without, as rationalism

agreement with empiricism) holds

(e.g.

autonomously. Thus Kant's theory of
enables him to establish for reason
objects and

itself

and hence

(in

God, Truth, the Good), but

faculties, according to Deleuze,

autonomous power over

its

its ability

to

engage

in critique.

It

its

is,

according to Deleuze, the theory of faculties that constitutes the essence
of Kant's critical transcendental

method.

We

can therefore see that

Deleuze's reading provides an additional explanation for the

94

There are also the faculties of desire and that

pain, obviously corresponding to the other
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two

failure of a

of the feeling of pleasure

of Kant's "Critiques."

and

reading

like

Strawson's to account

Kantian critique. The

for or to allow the possibility of

capacity as Deleuze understands

critical

it

is

a

function of the transcendental account of the nature of the
mind.

There

is

faculty theory

ground

however,

problem that Deleuze

a

which bears on our project

for his capacity of critique.

transcendental account of faculties

to find

The problem
still

The

understanding) differ

nature such that one

in

in

is

that the theoretical

knowledge e.g .,
(

is

legislative

other passive. But then Kant needs to explain the

two

Kant a theoretical

short of grounding the

falls

certainty of knowledge.

faculties of

identifies in Kant's

radically different faculties accord with

way

in

and

sensibility

and active, the

which these

one another. To do

so,

he

invokes the action (called the "schematism") of the imagination which
will

prepare the sensible intuition for the application of the

understanding's concepts. But this solution doesn't
preexisting problem of epistemology
of relating the

concepts and
...

in

unformed data

(in

really solve the

both rationalism and empiricism)

of sensation with the general forms of

principles.

order to explain

how

passive sensibility accords with active

understanding, Kant invokes the synthesis and the schematism of
the imagination which

is

applicable a priori to the forms of

sensibility in conformity with concepts. But in this

problem

is

way

the

merely shifted: for the imagination and the

understanding themselves

between these two
(likewise the accord

differ in nature,

active faculties

is

and the accord

no less 'mysterious'

between understanding and

100

reason).

It

would seem that Kant runs up against

difficulty.

We

a formidable

have seen that he rejected the idea of

a

preestablished harmony between subject and object,
substituting
the principle of a necessary submission of the object
to the
subject
of

itself.

But does he not once again

harmony, simply transposed to the

subject which differ

Deleuze thus

in

in

come up with

the idea

level of faculties of the

nature? 95

essence agrees with

my

conclusion that Kant's

empirical realism isn't sufficiently established by his transcendental
idealism; that there remains a contradiction or gulf

between these two

realms, perspectives, discourses, or aspects of knowledge. For Deleuze,
this gulf

is

not adequately bridged

in

theory, but

is left

to be accounted

for in the nature of reason's "higher" non-speculative faculties.

Oscillation:

In

Howard and Hutchings
two examples

addition to the above

critique that

embrace the two extremes

transcendence (Deleuze), there
those

who

as both

immanence (Strawson) and

another logical theoretical possibility for

accept the paradoxical nature and dual necessities of critique

immanent and transcendent. This

to require that critique remain

or stabilized in either pole.

view. Dick Howard,

95

is

of

of interpretations of Kantian

whose

in

Two

is

to

embrace the paradox and

an ambiguous tension, never grounded
recent commentators have held such a

characterization of critique as comprising

Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy page 22.
,

101

both a genetic and a normative

Chapter One, explores

Thus according

to

moment we have

this characterization

Howard, Kant's

first

the

A

through a reading of Kant. 96

critical

reason which

is

given

edition deduction; and an attempted legitimation via grounding

normative objectivity for our purely rational knowledge
deduction. Kant found

of critique.

Howard

therefore sees the theoretical solution to the

an admission that there are structures

in

meaning which elude characterization

ontologically "originary" or symbolic.

a

need

for both normativity

in

Thus

simple terms, but which are
critique as an activity

between the two

poles.

must be supplemented with
self-consciously biased

in

Thus Howard

politics

will

constantly

insists that philosophy

and critique with criticism (which

way which

a

which

and genesis, theory and practice,

philosophy and politics can be reduced to neither, and
alternate

the B edition

capable of grounding the double nature

is

grounding problem as consisting

combines

in

in

necessary to give both versions, according to

it

Howard, because neither alone

of

in

Critique offers both a genetic

explanation or ground for the possibility of
in

already discussed

it

doesn't attempt to defend)

is

if

these two poles are to be adequately addressed. But the problem with
this

so called solution

lies in

poles. Since the relation

96

Howard, The

University of

New

is

the nature of the relation between these two

"symbolic" and neither conceptually necessary

Politics of Critique

,

and From Marx to Kant (Albany: State

York Press, 1985).
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nor actual or

real,

that the theory

is

there

no way of answering the skeptic

is

adequate to the practice or that the

knowledge we profess

denies

beliefs or

to have are justified on the basis of anything

either empirical or theoretical.

based upon

who

The

legitimation or grounding

a structural entity that eludes rationality.

might as well appeal to mysticism, a god, or
Similarly, Kimberly

faith in

is

insecure,

Once again we

human freedom.

Hutchings 97 sees critique as structured by the

needs of immanence and transcendence, and finds

this paradoxical

construct

it

to

escape

in

Kant's

critical

theory. She argues that

is

not possible either

or to instantiate the duality, but that the critic's task

"oscillate"

between the two

Kantian critique

is

is

to

poles.

premised on both the limitation of reason and

the assumption of the capacity of reason to transcend that

From the beginning,

limitation in the process of critique.

critique

is

therefore,

an impossible task. The philosophical richness of

critique lies in the

ways

in

which

impossibility. In an effort to

it

is

an exploration of

its

deduce the legitimate scope

own

of

theoretical reason, practical reason and judgement, the Kantian
critic

takes on the roles of legislator, warmonger and judge, but

each time the authority

of critique appears to be

always undermined. The alternatives
speculation which critique

threaten the work of the

97

was

critic

of

it

is

dogmatism and

intended to transcend continually
98

.

Kimberly Hutchings, Kant. Critique and

Politics

1996 ).
"Hutchings, Kant. Critique, and

grounded

Politics

103

,

pagel.

(New York: Routledge,

Again,

would have

I

to say that this solution to see critique as

impossible, tempting as
skeptical

critic.

suggest that

it

may

be,

unsatisfactory to the theoretical

is

Before giving up and embracing such a "cop out"

we

continue to explore the theoretical attempts to ground

the possibility of critique and to perform a critique of reason

such attempt

Hegel:

I

lies in

Hegel's

One

itself.

extension of the Kantian project.

critical

Phenomenology as Immanent

Critique

Hegel's Phenomenolog y 99 can be seen as a deduction of the
possibility of authentic or "absolute"

basic and ordinary "stage"

(

knowledge from the premise

Gestalt or act of consciousness.

In this

)

respect, Hegel's critical epistemology

is

of a

comparable to Kant's

"transcendental deductions," which likewise attempt to deduce the
possibility of

knowledge that was held by skepticism

to be questionable

(synthetic a priori propositions) from the fundamental premise of an

aspect or feature of consciousness which he held to be irrefutable

"Although many

of Hegel's writings contain criicisms of Kant,

in

100
.

As

what

be focusing on the Phenomenology as my main souce. This is
because, as several commentators have pointed out, the Phenomenology can be
seen as Hegel's attempt to deduce the possibility of "absolute knowledge" from
a preliminary and basic stage of consciousness. Thus a close comparison with
Kant's "transcendental deductions" of the possibility of knowledge is

follows

I

will

warranted.

There is certainly (at least one) basic and important difference between
Kant's and Hegel's starting points even though both have to do with a
fundamental feature or pose of consciousness. For Hegel, the premise with
which he begins is actually performed or taken up — it is an experience of
consciousness; for Kant, however, the "I think" of consciousness is of
100
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we have

seen above, Hegel took issue with Kant's
methodological

presupposition that epistemology needs to examine
to

its

its

"instrument" prior

actual use. This original assumption of skepticism,
this "mistrust,"

according to Hegel,

is

a mistake

realize the full potential of

which resulted

human

reason.

We

in

Kant's inability to

need not, and indeed

cannot "examine" the instrument, but simply should put

must look

at cognition as an instrument at

all).

"proof" of the possibility of genuine knowledge

demonstration

in

(if

we

For Hegel, then, the

comes

a narrative

development of philosophical consciousness
pre-reflective origin.

is,

to use

via its

the process of knowing.

Thus, the Phenomenology offers

Knowledge"

it

The foundation

or

account of the

knowledge from out

of

its

or starting point of "Absolute

for Hegel, the pre-theoretical orientation of the subject to

the object of cognition, out of which self-reflective, philosophical
cognition develops as a matter of course. Hence, Hegel's method
of

immanent

critique, for the

motor

for the

development

a

consequence

one

of

consciousness comes about from within the consciousness

development cannot be

is

itself.

The

of the imposition of external

necessity a proposition. For Kant, the transcendental unity of consciousness is
never experienced, for experience can only be of the phenomenal self. See The
"Paralogisms" where Kant explicitly argues that we have no experience of the
transcendental or noumenal self; and that Descartes and others have simply
confused the "unity of experience" with the "experience of unity." This point is
obviously crucial for my analysis of Kant's failure discussed above, for the
Kant's analysis to ground the actuality of knowledge depends on
analysis remaining outside of experience.
inability of

105

his

standards of correctness, under whose dictates consciousness
purges
of

itself

whatever does not measure up. The standards used

prescribed by the consciousness to
therefore for Hegel already

enactment
from

its

itself.

Every form of consciousness

and he has no need,

critical,

are

is

prior to the

of his study, to identify and to separate out critical reason

non-critical or instrumental use in order to use the former to

study the

latter (as

we

have seen to be Kant's procedure). The

normative-transcendent aspect of
every form of consciousness

(or

critical

reason belongs immanently to

instance of attempted cognition),

according to Hegel, so that the epistemic development (from less to
greater knowledge) proceeds from within the object of Hegel's critique.

The self-movement

of

consciousness that Hegel studies thus

proceeds "dialectically," as the consciousness under study becomes

aware

of

its

internal contradictions

nature of consciousness, for Hegel,

between what we have been
poles of critical reason

101
.

account

will

is,

their resolution.

The

therefore, a dialectical tension

calling the

immanent and transcendent

Since this dialectical development takes place

within the object under study,

undergoing the

and attempts

i.e.,

the form of consciousness which

critique, the task of the philosopher

be that of an observer

who

101

who

merely describes. Hegel

Thus Hegel can be seen as an important forerunner
Horkheimer's view of the dialectical nature of reason.
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narrates this

of

Adorno's and

is

therefore apparently eludes one horn of the

critical

dilemma by avoiding

an illegitimate transcendence out of the object of critique. His position,
as the philosophic observer of the form of consciousness under study,

is

not one of normative outsider, but merely of passive observer. The
critique

enacted solely on the "inside," so to speak, of the form of

is

consciousness which

is

the object of the critique. The story of the

developing consciousness

be a "phenomenology," while

will

matter, the object of study of the phenomenologist,

development
But

is

of

consciousness through

this distinction

its

will

subject

its

be the

self-

various forms of cognition.

(between the phenomenologist as observer and the

active critical consciousness that exists on the inside of the object of

critique),

in

which enables Hegel to escape the

critique

The

without transcendent activity on

Dialectical Experience of

critical

dilemma by engaging

his part, really tenable?

Consciousness and Immanent Critique

For Hegel, as well as for Kant, the reflexivity of consciousness

its

most

essential feature.

consciousness as
reflective.

a

It

is

this feature that allows Hegel to see

connected continuum, ranging from

Thus the foundation

like

act of consciousness, which Hegel follows as
in self-reflection.

We

less to

more

self-

or starting point of Hegel's "deduction" of

the possibility of authentic knowledge can,

object,

is

find in the

107

it

Kant's, begin

then takes

in

a basic

itself

Phenomenology that

as

consciousness

is

and

this feature of

itself.

It

is

self-relational, reflexive,

always aware of both

object

consciousness which grounds the

possibility of the critique within

each form of consciousness, as each

given act, stage, or form of consciousness

turn transcends itself

in

toward greater knowledge. Consciousness, according
itself

its

by means of acts of progressive

self-reflection,

to Hegel,

moves

and thereby gains

"experience" (Erfahrung).

Hegel therefore

relies

upon

a link

between

natural consciousness,

insofar as this attitude

makes any knowledge claims

knowledge

Thus

or science.

it

will

at

knowledge claim

or instance of

knowing whether

some independently determined essence
according to Hegel, by means of

"Science"

is

and true

not be necessary for Hegel (the

phenomenologist) to apply standards from the outside
of a

all,

its

it

knowledge.

of

order to judge

in

measures up
It

is,

own immanent essence

able to distinguish itself from

its

to

therefore,

that

mere appearance

or the

pretension to knowledge of an instance of cognition. Science, according
to Hegel, "liberates itself" from

"turning against"

its

its

mere appearance

false manifestation

process of "turning against"

its

(

or

semblance by

Phenomenology, #76). This

appearance

in

which science engages

is

progressive realization or actualizing of the "Notion" or concept
("Begriff") of science,

which any consciousness claiming to have

knowledge must presuppose. Cognitive consciousness

108

is

self-relational,

a

for its activity

make

to think or

is

presuppose true knowledge as
Consciousness, however,
it

is

its

its

a

concept or "notion" of

something that goes beyond

own,

limits,

Notion of

itself.

and since these

something that goes beyond

is

it

its

itself.

102

is

propelled by

He does not need, as

its

to this self-reflective structure, Hegel

appears to be capable of maintaining immanence
critiques.

Hence

self-posited essence or "notion," and

Due

actual state of knowledge.

in

the totality which he

did Kant, to try to transcend the

knowledge. Hegel, therefore,

capabilities of the pre-critical object of

believes that he has a solution to the "problem of the criterion," for

not necessary to know, explicitly and

in

advance, what knowledge

order to attempt to learn about the nature of knowledge.

necessary

is

to

let

to

limits are

Consciousness' continual movement of self-transcendence
the discrepancy between

— i.e.,

essence or standard.

explicitly the

is

itself

All

that

it

is

is in

is

consciousness' self-posited standards guide the

epistemological inquiry.

"Experience"
"reverses itself"

(

is

gained, according to Hegel, as consciousness

Phenomenology #87) by
.

discrepancy or gap between the object

reflecting

in-itself

upon the

and the object

for-

consciousness. By means of this self-reflection, consciousness

aware
object.

102

of

its

own

active involvement

Consciousness

in

determining the nature of

realizes that the object

Hegel, Phenomenology

.

#80.
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is

which

it

made
its

has posited as

in-

itself

really only

is

for consciousness. This realization denies

in itself"

the "in-itself" existence of consciousness'

first

object, and

in

so doing,

implicitly posits as a presupposition another object "in-itself,"

becomes the

truth or standard

object (which

now

is

in

which

comparison to which the previous

understood to be only "for-consciousness")

is

judged inadequate. This self-movement proceeds via the following steps:
first,

as

it

consciousness

awareness

awareness

its

an awareness of

into

exists apart from consciousness, or as

awareness of
"for

splits its

it

object

"in-itself,"

and an

awareness

of the object

is

of the object, or an

its

consciousness."
For consciousness

is,

on the one hand, consciousness

of the

object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness
of

what

for

it

is

the True, and consciousness of

is itself

their

comparison;

consciousness to know whether

its

it

is

for this

knowledge

corresponds to the object or not. The object,
to be for consciousness
it

seems

the

way

it

it

it

of the object
is

knows an

is

and hence, too, cannot test

already present

object at

knowledge,

all.

in

true,

seems only

knows

it;

examine what the
its

by that standard. But the distinction between the

knowledge

same

were, get behind the

exists for consciousness so as to

is in itself,

of

this

that consciousness

that consciousness cannot, as

object as
object

in

knowledge

same consciousness,

the truth. Since both are for the

consciousness

its

own knowledge
in-itself

and

the very fact that consciousness

Something

is

for

it

the

in itself;

and

or the being of the object for consciousness,

110

is,

for

it,

another moment. Upon this distinction, which
the examination rests.

is

present as a fact,

103

The Phenomenological Consciousness as Transcendent
But this

same

pattern of

movement must

experience of the consciousness which

is

must likewise characterize
involved

in a

his

in

Object

its

also constitute the

doing the study, or the

epistemological-phenomenological consciousness.
the structure of conscious experience

to

If

Hegel

general, then the

is

right

same

about

structure

conscious experience insofar as he

is

cognitive endeavor as the phenomenological observer. Thus,

Hegel's phenomenological consciousness must likewise immanently
contain a standard of knowledge which

whether

it

is

satisfactory. This standard

it

will

is,

use to judge of

of course,

its

object

none other than

the actual development of the stage of consciousness under study — that

development as
directive

103

is

it

takes place

"in-itself," for

to let the object of study perform

Hegel, Phenomenology

.

Hegel's methodological

its

own

critique

104
.

#85.

Kenley Royce Dove sees the importance of this methodological point, and
accepts Hegel's characterization of the passive (i.e., non-transcendent) role of
the phenomenologist. According to Dove, "Hegel's method is radically
undialectical. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical and
104

Hegel's Phenomenology is a viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the
extent that it merely describes this dialectical process. The "new object"
therefore must not be introduced by the philosopher; it must arise out of the
course of the experience described-and not merely qua described, but through
itself."

See Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method,"
Metaphysics volume xxiii, 1970, pages 615-641.
,

Ill

in

Review

of

Consequently,
of our

own

inquiry;
in

it

not need to import

criteria, or to

make use

bright ideas and thoughts during the course
of the

is

precisely

when we

contemplating the matter

But this standard
of

we do

is

in

leave these aside that

hand as

is in

it

and

we succeed
105

for itself

.

determined and presupposed nonetheless by the

consciousness of the phenomenologist, from which the inquiry

being conducted. Since Hegel

level

is

concerned to avoid the illegitimacy of

is

transcendent critique, he attempts to "apprehend" rather than to

"comprehend"

(Begreifen), for to

comprehend

"notion" which serves as standard. But
believes that

it

is,

is

is

to posit a

concept

or

this really possible? Hegel

so he refrains from allowing his consciousness to

interfere with the process of cognition being studied. He, therefore,

attempts to preserve the standard of truth posited by the object of study.
It

is

the essential truth of the object

studied

— that

in-itself

Hegel, the phenomenologist,

must begin by "bracketing" the

— independent

is

after.

criterion or

own

may come from

consciousness under study. What Hegel's method assumes
essential reality or truth of the consciousness under study

105

being

normative standard for

the truth of his investigation — so that this criterion

to the

its

Thus Hegel's method

natural activity of his

consciousness — that of positing the

of

is

is

the

that the

accessible

unmediated and passive apprehension of the phenomenologist.

Hegel, Phenomenology

.

#84.
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But

assumption

isn't this initial

of the

phenomenological method

already the positing of a standard or criterion — an "in-itself" against

which the object of knowledge can be measured? That Hegel collapses
the "in-itself"

assumed by

his

own consciousness

into the "in-itself" of

the object of study, does not absolve him of responsibility for originally

engaging

the transcendent-normative

in

phenomenologist takes the
standard for what

coming

into

is

really

"in-itself" of

going on

in

moment

of critique.

The

the object of study as the

the process of consciousness'

knowledge. Thus Hegel cannot claim, as the

phenomenologist, not to have drawn a distinction between appearance

and
for

reality, for

it

as

it

is

the intention of the phenomenologist, to

"in-itself,"

holds out as

reality of its object of study.

study as

it

is "in-itself."

its

own

let reality

appear

criterion the criterion or

The phenomenologist's

truth

is its

object of

The phenomenological method presupposes the

object "in-itself" to be the source of true knowledge. Thus the

phenomenological consciousness

is

indeed

critical, in

the

full

sense which

includes the deployment of a standard or criterion for truth.

There

is

further evidence at Hegel's starting point that the

phenomenological consciousness begins

its

study by presupposing a

normative standard for knowledge. Hegel begins

his exposition of the

progression of the forms of consciousness with "sense-certainty." The
rationality of this choice

becomes

clear

113

once

we

realize that sense-

certainty

the simplest, least complex structure of
cognitive

is

consciousness. Consciousness of sense-data comprises
the least amount
of subject-object relations; sense-certainty

direct relation of consciousness to
a sensation.

is

the least mediated, most

object, for

its

Thus sense-certainty must

it

is

simple awareness of

also be consciousness'

most

general and universal form of experience. Every consciousness
has
necessarily experienced sensory awareness. Hegel's choice of
beginning
is

therefore justified given that he seeks the essential nature of

consciousness and knowledge,
underlie

in

general, or the

forms of consciousness.

all

Knowledge," he

will

consciousness, and

Thus,

it

is

from sense-certainty to "Absolute

have shown that
is

Hegel can demonstrate the

If

possibility of a continual progression

most basic features that

this experiential path exists for

all

therefore the truth of the totality of knowledge.

Hegel's intention at the start of the phenomenological

enterprise to seek the essential and total truth of knowledge, to grasp

knowledge,

his object of study, in-itself.

To "apprehend" the

truth of

knowledge, must therefore be seen as simultaneously comprehending
that truth. Hegel's choice of starting point

assumption of

a

must then be seen as the

normative standard for truth. Thus the phenomenological

consciousness, according to Hegel's
spite of Hegel's denial,

must begin

own

its

114

theory of the dialectic, and

inquiry with implicit

in

a

"

presuppositions about what counts as true
knowledge, and, therefore,

with a normative criterion which

will

guide his search.

Furthermore, the phenomenological consciousness
becomes aware
of

its

own

activity as

necessary to

dialectical progression

its

Absolute Knowledge." There comes a point

phenomenological consciousness

knowledge
its

own

is

essential,

limits.

That

Introduction to the

which the

realizes that its

and so gains

own

its

must occur

this point

at

is

toward

own

contribution to

experience and goes beyond

suggested by Hegel

Phenomenology where he makes
,

the

in

explicit the

contribution of the phenomenological (or observing) consciousness
to the
dialectical progression being studied.

of the progression of

According to Hegel, the necessity

consciousness from one form to another

and understood only by the phenomenological consciousness;
necessity

is

actually the "result" only of the perspective of

is

seen

this

"we

phenomenologists.
This

way

of looking at the matter

is

something contributed by

us,

by means of which the succussion of experiences through which

consciousness passes
is

a

of

not

known

is

raised into a scientific progression

to the consciousness that

matter of fact, ...

in

from which

to run

away

into

mode

an empty

must necessarily be grasped as the nothing of
it

results

—

result

the preceding knowledge.
the origination of the

new

.

.

that

which contains what was true

But

it

is

in

just this necessity itself, or

object, that presents itself to

115

it

are observing. But, as

every case the result of an untrue

knowledge must not be allowed

nothing, but

we

— but

consciousness without

proceeds

It

is,

new

for us, as

its

understanding

how

this

happens, which

were, behind the back of consciousness. 106

it

according to Hegel, due to this necessity of the emergence of the
object within the experience of the phenomenal consciousness being

studied, that "the

way

to Science

#88). But since this necessity
"abstract" negation)

is

is

(of a

already Science"

(

Phenomenology

"determinate" rather than of a merely

the contribution of the phenomenological

consciousness, that consciousness must be understood as actively
involved

in

the dialectical progression toward Absolute Truth. Thus, the

phenomenological consciousness must gain cognitive experience by

means

of a dialectical

transcendence of

its

development which presupposes

a normative

object.

Furthermore, there

will

come

a point

where the phenomenal

consciousness catches up, so to speak, and coincides with the

phenomenological consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness must
learn at

some

point that

it

has undergone a necessary

"Absolute Knowledge" which
entire "Science of

it

ultimately attains

at

some

of the

point be recognized by

the phenomenal consciousness to be essential to
this point, the experience of the

106

knowledge

Consciousness." Thus the contribution of the

phenomenological consciousness must

At

is

dialectic, for the

Hegel, Phenomenology

.

its

own development.

"phenomenological we"

#87.
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will

become

bound up with the
study.

consciousness under

The phenomenal and phenomenological consciousnesses must

arrive at

can be

dialectical progression of the

“Absolute Knowledge" together, for

left

out. But this

means

phenomenological consciousness
critical

the "Absolute," nothing

that Hegel's attempt to elude the

problem by avoiding the transcendent

both sides" of the

in

is

activity of his

an

illusion.

critical

own

Hegel

is

simply "playing

dilemma, by oscillating between the

perspectives of the phenomenal (immanent) and phenomenological
(transcendent) perspectives, requiring both for the progression of the
dialectic.

The Ground

of Hegelian

Transcendence

The transcendence enacted by Hegel
Hegel, because he posits

it

as

the nature of consciousness

consciousness

is

in

immanent

is

legitimated, according to

to the object of study,

which

is

general. But, this view of the nature of

only fully justified at the end of the study

"Absolute Knowledge," which knows the

total truth,

when

has been attained.

This feature of the Hegelian dialectical critique has been remarked by

Michael Rosen,

who

similar to the critical

calls

it

the "post festum paradox ."'

dilemma as

I

have developed

107

Michael Rosen, Heael's Dialectic and
University Press, 1982.
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its

Criticism

it.

,

01

This paradox

is

According to Rosen,

New

York: Cambridge

... to

criticize

Hegel

is

to claim that the

system does not

validly its point of completion. But to criticize

attain

from any point

other than the point of completion violates a
crucial

presupposition of the system

who
of

has

its

itself,

namely, that only someone

really attained its final point

attainment.

Thus, the proper

I

critical

shall call this the

can perceive the

rationality

post festum paradox. 108

stance requires both immanence and

transcendence, since the system must be gone through, but can only be
evaluated at

immanent

its

endpoint. This form of the dilemma

critique, for

it

is

specific to

requires that the system be entered into and

followed out. But this immanent strategy encounters the horn of the

dilemma facing the immanent
be reached, since
a

it

is

critic, for

also requires that the endpoint

it

the totality which must be grasped, which requires

degree of transcendence out of any particular point within the system.

According to Rosen's view, another way

of looking at this

is

to see the

endpoint of Hegel's system, the "Absolute Knowledge" that the system
seeks, as always present

in

the stages of consciousness that precede

attainment. Rosen thus points up the criticism

I

its

have been here

developing that the transcendence necessary to critique

is

simply

displaced by Hegel to within the nature of consciousness, thus allowing

Hegel to maintain an apparent posture of immanence.
But can Hegel justify this assumption that the endpoint
already

108

immanent within every

pre-critical

Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic, pages 23-24.
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is

stage of phenomenal

always

consciousness? Although Hegel has made the self-transcendence

of

consciousness toward the Absolute immanent to the structure
of
consciousness

itself,

he cannot

show

the necessary attainment of

Absolute Knowledge to be imminent or even possible, without
presupposing a

faith in its

cognitive-critical journey.

writing from the point

completion

in

necessary existence as the te/os of

As Rosen

points out, Hegel believes that he

when

time

in historical

his

is

the dialectic has achieved

the Absolute. Thus, for Hegel, the possibility of the

attainment of the Absolute has already been actualized, so that

it

is

merely a matter of drawing out of natural consciousness the

explicit

awareness

assumption

that

we

implicit

of

what

it

already possesses. But

if

we

reject the

are at the historical endpoint of the development of Spirit, the

knowledge

of the Absolute

which Hegel assumes

to exist

in

every instance of ordinary cognition must be seen to be rationally

without ground. His avoidance of the

based on an always presupposed

grounded

until

Descartes,
Plato for

(e.g., in

critical

faith,

the end of the journey,

who needed God

whom

which cannot be

rationally

manner again

similar to

in

a

the practical demonstration of knowledge
in

was

required

Chapter One, above) as the

justification for his theoretical position that

like

therefore,

is,

to justify his cognitive capability, and to

the Meno, as discussed

Thus Hegel,

dilemma,

Adorno and Horkheimer,
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knowledge was possible.

falls

back upon a

faith in the

dialectic's ability to transcend the limitations of the

consciousness which he

presupposes
maintaining

this faith

its

is

concerned to

The

critique. Furthermore,

from the outset. Thus

posture of radical immanence

independently justify or ground

Oscillation of

its

own

form of

his critical

in its

epistemology,

object, cannot

in

Kant and Hegel

The choice between Kant and Hegel therefore seems
critical

epistemology has been shown to enact an
while Hegel,
itself

in

remaining immanent,

which does not presuppose

from the

start. Neither

escaping the
of uncritical

critical

its

is

to be a

dilemma. Kant's

illegitimate

transcendence;

unable to offer a legitimation of

own

critical

capacity to transcend

Kant nor Hegel, then, have been successful

dilemma, but rather

immanence and

oscillate

in

between the two poles

unjustified transcendence. But perhaps the

attempt to elude the dilemma by focusing on reason's capacity,
purely theoretical and abstract form, has been too stringent

will

in

activity.

Immanence and Transcendence

choice between the two horns of the

he

allow of reason and of rational critique. As

discussion of Adorno and Horkheimer, reason

we have

is

in

seen

in its

what
in

it

our

always necessarily

intermixed with the nonrational. To attempt to purify reason as Kant has

done, and to focus on reason
as Hegel does,

fails to

in its

most abstract and

universal features,

allow for the possibility that the

120

critical

perspective
to

may be

encompass

situatedness.
fact, as

practical

concrete instantiation

its

If

justifiable insofar as its rationale

Adorno and Horkheimer

was

hinted at

and

political.

enactment

in

its

if

Chapter One, the rational

it

is

its

attempted

subject of critique
politically

political

component.

motivated

brought
in

down

will

two

never pure.

is

motivation for the

may

examine

offer a

of course,

is

to earth as embodied, situated, and

121

to

this possibility,

chapters, where the

the person of the feminist.

In

always already

The problem,

We

justifications, in the next

is

is

recognized and accepted,

theoretical groundedness.

justify this practical-political

and

bodily and historical

are right, reason

Thus, the practical-

of critique,

contribution to

in its

may be broadened

CHAPTER
IS

3

THERE A GROUND FOR A FEMINIST STANDPOINT?

The basic

critical

fundamental problem

dilemma that

have thus

I

far

explored

is

a

for feminist theory, especially feminist

epistemology. For feminist theorists, the attempt to critique the values

and beliefs of patriarchy requires both the
outsider, and the simultaneous

distancing of the

critical

acknowledgment

of patriarchy's

influence on the very tools and ideas needed to engage

in

deep

feminist

critical

thought. This deep ambivalence and dual position of feminists with
respect to the patriarchal tradition has been recognized and

upon by

most

many

a great

commented

feminist theorists. Myra Jehlen gives us one of the

pithy and easily understood expressions of the problem

of the

image

of

Archimedes and

Somewhat
lever required

like

his fulcrum.

who

Archimedes,

someplace else on which

109

to

in

her use

According to Jehlen,

lift

the earth with his

to locate himself and his

fulcrum, feminists questioning the presumptive order of both

nature and history — and thus proposing to remove the ground

from under

their

own

feet

— would

appear to need an alternative

base. For as Archimedes had to stand somewhere, one has to

assume something
of

in

order to reason at

all.

So

if

the very axioms

Western thought already incorporate the sexual teleology

question,

it

seems

that, like the

Greek philosopher,

we have

in

to

find a standpoint off this world altogether.

109

Myra Jehlen, "Archimedes and the Paradox

of Feminist Criticism,"

in

Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, edited by Nannerl 0. Keohane, Michelle
Z. Rosaldo, and Barbara C. Gelpi, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1981,

pages 189-215- 215).
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question,

it

seems

that, like the

Greek philosopher,

we have

to

find a standpoint off this world altogether.

But, of course, this

is

impossible, so Jehlen continues:

Archimedes never

did.

However persuasively he

established that the earth could be

moved from

appointed

its

place, he and the lever remained earthbound and the
globe stayed

where
it

it

was. His story may point another moral, however,

just as

points to another science able to harness forces internally and

apply energy from within.

needed was

really
will

be that

We

could then conclude that what he

My

a terrestrial fulcrum.

a terrestrial fulcrum, a

point here, similarly,

standpoint from which

we

can

see our conceptual universe whole but which nonetheless rests
firmly

on male ground,

is

what feminists

really

The feminist standpoint epistemologists
Rose, Flax, Jagger) can be understood,
"terrestrial

fulcrum," which

will

while simultaneously remaining
traditional values

like

need. 110

(Harding, Hartsock, Smith,

Jehlen, to be looking for a

enable them to critique the tradition

embedded

in

which must be preserved

it

in

and true to those

order to engage

in a

struggle for greater truth and political freedom. Standpoint theorists are

deeply aware of the difficulties which the

critic's

dilemma poses

own

attempts to develop an epistemology that

male

bias, while simultaneously preserving that with

do without, namely the commitment to

Jehlen, "Archimedes," page 190.

123

avoid the

pitfalls of

which they cannot

objectivity and truth that the

standard epistemologies also claim to respect.

110

will

for their

It

is,

in

fact, the

the necessary implication of their

development

led to the

difficulty

own

ideals in those very values, that

of standpoint theory as a

means

to elude the

by devising a "successor science" which constitutes

radical break with the tradition than

does

a

more

a

more

stringently adhered to

empiricism. But does this approach, which does not completely
relinquish, but merely

revamps values such as

other feminists 111 claim that

embracing

a

doesn't; thus

it

work? Many

objectivity,

we have grounds

postmodernist feminism which breaks even more

for

radically

with tradition, by relinquishing even the dream of objectivity and truth.
this chapter,

its

I

success or

The Ground

will

examine the standpoint approach

failure in solving or

order to determine

critic's

dilemma.

of Standpoint Theory

The basic question
and

escaping from the

in

In

justification.

I

will

ask of standpoint theory

Standpoint epistemology, as a

is

for its

ground

critical alternative to

the

already existing mainstream-malestream epistemologies of empiricism,
functionalism/relativism (e.g., sociology of knowledge), and Marxism,

must be

able to provide adequate legitimation for both

its possibility.

The arguments

ni These feminist theorists

for

its

necessity and

grounding standpoint theory's

who embrace

position can be seen to include Jane Flax,

in

a

more

radical post modernist

her later articles,

Donna Haraway

(who has also argued for a standpoint approach, see "Situated Knowledges"),
Judith Butler, and Luce Irigaray. Irigaray's position will be discussed below in
Chapter

4.
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must be
its

able to provide adequate legitimation for
both

possibility.

The arguments

for

on

of the

main proponents seem

its

to

five basic appeals: (1) an appeal to the
Marxian-Hegelian theory

development

an appeal to

of the enlarged consciousness of the oppressed;
(2)

women's common experience

in

labor; (3) an appeal to the dual or bifurcated

women

reproductive and nurturing

consciousness developed by

as an oppressed class; (4) an appeal to object relations

psychoanalytic theory,

gendered

understanding of the construction of

in its

identity; (5) a revised notion of "objectivity,"

feminist standpoint yields greater objectivity (of this
sort)

necessity and

grounding standpoint theory's

legitimacy that have been put forward by
rely

its

such that

a

new and improved

than the standard masculinist view. These appeals are not

completely separated or mutually exclusive, but are overlapping and
interrelated

I

will

in

the various expressions of standpoint theory. However, as

argue below, standpoint epistemology's use of these appeals

insufficient to solve or to

evade completely the

satisfactory theoretical way.

epistemology

will

commitment,

for

be that

it

The upshot

of

my

critic's

125

in a

critique of standpoint

must be supplemented by

which there can be no purely

dilemma

is

a political

theoretical ground.

viewpoint

112
.

Marx,

in

whose master/slave
development

bases

turn,

his position

on the work of Hegel,

dialectic offers a hypothetical

model

for the

of an enlarged consciousness by the
oppressed as s/he

struggles with her/his oppressor. Standpoint
epistemology takes off from

Hegel's master/slave parable, and Marx' use of

own

it,

to try to ground

its

feminist epistemology, which privileges the
achievement of a

feminist standpoint born of struggle.

Phenomenology the
,

relationship

whereby the slave gains

in

As Hegel argues

The

slave,

master's demands, grows

commands

is

one

in

skills

the slave to do

it,

necessary to meet the

understanding both the master's

consciousness and her own. Thus the slave develops
consciousness, which

is

knowledge and power, while the master, who

developing the

in

the

between master and slave

doesn't perform labor for himself, but
atrophies.

in

more comprehensive and

a

double

less one-sided

and

distorted than the master's. Similarly, Marx's epistemology argues that

112

The basic elements

of Marxist epistemology are scattered throughout his

makes use of the standpoint of the proletariat as
he analyzes the real relations of production under capitalism in Capital, as he
develops his theory of alienation, historical materialism, and base-superstructure
in the early writings (including The German Ideology ). The idea of the proletariat
as a revolutionary class with the ability to penetrate the appearances generated
by capitalism is introduced in the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right." The theory is much further developed and explicitly stated
by Georg Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, translated by Rodney
Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), pagesl 49-209.
entire corpus. In particular he
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consciousness, which

is

more comprehensive and

less one-sided

and

distorted than the master's. Similarly, Marx's
epistemology argues that

the proletariat, as the class which labors under
capitalism, develops

own more comprehensive

and unclouded view of the social

its

reality 113
.

Marx's theory of the superior standpoint of the proletariat
attempts
to provide for

Marx,

all

Marxism

thought

is

a

way

out of the

superstructural, that

critical

is

paradox

to say that

it

114
.

is

According to
conditioned

by the materialist economic base of a society. But, of course,

this

charge

equally implicates Marx's historical materialism along with the bourgeois

thought which he was concerned to
is

to argue that although

all

stratification of society into

proletariat

— positions

thought

two

refute.

Marx's answer to

in

charge

materially conditioned, the

is

distinct classes

those classes

this

ways

— the

bourgeoisie and the

that offer an advantageous

perspective on the really existing social relations to the oppressed class.

The dominant class

in

a stratified society will be unable to problematize

those social beliefs and theories which support and uphold

113

their

For Sandra Harding's discussion of the Hegelian-Marxian history of

feminist standpoint theory, see

Is

Science Multi-Cultural (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1998), pagesl 49-1 50.
114

The success or failure of Marxist theory at eluding the critic's dilemma
cannot be adequately addressed within the scope of the dissertation. Obviously
the literature on this topic is huge and would require a major study. However,
given the focus on praxis in Marxist theory, believe that it is safe to say
preliminarily that Marxist theory, like the theoretical orientations that form the
basis of this dissertation, requires a political/practical commitment to freedom
and democracy that cannot be grounded in a solely theoretical proof.
I
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domination. But for the worker class, the exploitation
underlying social

economic production

is

clearly visible.

The standpoint

of the

that of the ruling class;
It

it

is

As Alison Jagger expresses

oppressed

is

not just different from

also epistemologically advantageous.

provides the basis for a view of reality that

is

more

impartial

than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive.

more

impartial

because

it

this,

comes

interests of society as a whole;

It

is

closer to representing the

whereas the standpoint

ruling class reflects the interests only of

of the

one section of the

population, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and

is

able

to explain the standpoint of the ruling class. 115

Marxist economic theory, unlike bourgeois economic theory, bases
itself

on the standpoint of the

relation

is

one

proletariat, for

of exploitation rather than free

whom

the labor-capital

and equal exchange. Due to

the basic fact of historical materialism that the material conditions of

life

influence consciousness, the consciousness of the oppressed worker

will

necessarily be different from that of a

115
1

Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and

member

Human

of the ruling class

Nature.

(Rowan &

116
.

The

Allenheld,

983), page 371
116

men

According to the early Marx,

"In the social

inevitably enter into definite relations,

namely

production of their existence,

which are independent

relations of production appropriate to a given stage

The

in

of their will,

the development

these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
of their material forces of production.

definite

totality of

forms of social consciousness. The mode of production

of material

life

conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social
existence that determines their consciousness." Karl Marx, Preface to "A

Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," in Early Writings, translated
by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975),

page 425.
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worker

will

be capable of seeing and comprehending the real
relations

which underlie the
worker

will

superficial

appearance of equal exchange, because the

have an intimate acquaintance with the process

production. The point of view of the capitalist
obtaining profit.

As such, he

be an exchange value,

like

paid equal compensation
that the value paid

in

will

for

which he

total value.

the labor exchange

What
is

is

due to

is

in

a position of

is

its

use value

able to get

owner

away with

of the

relation

is

in

this

means

power over those who

such ownership. Thus, under capitalism, the
capitalist

believe he has

the capitalist misses

his privileged position as

production, which puts him

will

less than

producing a surplus, and that the reason he

underpayment

tied to his interest in

see the labor provided by the worker to

any other,
its

is

of

of

lack

between worker and

based as much on material force as was the case under

feudalism, although this force

is

hidden from view, disguised by the

appearance of equal exchange which presents

itself

to the capitalist

consciousness. For the worker, however, the force and necessity which

compels him

to sell his labor

power on the market

the difference between the value he creates

and the exchange value

for

which

it

is

in

is

real

and

visible, as

the production of the good

sold as a

commodity on the

market — a difference which becomes the

profit of the capitalist.

Exploitation can be seen by the worker

a

in

way which

is

impossible for

the capitalist to see. Thus the standpoint of the proletariat as a class

129

is

will

be more comprehensive and penetrating than the
standpoint of the
capitalist class.

Similarly, feminist standpoint

standpoint of

women,

Furthermore,

women

in

epistemology

will

base

on the

itself

as the oppressed class under patriarchy.

as a class are

like

the proletariat

that their relationship to the dominant class

is

dual

Marx's analysis

in

— their

essential but unrecognized by the dominant perspective

117
.

labor

is

both

This dual

positioning gives to

women

a

social relations, for

women

are required, due to their subservient position,

to understand

more comprehensive understanding

and to operate according to the

beliefs

the dominant class, while the dominant class need

knowledge

specific to the experiences of

women

of

and knowledge of

know

nothing of the

as a subservient class.

Likewise, according to Marx's theory, the proletarian standpoint

encompasses the viewpoint

of the capitalist class, as well as

specific experience of alienation and exploitation.

It

was

its

own

not simply the

marginality of the proletariat, their outsider status, but also their

117

For an illuminating discussion of this point, see Bat Ami Bar-On,
in Feminist Epistemologies (New York:

"Marginality and Epistemic Privilege,"

Routledge, 1993). See also Flartsock, Money. Sex, and Power: Toward a
Feminist Historical Materialism (Northeastern University Press, 1985) and "The
Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology,
Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science edited by Sandra
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983), and Ann
,

Ferguson. Blood at the Root: Motherhood. Sexuality & Male Dominance
(London: Pandora Press, 1989), especially chapter 6 on women as a
revolutionary class.
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essentiality to capitalist production, that granted

as the revolutionary class. This

same

them the unique

status

dual positionality and

consciousness characterize Hegel's slave,

who

and essential to the master. Since

under patriarchy do most of

women

is

both radically other to

the subservient necessary labor employed with caring for bodily
needs,

while maintaining outsider status

when

it

comes

to sharing power, they

too can claim the duality which Marxist and Hegelian standpoint theory

argue allows for epistemic privilege. Furthermore, the marginality of

women

to the patriarchal order, their outsider status

sharing positions of power,
responsibilities for

them with no

is

directly

due to the fact that

what Ann Ferguson

it

comes

to

their

calls "sex/affective labor" 118 leave

time, energy or opportunity to occupy the positions of

domination. 119 Thus

women's

marginality

which allows both

essentiality,

when

insider

is

a function of their

and outsider, both immanent and

transcendent, points of view to overlap. Moreover, the feminist

standpoint epistemologists trace this dual positioning through to the
meta-level of the production of knowledge, where feminist scientists'

118

See Ferguson. Blood at the Root, chapter 4, pages 77-100. Sex/affective
produces four goods: domestic maintenance,
nurturance, children, and sexuality.
labor, according to Ferguson,

119

that

Bar

On

women

claims that although standpoint theory

is

successful at showing

are marginalized, and simultaneously central to patriarchy,

the case that

women's

marginality

is

it

is

not

a function of their centrality, and so the

with Marx's epistemological theory fails at this point. See Bar On,
"Marginality." disagree, as state above, as does Hartsock. See Money, Sex

parallel

I

I

and Power.
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positions, as both inside and outside the patriarchal
symbolic order, grant

them
their

a

more comprehensive viewpoint. Thus women, and feminists

as

spokespersons, are a privileged knowledge class under patriarchy,
simultaneous immanence and transcendence

for their

in

the patriarchal

order offers the possibility of their embarking on the dialectic
of critique.

Another important appeal standpoint theory makes
different experiences of

standpoint theorists
Hartsock,

women

who make

to the

is

as laborers, mothers, and nurturers. The
this appeal include

Ann Ferguson and Nancy

theorists can be seen as drawing,

Folbre,

in

turn,

Dorothy Smith, Nancy

and Hilary Rose

upon the work

as Sara Ruddick, Nel Noddings, and Carol Gilligan,

120
.

of

These

such thinkers

who have

elaborated

an "ethics of care," and of "maternal thinking," based on the work

women

do

theorists

is

in

the

that

home

121
.

The basic point that connects

women's domestic

all

these

labor gives rise to their unique and

120

See Dorothy Smith, ""Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of
Sociology," Heidi Hartmann, "The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and
Political Struggle: The Example of Housework," both in Feminism &
Methodology, edited by Sandra Harding (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1987; Nancy Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,"

in

Discovering Reality:

Ann

Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, "The Unhappy Marriage of Capitalism and
in Lydia Sargent, editor, Women and Revolution (Boston: South End
Press, 1981); and Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain and Heart; A Feminist Epistemology

Patriarchy,"

for the Natural Sciences," in Signs: Journal of

Women

in

Culture

and

Society,

1983, vol.9, no.1, pages 73-90.
121

See Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking /'Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), Nel
Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education
(Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press, 1986) and Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
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alternative (to men's) skills and

ways

of thinking,

which

in

turn will yield

epistemic and ethical norms and values that are different from those

developed solely on the basis of men's experiences as individuated,
competitive, Cartesian subjects of knowledge, and Hobbesian subjects of
practice.

The bearing

of

and caring

example, cannot be

for children, for

adequately understood on the model of the production of objects, nor can
the relationship between mother and child be seen as one of

two

completely individuated consciousnesses confronting one another

in a

competitive struggle over scarce resources. Furthermore, the repetitive,

concrete labor performed by

women

the

in

home

involves the inextricable

way which

collaboration of intellect, emotions, and the body,

in

privileges neither the mental nor the material, and

which therefore cannot

be understood

in

a

the analytic terms used to account for labor

in

the

public sphere of patriarchal capitalist work. Thus, maternal and domestic

work merge "hand,

brain,

and heart,"

in a

way

that renders the

mainstream categories inadequate.

Nancy Hartsock's
this appeal.

analysis

is

perhaps the most clear expression of

She argues from the sexual

division of labor to the possibility

of a specifically feminist epistemological standpoint. According to

Hartsock, a major claim
material

life is

made by

structured

different groups,

in

standpoint theory

is

the following:

"If

fundamentally opposing ways for two

one can expect that the vision

133

of

each

will

represent an

inversion of the other, and

systems

in

to the rulers will be both partial

without

it,

first

successful

domination the vision available

and perverse." 122 This claim

is

crucial, for

the superiority, rather than merely the equal
legitimacy, of the

feminist standpoint

Hartsock

of

in

is

groundless. But

how

is

this claim justified?

appeals to Marxist theory to argue that Marx

showing that the

capitalist social relations.

under capitalism)

is

The

had indeed inverted the order

ruling class

of significance of the spheres of use and

real point

(and should be) for

exchange

fail

in

understanding

and purpose of production (even

human subsistence and

However, the bourgeoisie, whose viewpoint
realm of exchange,

was

is

need.

necessarily limited to the

to see the logical priority of the proper endpoint

and purpose, and rather

privilege

exchange as the goal

of production.

This focus on exchange can arguably be seen as a "perversion" of the

proper order (and

in

fact the excesses of capitalism, and the misery

capitalism thereby causes, as

it

produces not

for

need but

have been remarked repeatedly by many and various
capitalism). Furthermore, the inequities that exist

in

for the market,

critics of

the productive realm

are likewise hidden from the point of view of the equality of exchange.

Viewed from the perspective
capitalist

engage

in fair

it

appears that the worker and

and equal trade of labor

perspective of the worker

122

of exchange,

is

adopted, the

for

illusion of

Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint," page 285.
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wages. But once the
equal exchange

proper and revolutionary perspective was, of course, Marx's
fundamental

and essential contribution, and enabled him to develop

his entire critique

the theories of alienation, exploitation, and ideology). Can the
same

(e.g.,

be said for a feminist standpoint? Can

its

adoption enable a less

"perverse" or less distorted theory of society and nature?

Object Relations Theory
In

order to understand more clearly the argument Hartsock gives

for the greater perversity of the traditional, patriarchal standpoint,

necessary to examine more closely the explanation given

for

it

is

women's

differently structured conceptual and value systems. This explanation

is

given by the feminist development of object relations psychoanalytic

theory
their

123
.

According to object relations theory, boys and

genders differently due to

girls

construct

their different relations with their

mothers. Object relations theory accepts the account given by Freud of
the

little

boy coming

to distinguish himself as an individual by negotiating

the oedipal conflict. But Freud, as

many

feminists have held,

was unable

to give a satisfactory account of the gender construction of the

little girl.

Feminist object relations theorists thus supply an account that stresses

See, for example, Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering:
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley; University of California
Press, 1978), Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven; Yale
University Press, 1989), and Jane Flax "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal
Unconscious; A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics,"
123

in

Harding and Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality
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Feminist object relations theorists thus supply an
account that stresses
the

girl's

and

girl,

more

The reason

their primary object of identification

person. Both

in

being. For the boy, this separation

in his

is

is

that for both boy

the mother — a female
this

order to develop an identity as an individual, separate

sees himself as fundamentally unlike
helped

for this

and boy must learn to separate themselves from

girl

primary object

human

relational identity.

individuation by

all

his

is

easier and cleaner, since he

mother. Furthermore, the boy

the societal cues regarding what

is

is

appropriate behavior for masculinity. He establishes his identity based on

an intellectual appropriation of the rules and principles of male behavior

he

is

given by society and by a father

absent and removed. The

example of what she

is

girl,

to

who

is, in

most cases,

on the other hand, has

become. Her mother

is like

a

concrete daily

her,

to maintain and nurture this likeness. Consequently, the

largely

and

girl

is

present

never

fully

individuates herself, but sees herself as continuous with and related to
others.

124

Thus

all

women

This universalizing

124
,

according to the theory, whether they,

move has been much

criticized.

Obviously,

it

in

is

problematic to extend the conditions of the modern, bourgeois, oedipal family to
all humans, so that women always and everywhere can be understood to
exhibit the same qualities as they have developed under a particular historical
believe the appeal to object-relations theory cannot
situation. For this reason,
strongly support a standpoint epistemology applied universally. do, however,
believe that the previously discussed appeal to women's specific mode of
I

I

domestic labor is both more legitimately universalizable (as empirical studies
have shown), and more analogous to the Marxist model, which bases the
legitimacy of the proletarian standpoint on their specific praxis. The problems of
universalization and essentialism will be discussed further in the last section of
this chapter, and in Chapter 4 below.

136

turn,

become mothers themselves,

continuity with their

own

are socialized

way

a

in

that preserves

mother, and prepares them for the profound

relationality with another that constitutes the
activity of mothering. This

greater relationality on the part of
theorists, leads

women

to

women, according

embrace the values

to standpoint

of cooperation, rather than

domination, unities of body and mind, subject and object, nature
and
culture; connectedness, rather than separation;

rather than death.

life

Thus, the fundamental perversion of the patriarchal viewpoint
according to Hartsock,

expresses

its

substitution of death for

life

125
.

is,

As Hartsock

this,

The substitution

of death for

sexual division of labor
rigid

in

life

results at least

the self experienced as walled city

Georges

Bataille

has

made

is

is

inner and

itself

logic

brilliantly clear

is

outer,

the

ways

in

which

this discontinuity

through to argue that reproduction

must be understood not

The core experience

what

discontinuous with others.

death emerges as the only possible solution to

and has followed the

part from the

The self-surrounded by

childrearing.

ego-boundaries, certain of what

in

as the creation of

to be understood

is

life,

but as death.

that of discontinuity and

125

Also see Mary Daly, Gyn-Ecoloay for an elaboration of the claim that
patriarchy is "necrophilic." Gyn-Ecoloav: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978. Also, see Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain, and Heart,"
(in Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 1983, vol. 9, no. 1),
where she argues that the continued following of male scientific norms will lead
to nuclear annihilation. In addition, many feminist theorists have pointed out the
emphasis on the death of the other as the desire that motivates the
master/slave dialectic in Hegel. It seems that Hegel could not conceive of
arguing that the most basic attitude

another possibility for relation, but

is

toward the other
autonomy.

threat to one's

is

to eliminate

its
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own independence and

its

consequences. As

a

consequence

of this experience of

discontinuity and aloneness, penetration of
ego-boundaries, or

fusion with another

is

experienced as violent. Thus, the desire for

fusion with another can take the form of domination
of the other.
In this

form,

other:

when

leads to the only possible fusion with a threatening

it

the other ceases to exist as a separate, and for that

reason, threatening being. Insisting that another submit
to one's

simply a milder form of the destruction of discontinuity

will is

the death of the other since

case one

in this

confronting a discontinuous and opposed

discontinuous embodiment. This
links

between sexual

Certainly,

death for
this

life is

it

is

a "perversion" of

commitment

perversion,

I

127
.

solely

its

perhaps one source of the

is

domination, and death. 126

what should

be.

Even

so,

on theoretical grounds, but

I

do not think

entails an

Notwithstanding whether this would indeed be

a

do not think that Hartsock has shown adequately that

patriarchy does value death over

Hartsock's argument. To

126

despite

a reasonable position to argue that substituting

view can be upheld

ethical

activity,

no longer

is

will,

in

life.

There seems to be a gap

move from women's

in

greater tendency to uphold

Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint," pages 299-300.
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could be argued that to value death over life is self-contradictory and
in that death would negate the ground of the

therefore a purely logical error,

manner

possibility of the enunciation of the position in a

which,

in

Kantian ethical theory, contradiction arises
maxim which underlies an action which

to universalize a

"categorical imperative." But this

similar to the

when an attempt

seems

perfectly consistent to hold that the best

a

little

life is

is

forbidden by the

sophistical, since

one which

way in
is made

is

it

could be

short and sweet,

so that death at the proper time becomes of greater value than life. And, of
course, contemporary public ethical discussion on such topics as the right to die
holds just such a view, and can be seen as quite reasonable.
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the more life-affirming values of nurturing, connection,
and relation, to

the claim that the entire patriarchal symbolic order
prioritizing of

death over

life

appears to

me

is

based on

a

to be an overstatement.

Is

it

not the case that such traditional values as rational
self-interestedness,

autonomy, and the control
consequences,

at

of nature

some times and

have had some

for

some

people,

life-affirming

in

well-documented (by feminists) neglect of other, more

women
male

experienced values? Furthermore, as

critics as

have argued

we have

addition to their
traditionally

seen above, such

Marx, Horkheimer and Adorno, Heidegger, and Gadamer

for a shift in traditional values

away from

the stress on

domination of nature and others, separation of subject from object,
interested individualism and autonomy.
style values

If

these newer, more feminist

can be extracted from the (malestream)

not the case that

it

is

tradition,

Based solely on the

it

is

is

guilty of

logic of Hartsock's claim, the material

conditioning of the vision of the ruling class results

partial

then

only with a feminist standpoint that perversity can

be overcome, or even that the entire patriarchal viewpoint
perversity.

self-

in its

having only a

viewpoint, but not necessarily a "perverted" one.

But what about the complementary claim that a feminist
standpoint

will

necessarily be

more comprehensive than the

androcentric one? Although here

I

believe there

is

support this claim, there are also some problems.
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traditional

some reason
In

to

support of the claim,

we

should consider the fact that the members of
an oppressed group

in

a

social hierarchy must, in order to survive,
learn to read their masters.

Thus, the oppressed

knowledge

of the

view. However,

be forced to follow the dictates and act on the

will

dominant

isn't

it

class,

and so must understand

also possible that there will be

possession of the dominant class that

oppressed? Part of the problem

for

their point of

knowledge

in

the

be unavailable to the

will

any oppressed group

is

to gain access

to the education and skills that the elite take for granted. Furthermore,

the experience of oppression

is

oftentimes damaging. Not only does an

impoverished social existence prevent access to education and

knowledge, but

it

can also lead to misunderstandings, distortions,

delusions, and mental incapacity. Thus,
is

it

seems

that the feminist vision

necessary as a complement to render more complete the knowledge

gathered on the basis of male experience, but not
less perverse or

more correct

in all

cases

will

it

be

128
.

Moreover, the analogy with Marxist epistemology breaks down on
this point. Part of the

reason for the objective superiority of the

proletariat's standpoint

theory,

is

is

that the proletariat, according to Marxist

the universal class.

As such, the

proletariat represents the

interests of society as a whole, and not just those of a particular

128

Certaintly, the

Lysenko

misguided proletarian science.
discussion of this episode

in

has taught us this in the example of a
See Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain, and Heart," for

affair

proletarian history.
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a

segment

of society. This fact

analysis of capitalism, and

Capitalism

doomed

129
.

is,

its

is

based upon Marx's

historical materialist

inevitable contradictions and crises.

according to the "science" of historical materialism,

The

proletariat

is

the continuously expanding class, for as

capitalism develops, the bourgeoisie,

other for profit,

will

who

continue to shrink

former capitalists are forced to

in

are

in

competition with each

numbers as more and more

join the ranks of the

working class. The

proletariat thus represents the fate of the vast majority.
Furthermore, the
historical destiny of the proletariat

structure altogether.

The

is

to abolish the antagonistic class

proletariat both represents

classless society, according to Marxist theory. But

is

and brings about the
there a

corresponding "scientific" or theoretical analysis which renders the
abolition of patriarchy inevitable? Without such,

standpoint theory claim that

women's

interests of society as a whole,

standpoint

129

is

in

how can

feminist

interests are identical with the

order to argue that the feminist

more comprehensive, and not merely equally

my

legitimate ?

130

aim in the dissertation to evaluate this claim. merely want to
point out that Marxist theory does have a theoretical basis for claiming the
inevitability of an end to oppression, such that the class responsible for its end
can be seen to be a universal class. My question is whether feminist theory can
make an analogous claim.
lt

130

These

is

not

As Ann Ferguson

I

argues,

women

do meet the Marxist

criteria for a class.

cohesiveness, historical
cohesiveness, domination relations, and lack of autonomy. See Blood at the
Root, chapter 6. However, it is not clear from this analysis whether, as a class,
women possess a privileged and superior epistemic standpoint, such that the
criteria include relations of exploitation, political

real social relations are visible only to their
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viewpoint.

granting to the previously oppressed the power to speak
and to be heard.

The necessity

of this political

commitment

will also

be evident

in

Sandra

Harding s arguments for the necessity and legitimacy of feminist
standpoint epistemology. Furthermore, Harding's theoretical-critical

method, as

itself

an instance of a standpoint approach,

will

demonstrate

the necessary appeal on her part to a political rather than a purely
theoretical ground.

question of her

My

method and

critical

failings of critique that

The

discussion of Harding

I

its

will

therefore focus on the

instantiation of the principles and

have discussed

in

the dissertation above.

Conflictual Nature of Feminist Empiricism

Sandra Harding's argument

for the necessity of a feminist

standpoint epistemology begins with a
alternative feminist epistemology

empiricism,

like traditional

critical

— feminist

empiricism,

practice that espouses the empirical

is

a

empiricism. Feminist

metatheory of

method and

that also claims that feminist inspired research

approximates the
position arose

research

131

in

in

examination of the

scientific

scientific objectivity, but

more

closely

traditional empiricist ideals. This epistemological

response to the increasing instances of feminist

the natural and social sciences of the last few decades.

For a recounting of

some

of this research, see

131

Donna Haraway,

Blaffer Hrdy, "Empathy,
"Primatology is Politics
Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female," both in Feminist Approaches to
Science, edited by Ruth Bleir (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988; also Sandra

by Other Means," and Sarah
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research

in

the natural and social sciences of the last few decades

With the increasing numbers

of

women

unexamined research topics were and
yielding conclusions not previously

research topic

system

is

is

in

are

131
.

the sciences, hitherto

now

being investigated,

known. One example

of

such a

the existence of a sex/gender system. The sex/gender

the system of male domination and control of

women's

productive and reproductive labor that permeates society and oppresses

women

132
.

visibility of

time

133
.

In

an early essay, Harding analyzes the reasons for the

the sex/gender system only at this particular historical

Why was

this pervasive societal

earlier social scientists?

phenomenon not

According to Harding,

question for epistemology, but

it

this

is

noticed by

an important

cannot be asked within the

traditional

epistemologies. The existence of such a system had been invisible to

131

For a recounting of some of this research, see Donna Haraway,
"Primatology is Politics by Other Means," and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "Empathy,
Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female," both in Feminist Approaches to
Science, edited by Ruth Bleir (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988; also Sandra
Harding, The Science Question in Feminism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986), and Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science. (New York: Pathfinder Press,

1978).

The existence of the sex/gender system was first proposed and analyzed
by Gayle Rubin. See Rubin, " The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political
Economy" of Sex," in Alison M. Jaggar and Paula S. Rothenberg, editors
Feminist Frameworks: Alternative Theoretical Accounts of the Relations
Between Women and Men, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984).
132

Sandra Harding, "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only
Now?" in Discovering Reality. Feminist P erspectives on Epistemology.
Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science edited by Sandra
133

,

Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983).
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scientists operating within the traditional epistemologies,
according to

Harding, because the basic tools and assumptions of these theories,
as

products of the social situatedness and biases of

their agents, are

inadequate to the task. Traditional empiricist, functionalist-relativist, and
Marxist epistemologies were thus unable to identify the system of sex-

gender oppression.
Again,

made by

essay, Harding

in a later

makes

a similar point 134 Claims
.

feminist scientists, guided by their political agenda, according to

Harding, appear more objective than those

Her epistemological question

scientists.

is

made by

how

traditional (male)

to explain this increased

objectivity.

.

.

.

Some

clearly

social scientists

and biologists have made claims that

have been produced through research guided by feminist

concerns.

Many

of these claims appear

supported, more

by evidence,

reliable, less false,

etc.)

more

more

plausible (better

likely to

be confirmed

than the beliefs they would replace. These

claims appear to increase the objectivity of our understandings of
nature and social
questions.

How

life.

can

.

.These claims raise epistemological

politicized inquiry be increasing the

objectivity of our explanations and understandings?

135

Sandra Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," in Women,
Knowledge, and Reality. Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by Ann
Geary and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), page 190.
134

135

Harding "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 190.
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This

same question guides Harding's

epistemological research

in "Is

There a Feminist Method?," 136 where she begins her inquiry
with the
"paradox" that
results than

politically

does

traditional research,

and

political interest

engaged research

bias.

However,

yields greater objectivity

which

a basic

in its

supposedly free of

is

problem

in

Harding's critique

arises here. Harding uses empiricism's inability to explain the superiority

of the feminist

view as evidence

for its inferiority to a

more

radical

successor science — feminist standpoint theory. But Harding appears to
be begging the question. She has not yet independently established the
superiority of feminist research

general, but

in

superiority as a self-evident given. This

assuming

it,

already

the history of philosophy,

in

and then asking

seems

method

of proving legitimacy

for an explanation,

when

it

to take this

has been

was

criticized

perceived by

many

be Kant's epistemological strategy. 137 Although Harding's attempt
justification

may

be satisfying to the already converted,

that feminist generated research

is

more objective

it

by

to

at

cannot prove

to the skeptic

who

136

Sandra Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" in Feminism &
Methodology (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987). Harding uses
.

this

same

strategy to argue the need for a specifically feminist epistemology

throughout
137
I

all

of her writings.

disagree with those

who

find

Kant guilty of

this in the Critique, (see

chapter 2, above), however, it is certainly his method (at least of exposition)
the Prolegomena to Anv Future Metaphysics, which was his more popular

statement of

his

epistemology.
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in

doesn't already believe

to be so. In fact, Harding readily admits this

it

point.

(While one need not find any particular claim more
plausible than the beliefs

would replace, one must

it

such feminist-inspired claim

more

likely to

is

more

at issue.

in

order to enter the

the justification of this kind of claim

It is

you cannot

If

some

plausible, less false,

be confirmed by evidence, etc.

discourse of this essay.
that

or other

find

find

any

scientific claim

generated

by feminist-inspired research to be reasonable, then do not waste
your time reading

But

in

further!).

138

order to ground, explain, or justify the superior objectivity of

feminist guided research, isn't

it

rather necessary to "bracket"

its

apparent superiority and to try to inquire whether there are independently
established grounds for believing that a feminist vision really

comprehensive, more

clear,

more adequate

to

its

task, than the

supposedly "neutral" viewpoint of the tradition? After
appeared to be the truth
appears to

many

in

it

business and

is

all,

the old beliefs

time they were proposed. (For example,

to be the natural order of things that

babies at home; that

engage

at the

women

politics; that

who

the abstract principles of justice
relies

must be applied equally

regardless of context or relationship; that "man, the hunter,"

responsible for the advance of

it

care for

predominantly men, rather than women,

upon which modern, western jurisprudence

138

more

is

human

civilization; that

human

Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 190.
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was
subjectivity

IS

most

fully

achieved

in

opposition to, rather than

in

connection with,

others, etc.) Harding's strategy thus appears circular,
for

it

seems

that

she presupposes the superiority of the view which she
ostensibly seeks
to establish.

However, Harding has not yet claimed that feminist

conducted research
research.

is

In fact,

is

per se more objective than non-feminist guided

feminist empiricism cannot establish this claim, which

one of the reasons that Harding believes that

epistemology makes better sense.

All

some

superior.

feminist inspired research

From the point

of

is

standpoint

a

empiricism can claim so far

view of the superiority

some

of

is

that

feminist-inspired

research, Harding then goes on to critique the less radical attempt at
justification for feminist scientific research given

The feminist

by feminist empiricism.

empiricist legitimation strategy argues that

"it is

social

biases — sexism and androcentrism — that are responsible for the false

claims that have been

made

in

biology and the social sciences." 139 These

biases operate as "blinders," making

it

impossible to perceive the

story of social reality, including the oppression of

women

marginalized others. Liberatory social movements,

those blinders, thus allowing a clear view of social

like

and

feminism, remove

reality.

mode

full

Again, Harding

of legitimation.

is

careful to point out the logic of this empiricist

is

not the case, according to feminist empiricism, that the feminist bias

139

Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 191.
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It

itself

guarantees greater correspondence with

Harding,

not that

is

It

all

politically

when

the results of such research

were produced through

guided research should not count against them ." 140

The

the fact that

norms

rather,

empirical support, the fact that they

Harding
strategy.

According to

feminist claims are automatically preferable

because they are feminist;

show good

truth.

is

aware

rightly

of the

problems with

this justificatory

superiority of feminist inspired research

it

produces results that are more

in

here grounded

is

in

accord with the same

of objectivity and truth of traditional empiricism.

However,

this

cannot adequately explain the paradox of feminist research's greater
objectivity, for in other

in

ways,

this very

success of feminist research

flies

the face of traditional empiricist commitments. There are three basic

problems which Harding

identifies that prevent a feminist empiricism

from being an adequate justificatory strategy

141
.

Firstly,

feminist

empiricism cannot accommodate the value of disinterested neutrality on
the part of the scientific researcher. According to standard empiricism,
the social identity of the scientist, and the context of discovery, are
irrelevant to the matter of justification and truthfulness. But

if,

as

feminist empiricism shows, a feminist viewpoint can yield greater
objectivity in the results of

140

its

studies, this

commitment

to value

Harding, "Feminist Justificatory Strategies," page 191.

Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from
Women's Lives. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 991 ), p. 117.
141

148

neutrality

cannot be held. Secondly, according to Harding, rigorous

enforcement of empiricist methods doesn't eliminate

all

social biases,

especially those that enter research via the questions that
form the

research project.

.

.

Feminist empiricism argues that an androcentric

picture of nature and social

feminist concerns seriously.

life

.

.

emerges from sciences that do not take
Traditional empiricism

researchers to locate their scientific projects
their subject

in

the

does not

same

direct

critical

plane as

matters ." 142 Since researches do not adequately reflect upon

the questions that they ask, biases can be present from the beginning of
a research project

which cannot be overcome

via the

answering of the

biased question. Thirdly, feminist empiricists, according to Harding, have

recognized that

it

is

oftentimes the very following of the traditional

empiricist

norms and methods

that lead to androcentric results.

particular

methods and norms

of the special sciences are

sexist and androcentric ."

It

to

have

142

".

.

.

The

themselves

143

appears, from Harding's analysis, that feminist empiricism wants

it

both ways — to hold onto the traditional empiricist standard of

Harding,

Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? page

1

16.

143

Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? page 1 17. For feminist
theory that argues this point convincingly, see Evelyn Fox Kei'er, Reflections on
Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), Genevieve
Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), and Andrea Nye, Words of
Power A Feminist reading of the History of Logic, New York: Routledge,
,

,

(

:

1990).
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objectivity, holding that

the superiority of

its

it

is

this standard alone that

research, while insisting that

it

proves or grounds
only research

is

guided by feminist concerns that meets that very standard
of objectivity

more

readily than other "value-neutral" research. Both
claims cannot be

consistently held, for

recommends

if

it

is

merely the fact of increased objectivity that

feminist science as superior, the fact of

its

feminism should

be irrelevant. As feminist empiricism argues, social biases are exactly the
stumbling blocks
resulted

But

if

in

in

the

way

of a disillusioned vision of reality that

the falsities of traditional empiricist male-conducted science.

biases are a problem,

why

isn't a feminist bias equally

Feminist empiricism wants to hold that feminist research

is

problematic?

more

objective, but this claim cannot be upheld according to the theory of

what makes

empirical science lead to objectivity

disinterestness).

that

if,

The problem with the feminist

(in

particular, researcher

empiricist approach

is

as feminist empiricism holds, traditional scientific norms are

already adequate to truth,

why

is it

only with a feminist perspective that

greater truth has been achieved? These considerations lead Harding to
reject feminist empiricism as a successful justificatory strategy for

feminist scientific research, and to seek a

more

radical

epistemology that

both abandons some, and modifies other, traditional empiricist norms and
standards.
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Harding s Strategy of immanent Critique
Harding clearly sees that feminist empiricism

relies

on

its

successful compliance with the already accepted norms and
standards of

good science. What

is

wrong with feminist empiricism

paradigm examples of good science also violate

that

is

at least

its

some

of those

norms, particularly the normative standard of value neutrality on the part
of the researcher.

And here we can see

the

way

in

which Harding’s

rejection of feminist empiricism relies on a strategy of
In

immanent

critique.

her defense of the standpoint approach, Harding begins again with the

alleged fact that feminist research projects yield

more objective

than mainstream research does. However, from

a traditional

results

epistemological perspective, there appear to be solid reasons that Harding

should not be permitted access to this traditional concept of objectivity.
Since there are, as I've already pointed out, scientists

who

disagree that

feminism's claims are objectively superior to mainstream claims,
Harding's original premise

is

hardly uncontroversial, and

is

therefore

inadequate as a firm premise for her further argument. Harding thus goes

on to modify the

traditional

concept of objectivity to include the notion

researcher social situatedness. But

if

this

is

the case, then the success of

feminist science at instantiating traditional objectivity (which Harding
cites for her evidence of feminist science's superiority)

disingenuous.

It

was

seems

to be

not the old concept of objectivity that feminist

151

of

research instantiated, but the
objectivity

inspired

was

present

knowledge

in

(like a

snuck the feminist values

the

new

one. Harding's

first

instances of successful feminist

new concept

of

Trojan Horse, those original feminist studies
inside).

Although

this

may appear

the traditional empiricist epistemology, this circle

may

also,

circular to

perhaps by

other epistemological standards, be seen as non-vicious,
and a legitimate

mode

immanent

of

critique, in its teasing out the presuppositions of

what

has been already accepted as true. Thus, Harding's epistemological
practice

is itself in

accord, not with traditional empiricist epistemology,

but with the standpoint theory she articulates. She doesn't shun her
political

commitment

to feminism, but places

it

front and center

research project. Thus Harding openly admits that she
find the

reasons

for,

and not to prove the fact

of,

is

in

her

attempting to

the success of feminist

research.

Another way to look

at this strategy

is

to see

as an instance of

it

standard empirical practice. Harding observed an anomaly to the existing
epistemological theory

(i.e.,

the fact of

some

feminist-directed research's

greater objectivity), and then adjusted the theory accordingly.

has thereby

shown

is

that the old epistemology

What she

was inadequate

to

describe even standard scientific practice. Harding makes use of this
interpretation

in

Whose

Science?.

traditional epistemologies

Whose Knowledge? Although
.

have argued

152

for the principle of researcher

disinterestedness,

(Descartes, Locke,

response

to,

in

actual practice the giants of

Hume, and

Kant) have developed their theories

and as explanations

knowledge gathering. According

When we
science,

modern epistemology

the historical changes

for,

in

in scientific

to Harding,

look at the history of epistemology and philosophy of
is

it

perfectly clear that the "Greats"

in

these fields are

attempting to theorize adequately the historical changes

in

the

kinds of beliefs that their age finds reasonable and the difficulty
of appealing to conventional
virtually

to

all

grounds to

justify

them. Thus,

the leading epistemologists of the modern era attempt

make sense

out of the difference

in

are generated and legitimated and the

the

ways

scientific beliefs

consequences

of these

differences for other kinds of belief, such as religious or political

and social

belief.

Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and other

philosophers are quite explicit about what they see as the social

causes of

their problematics

adequate

belief

and the new kinds of standards of

they must keep

in

mind. 144

Thus, Harding sees herself as continuing the tradition. For Harding,
epistemologies are explanations of the success of our knowledge-seeking
activities.

The modernist dream and conception

providing firm foundation and certainty

questions,

is

not one she subscribes

to.

in

of epistemology as

response to skeptical

She rather sees her task as

developing a meta-level explanation of what she already takes to be well
established — namely the success of feminist inspired research
natural and social sciences.

144

Harding,

She

will

in

the

do so insofar as she can with the

Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? pages 170-171.
,
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already existing tools of science, and she
invent

new ones

as needed. Thus, as an

altogether give up the

commitment

modify those tools and

will

immanent

to objectivity.

she does not

critic,

To do

so,

she believes,

could lead to relativism, and the forfeiting of the right
to claim the
superiority of feminist science. Thus, Harding

game, which requires

immanent

a balancing act

to the tradition

which she

development and modification

forced to play the

is

between the
is

critic's

traditional standards

and the simultaneous

critiquing,

of those standards to

accommodate

her

very Hegelian. As

we

theoretical needs.

Harding's strategy of immanent critique

have seen
greater or

in

Chapter

Two

of the dissertation, the

development

more enlarged consciousness comes about

problems, tensions, or contradictions
being studied.

made

is

In

in

of a

via a realization of

the attitude of consciousness

an attempt to resolve those contradictions, a

move

is

to a higher-level theoretical orientation that explains the previous

attitude as an appearance arising out of a limited perspective. This
dialectical, critical pattern

the level of

women

is first

scientists' practice.

science to feminist science
reflected

upon the

instantiated

conflicts

feminist epistemology at

The move from

was made necessary
between

hand, and the descriptions of social

by traditional

in

scientific research,

their

reality

own

as

women

scientists

experiences, on the one

and the questions being asked

on the other. And as

154

traditional

we

have seen,

Harding's analysis follows a similar pattern. She

investigates

first

feminist empiricism as a justificatory strategy, and

is

led to

seek an

alternative epistemological theory, on the grounds that
feminist

empiricism

comes

These

values.

some

into conflict with

conflicts require the

strategy, one which will question

move

of traditional empiricism's

to a

more

more deeply

radical justificatory

into the

fundamental

values and central tenets of the traditional theory — feminist standpoint
theory.

Harding thus
is

"too immanent,"

oriented science.

criticizes feminist

i.e.,

In this

out of that which she

is

too mired

in

empiricism on the grounds that

the norms and values of male

way, Harding gains
criticizing, as did

perspective or attitude of consciousness
doing, does Harding, also
totality of

assume an

which she

is

like

illegitimately too

hand, and as

a

degree of transcendence

Hegel as he critiqued each prior
in

the Phenomenology

Hegel, gain too

a part?

it

much

.

But

in

so

"altitude" out of the

Does Harding's "strong

objectivity"

transcendent normativity? Or, on the other

some postmodern

feminists

will

argue, isn't an appeal to

the value of objectivity merely an echoing of the universalist claim and
desire of mainstream/malestream science?
position

is

not too transcendent, but rather

tradition? Just

does

it

differ

In

which case, Harding's

still

too immanent

what does Harding mean by "strong

from the dominant conception of

155

in

the

objectivity," and

scientific objectivity?

how

conceived

145
.

Traditional scientific objectivity,

in its

application only to

the context of justification, and not the context of discovery, cannot
eliminate from research those social biases that are held by the entire

research community. Obviously,
exists

cases where that research community

in

society, and consists of the

in a stratified

economic, gender group,

their biases

dominant

racial, socio-

concerning marginalized groups

will

not be recognized or eliminated by their peers. Thus, objectivity, as
traditionally conceived,

is

too narrow. Traditional scientific objectivity

however, simultaneously too broad, according to Harding, as
that

claims

and interests should be eliminated from objective

social biases

all

it

is,

scientific research. This

was, as

we have

seen, the violation that

disqualified feminist empiricism as an adequate feminist epistemology.

Harding's proposal

is

to alter the traditional conception of objectivity to

include the context of discovery— to place the researcher's social biases

and questions

in

the

same

"critical

plane" as the object of study, thus

"strengthening" the concept of objectivity to accommodate the fact, as

she sees

it,

of politically motivated research yielding better,

more

empirically supported results.

We

can see that Harding's

critical

methodological strategy

manifests both the immanent and transcendent aspects

expect

145

in all

modes

of critique.

In fact,

her attempt at modifying and

See Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?
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we have come

,

pages 143-144.

to

she sees

it,

of politically motivated research yielding better,

more

empirically supported results.

We

can see that Harding's

critical

methodological strategy

manifests both the immanent and transcendent aspects

expect

in all

modes

of critique.

In fact,

we have come

to

her attempt at modifying and

extending the traditional notion of objectivity to accommodate the needs
of feminist science

discussed

in

is

similar to the

attempt by Horkheimer and Adorno,

Chapter One above, of preserving the desirable aspects of

the concept of rationality, while modifying those which were seen as
detrimental to the project of continued Enlightenment. Harding's "strong
objectivity" similarly shores up

what she sees as progressive

in

the

standard concept, by extending the concept to include norms governing
the context of discovery and the researcher's state of mind.

Methodologically, Harding's critique

itself is

guided by her modification of

standard empiricist norms. She adheres to traditional empiricist

methodology as she accepts the "givenness"

of feminist inspired

research's superiority, and then she modifies the epistemological theory
to

accommodate the observation

of her "given." This

is

standard

empiricist practice.

What

is

not so standard, and what she believes to constitute a

transcendence out of the

tradition,

however,

is

her extension and

modification of the concept of objectivity. According to Harding,
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it

is

necessary for her

ideal of increased objectivity to place the researcher's

values and interests

"in

same

the

She, herself, accomplishes

this.

critical

Thus, Harding, unlike traditional

empiricists, admits that her "given"

theory-ladenness

is

politically

plane" as the object of study.

is

already theory-laden, and that this

motivated. She takes as premise the

superiority of feminist research. Although she claims that this research

more objective than

is

traditionally inspired allegedly "value-neutral"

research, she then uses this fact to argue that the concept of objectivity
is

we

inadequate. But

can quite

not purely epistemic. For,

inadequate because

it

if

clearly see here that Harding's critique

traditional objectivity as

it

stands

is

is

cannot accommodate the fact of feminist

research's greater objectivity, then she must be relying on something
other than objectivity at the beginning of her inquiry to
feminist research

is

tell

her that

superior. This something else can only be the political

value of allowing greater participation of previously marginalized people
in

the

power discourse

of science. Harding's epistemological grounding of

feminist standpoint theory,

have previously examined,
be seen as equally

in

is

a

way

similar to the critical theorists

not entirely epistemic-theoretical, but must

political.

Furthermore, this extension of the concept of objectivity
original, nor is

it

we

distinctly feminist. For

development constitutes one

of the

example,

hardly

this epistemological

main contributions of the
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is

phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger, as well as the
hermeneuticists, Gadamer, and Dilthey

whose “Verstehen" philosophy

elaborated just such a theory of researcher interestedness and

its

necessary consequences for and involvement with the results of
research. Thus, Harding's attempt at developing an epistemology that
distinctively

and uniquely feminist

fails.

(Although

it

may

still

is

be true that

there are scientific truths that are distinctly feminist, the methodology of
their

attainment

is in

accord with the newer modifications of the

tradition,

such as hermeneutics and phenomenology.)

feminists

who

are capable of reflecting

presuppositions.

standpoint

is

In

addition, as

I

upon

their

It

own

is

not only

values and

have argued above, unless the feminist

taken to be not just complementary to research conducted

from other standpoints, but necessarily superior, the most
conclude from the work of Harding and others
required by feminism

is

is

we

can

that the epistemology

merely one type of alternative epistemology, but

not, perhaps, the only epistemically legitimate

with the feminist epistemologists that the

sum

one
of

146
.

Although

I

agree

human knowledge

benefit from additional research based on the lives of

women

will

and other

her latest work, Harding admits that the standpoints of other oppressed
groups offer equally legitimate knowledges. Thus Harding fails to justify the
superiority of the feminist standpoint over that of any other oppressed group,
146

but,

ln

more importantly, my

point above

that she cannot even justify the

is

standpoint of the oppressed over that of the dominant group, if all she can
prove is that researcher interestedness must be part of the object of study. See
Sandra Harding, Is Science Multi-Cultural (Bloomington: Indiana University
.

Press,

1

998).
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necessarily yield superior epistemic results. Thus, the choice to adopt
a
specifically feminist epistemology

must be made on

ethical

and

political,

rather than purely theoretical, grounds.

Subject and Object

Feminist Critique

in

As we have seen, Harding's attempt
knowledge adequate

at constructing a theory of

to feminist experience centered on reformulating the

concept of objectivity. Her

relative neglect of developing a critique of the

subjective side of the knowledge-formula led her to accept, without
sufficient epistemic ground, the superiority of feminist

research. This lack

opened her

women

conducted

Harding's view of the subject of knowledge also

in

to the charge of essentialism for her uncritical

as possessing

have superior insight

skills,

attitudes, and values

into social

seen to remain too immanent

in

and natural

view

of

which enable them

reality.

to

Thus Harding can be

the patriarchal order, too accepting of

the universalizing tendency of patriarchal reason to abstract from

important differences

among

subjects of knowledge (and agents of action

as well). Although she attempted to adjust the view of the subject's role

in

knowledge-creation by arguing for the feminist perspective as an

important guarantor of objectivity, she did not question the possibility of
the traditional conception of a subject of knowledge

once

social biases are

accounted

for,

who

is

ultimately,

capable of perceiving an

160

as well). Although she attempted to adjust the
view of the subject's role
in

knowledge-creation by arguing for the feminist perspective as
an

important guarantor of objectivity, she did not question the
possibility of
the traditional conception of a subject of knowledge

once

social biases are

independently existing

accounted
reality in

for,

who

is

ultimately,

capable of perceiving an

an undistorted manner. Harding merely

replaced the traditional male subject of knowledge with a female or a
feminist subject, and "corrected" the traditional concept of objectivity to

allow for this. Thus, Harding operates with an old-fashioned
epistemological dualism of subject and object, and her theoretical
revolution consists of adding value-interestedness to the formula which

connects these disparate epistemic terms.
radical

In this

respect, Harding

is

less

and revolutionary than her classic standpoint theorist

predecessors, Marx and Lukacs,

whose fundamental

epistemological

position denies dualism by theorizing objectivity as itself a product of the

constructive laboring activities of theory and action. According to

Lukacs,

it

is

a basic

mistake of bourgeois thought to equate the objective

with the immediate; rather the object of knowledge and action

is

always

necessarily mediated by theoretical and practical activity. The objective
reality is

constructed by such activity and does not pre-exist

Harding's static analysis seems to imply. For Lukacs and Marx

mediated construction of

reality itself that
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as

it,

it

allows the proletariat

is

this

standpoint

its

privileged grasp of the reality.

The

proletariat

can grasp the

objectively existing social relations because the
proletariat has

constructed them and has the power to terminate them.
Marxist

epistemology theorized the relation between subject and object
as
dialectically

mediate

in

a

way

that Harding does not.

Thus Harding

loses

another aspect of the possible relation between knower and known

which could account

for the superiority of the feminist standpoint

she seeks to establish

which

147
.

But even Harding's

new concept

of objectivity

is

too uncritical,

still

too dependent upon the standards and values of the tradition, to be
sufficient to the revolutionary project of constructing a theory of

knowledge which escapes the problems
remains theoretically
objectivity"

is

justified or

of the traditional biases, but

grounded

in its

legitimacy. For,

women

Either a naive realism

(or,

"strong

simply traditional objectivity plus value interestedness, as

turns out to be the case for Harding's reformulation,

mean?

if

more

is still

what could

presupposed, except that

precisely, feminists) can

this

now

more adequately access the

147

This criticism of Harding can perhaps be corrected by appealing to the
work of other feminist standpoint theorists. Thus, for example, Hartsock and

Smith can perhaps accommodate a more dialectical relation between feminist
subject and the really existing social relations. Part of the problem for Harding,
believe, is that she wants her standpoint epistemology to apply equally well to
natural, and not only social, scientific knowledge. This gives her a more difficult
case, since it is more readily acceptable to view human social relations as the
products of human activity and interpretation. A more thorough inquiry is here
in order which would examine the grounds for proletarian natural science and
I

their applicability to the feminist situation.
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objective, universal, unchanging reality; 148 or
the perspectivism of

women's

position points to a changing, fluid structure
for reality.

In

the

former case, the traditional concept of objectivity
remains untouched and
the strength of Harding's argument

is

comprehensiveness and perspicacity
Harding's

new

objectivity

concentrated solely

of the feminist viewpoint. Thus,

would simply

of the appropriate subject of

the greater

in

knowledge

fall

back upon her reassignment

(i.e.,

feminists) and she will

now

be open to the postmodernist critique of traditional concepts of
subjectivity and the charge of essentialism.

In

the latter case, an

epistemological and ontological relativism results, for
is

merely different from men's, on what basis can

superior?

Thus we have an

if

we

women's

reality

argue that one

is

ground theoretically the feminist

inability to

superiority-the superiority can, at best, be assumed for ethical/political
reasons.

149

Harding's position thus succumbs to the

critical

dilemma, as

148

Jane Flax also sees this implication of Harding's position and argues that
standpoint theory does indeed presuppose a naive realism. See Flax, Thinking
Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary

West

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)

149
It

may appear

that

correspondence theory of

if

we assume

a

.

"coherence" rather than

a

truth, Harding's claim for the superiority of the

feminist perspective can be upheld, and relativism avoided. Indeed

what Harding

it

seems

assuming a
not
completely
avoid
appeal
such
coherence theory of truth does
an
to
nontheoretical standards of justification as greater inclusiveness in discourses of
power for those who have been oppressed. Also, although a coherence theory
can account for the normative preference of greater comprehensiveness, if we
assume an incommensurability between the perspectives of feminists and those
of the tradition, coherence theories cannot supply a decision method. What is
needed, if a coherence theory is to be made to work, is an explanation of the
objective and necessary overlap between the feminist perspective and that of
plausible that this

is

herself envisions. Nonetheless,
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her position oscillates

between

a too transcendent modernist objectivism,

or a self-refuting relativism.

On
is

a positive note,

what we have learned from Harding's attempt

the necessity of the proper perspective for the activity
of critique. As

we have

seen, feminists are (although,

capable of formulating

critical

I

would argue, not uniquely)

questions and proposing alternate visions,

since they are directly acquainted with contradictions, tensions, and gaps
in

the accepted theories of reality. The feminist experience

at

odds with the

and

quite often

stories being told about reality, so that feminists

develop a bifurcated and alienated consciousness. This
position,

is

for centuries

it

is

hardly a

must

new

has been a commonplace of dialectical

philosophy (from Plato through Hegel to Marx) that the starting point of
critical

to

thought

is in

the identification of contradictions and the attempt

overcome and resolve them through

theoretical (and, practical,

in

the

we shall see, this is what argue Irigaray supplies. But in
the case of Harding, the superiority of the feminist perspective relies upon the
the tradition; and as

I

it can see everything that the traditional perspective can see, and
more; thus it reduces back to the first pole of the dilemma that grounds
Harding's work in the belief in women as a special subject class, resulting in an
believe that this general line of reasoning can
uncritical notion of objectivity.
be made to work, once the theoretical account is given that demonstrates the
objective necessity of the greater comprehensiveness of the feminist
perspective. Thus some type of coherence theory is the best we can have. On a
traditional desire for a theoretical and formal ground for the possibility of critical
knowledge, standpoint theory, like the other critical theories we have examined
thus far, comes up short. In fact, my conclusion will be that it is time that we
give up the dream for a narrowly rational ground for human thinking, knowing
and acting, and that we accept the necessary implication of our standards for

claim that

I

and ethical values.
theory can help us do just that.
thinking

in political

It

is
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my

further contention that feminist

case of Marx) development. Furthermore, as

we

One above, an

the identification of a crisis

in

essential aspect of critique

is

have seen

in

Chapter

the object of critique which leads to the development and employment

adequacy

of a criterion of

for the

makes feminism so promising

this vision

radically

new

is

truly other

new

as a

which allows the

of perspective

and

new

theory (action or institution).

critical orientation is just this

sustained as such,

instances of knowledge, which

what counts as knowledge

criteria for

change

possibility of an alternative vision.

is fully

in

150
.

it

What

can result

When
in

turn can lead to radically

Thus, not only has

feminism's critique of the traditional (male) subject of knowledge

produced new instances
in

this chapter,

of

knowledge

(e.g.,

those mentioned previously

such as the existence of the sex/gender system

or

sex/affective labor), but feminism's epistemological contributions to the

concept of the subject of knowledge should also

what there
it.

is

to

know

(a

new

yield a

new concept

of

ontology) and of what counts as knowing

(Harding's "strong objectivity" failed to meet this expectation, and

thus failed at overcoming the terms of the

critical

dilemma.)

Perhaps, however, another deeper look at the subjective side of
the knowledge equation can yield

150

This

seems

some suggestions

for the desiderata of

to be an echoing of the traditional Cartesian methodology.

Descartes identified an instance of certain knowledge, and then extracted from
that instance the criteria for its certainty. Similarly, as Harding argues, feminists
can produce new instances of knowledge; the task is then to analyze those
instances (as Harding attempted to do) and to make explicit what it is about

them

that accounts for their being knowledge.
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a theory of the epistemological object that

problem of grounding
providing

some

of

critique.

I

can help us overcome the

believe that Irigaray can be seen as

what we need

to accomplish this task. Irigaray's

women

interpretation of the subject theorizes

as radically "other" than

the traditional subject of patriarchal knowledge and power.

In

so doing,

she too invokes the charge of essentialism. Perhaps, however, feminists

have been too hasty

in

dismissing essentialism as (an essential?) crime or

sin against the radicalism of feminist critique. In fact,

that anti-essentialism

essentialism,

is first

it

is itself

all ?

152

necessary to define

151
it

.

If

essentialism further the feminist project
of finding a justified theory

turn to Irigaray

in

Isn't

is

then possible that

it

— is

required

Perhaps there can be an essentialism which

"strategic" rather than metaphysical.

dilemma

has been argued

essentialist, for in order to dismiss

the use of essence — the notion of what a thing
theorize at

it

so,

in

which

might

this

order to

is

type of

the face of the

is

in

critical

sufficiently radical?

I

now

hopes of answering these questions.

See Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips
with Irigaray ."in Enaaaina With Iriaarav edited by Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor,
Margaret Whitford, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
151

152

Interestingly, this idea

is

explicitly

expressed

in

Plato's Gorgias,

where

it

and universals, the known world
is argued that without definitions, distinctions
would collapse into indistinguishable matter, according to the principle of

Anaxagoras. See Plato's Gorgias, 465d.
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CHAPTER 4

POSTMODERN FEMINISM THE ANSWER?

IS

What poses problems

in reality

turns out to be justified by a logic

that has already ordered reality as such. Nothing
escapes the
circularity of this

law

—

Female sexualization

is

thus the effect

of a logical requirement, of the existence of a language
that

is

transcendent with respect to bodies, which would necessitate,
in

order-nevertheless-to become incarnate, "so to speak,"

taking

women

one by one. Take that to mean that

not exist, but that language exists. That

owing

to the fact that

woman

woman

does

does not exist

language— a language— rules as master,

and that she threatens-as a sort of "prediscursive reality"?— to
disrupt its order (Irigaray, This

In

critical

the last chapter,

dilemma

we began

to

Sex Which

examine the way

Is

Not

in

One).

which the

arises for feminist theory. Sandra Harding, as

we have

seen, distinguishes three different epistemological approaches to the
critical

dilemma and the problem

of justifying feminist theory: feminist

empiricism; feminist standpoint theory; and postmodern feminism. This
tripartite division

is in

keeping with the work of

much

other feminist

theory which seems to maintain a similar schematic division, depending

upon the emphasis

153

or aspect of feminist theory being categorized

153
.

For instance, earlier generation feminist theorists held to a categorization

scheme that consisted of radical feminism, socialist feminism, and beyond; or
there was the scheme of equity (or liberal) feminism, difference feminism, and
postmodernist feminism; or according to Kathy Ferguson, we now have
rationalist feminism, cosmic feminism, and linguistic feminism; or as C.
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What
third

all

these classification schemes seem to hold

category of postmodern feminism. This

third

in

common

much

better understood and

categories. Obviously,

need of

it

is

it

fully

category that

this third

clarification. In fact,

more

seems

characterized this third category not

that

in

its

fit

in

the

analyzed,

is in

most desperate

most work thus

terms of

the

category seems

every case to be a catch-all category for theory which doesn't
previous two,

is

far

has

positive theoretical

attributes, but rather in opposition to or negation of that

which

it

is

not — namely modernist or enlightenment values concerning the nature of
the subject, the object of knowledge and action

and the tools with which

we know

name, postmodern, designates
absolute, identity

in

terms of

a

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

nature and society)

language, reason). Even the

a relational, rather than a positive or

transcendence or succession.

Thus, for example, Jane Flax has summarized postmodernism as

announcing or holding the death

of

Man, History, and Metaphysics, as

these terms have been understood according to their importance

for the

Enlightenment view of a unified, autonomous subject endowed with
reason, capable of knowing the true story of history and the hidden,

DiStefano sees it, rationalist feminism; anti-rationalist feminism; and
postmodern feminism. See Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Hu man Nature,
(New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983); Kathy E. Ferguson, The Man
Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993); and Christine DiStefano,

Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism,"

in

"Dilemmas

Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990).
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of Difference:

Linda Nicholson, ed.

universal truths of natural and social reality
of these

154
.

But what can be the result

deaths," especially for feminism, which seems
to rely

fundamentally on

its ability

to argue

the

in

name

of progress, reason, and

justice for the emancipation of an identifiable
social group,

subjectivity and

hence correlative

postmodernist feminist

embedded

in

rights

critique, or

is

whose

have been denied? Can there be

feminist critique necessarily

the modernist tradition?

Immanence and Transcendence

in Irigaray's

Postmodern/Difference

Feminism
According to Rosemarie Tong, postmodern feminism takes

from Simone de Beauvoir's claim that
masculinist order

work

155
.

woman

is

the "other" of the

Certainly this claim has been instantiated

of Luce Irigaray,

who

sees

off

woman's otherness

in

the

as the necessary

mirror that reflects the male image back to him and thus assures him of
his legitimacy

and superiority. Thus, most commentators see

an essentialist, since she theorizes the differences between

women,

Irigaray as

men and

the necessity of those differences for the upholding of the

patriarchal order, and the apparent grounding of those differences,

154

Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism. &
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990), page 214.
155

See Rosmarie Tong, Feminist Thought:
Westview Press, 1989), Chapter 8.

(Boulder:
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A Comprehensive

Introduction,

oftentimes,

in

women's

biology.

It

would therefore seem that

mistaken to identify Irigaray as a postmodernist; however,

I

it

believe that

her critical methodology demonstrates postmodernist
principles,
of her (alleged) essentialism

and

"difference" or radical feminists
that

I

am

interested

in,

I

am

the purposes of this study.
Irigaray s

156
.

in

spite

with the position of the

Since

it

is

her critical methodology

classifying her as a postmodernist critic for

As we

work, as reflected

structuralist

affinity

is

in

shall see, the greatest influences

come from

her methodology,

and post-modernist sources;

Irigaray

on

post-

employs Lacanian

psychoanalytic principles and strategies; Heideggerian and Nietzschean
anti-metaphysical critiques; Derridian-style deconstruction; and linguistic

and aesthetic rhetorical tactics and tropes,

all in

her provocative feminist

reading of the history of western philosophical and psychoanalytic
theory.

Furthermore, Irigaray's

critical

target

is

not simply the content of

theoretical descriptions and characterizations of

focus

is

more

and gender; her

precisely understood as a critique of modernist

representationalism

156

women

Such feminists

itself.

For Irigaray, the very conceptual structure,

are usually

opposed

to the "equity" feminists

who

see

feminism's main task as the elimination of privileges based on (alleged) gender
differences. The so-called "difference' feminists stress the ways in which
women are different from men, and include such figures as Mary Daly, Carol
Gilligan, and Luce Irigaray. These two divisions represent the basic and constant
dichotomy in feminist theory, as mentioned previously in the discussion of the
tripartite classification schemes; the third category typically being reserved for
the less understood "catch-all" category of postmodernist feminism.
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values, and

perspective.

methods

of theory-construction

respect, she

In this

is

to operate at the

critiquing male-centered theory about

strategic purposes, to re-define

theory. Her elucidation of

In

addition, her "essentialism"

"meta"

or theoretical level. In

women,

women

for

Irigaray

ways

intrinsic to the

well that

it

which

in

it

women, and

contradicts

within

critiques

what

male representational order, and, as such,

in

is

valid.

157
I

believe that Irigaray

said

is

woman
is

knows

not

women who

As we

shall

quite

exist; not

Irigaray

may

essences. But to do battle at the

well prove to be an "essential" tool.

see more clearly below, Irigaray's understanding of the

patriarchal situation

makes

in

which

women

find

themselves poses the

this point clear in the following

"Can anyone, can

I,

critical

passage from an interview:

elaborate another, a different, concept of femininity?

no question of another concept of femininity.
To claim that the feminine can be expressed in the form of a concept
to allow oneself to be caught up again in a system of "masculine"
representations, in which women are trapped in a system of meaning which

There

in

the concrete (or "ontic," to borrow a term from Heidegger)

theoretical level, essence

157

traditional

For Irigaray, the notion of an "essence"' or "concept" of

it.

any absolute or objective way

way,

attempting, for

woman's essence begins immanently

that essence by revealing the

is itself

is

and within the

the traditional theory which already essentializes

about

a masculinist

both a deeply radical feminist and an

anti-modernist or post-modernist thinker.

must be understood

embody

is

is

serves the auto-affection of the (masculine) subject. If it is really a matter of
calling "femininity into question, there is still not need to elaborate another
"concept" — unless a woman is renouncing her sex and wants to speak like me"
This Sex

Which

Is

Not One (p.122-123).
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dilemma

for her in a profoundly challenging

way. For

Irigaray, following

Lacan, language, the entire representational-symbolic order,
centered; thus any use of language by feminists would

always already co-opted. Given
order as phallocentric,

is itself

seem

male-

to be

Irigaray's identification of the linguistic

how does

she avoid the

critic's

dilemma with

respect to the totality of language? Since, according to the precepts of
this order, as Irigaray

uncovers them, women's speech

either imitative or "hysterical,"

how can

is

necessarily

she herself assume the subject

position as the author of critique which expresses the truth about

women? As
.

.

.

Dianne Chisholm puts

why does she mime

it,

so perfectly those projects, projections,

productions, contraphobias of phallogocentric discourse,

does she mirror so
psychoanalysis,

readily the

why does

production of theory
Is

in

'woman'

of philosophy

she lend her writing to the

why

and of
re-

seeming complicity with masculine desire?

she suggestible? Hysterical? Does she herself not entertain

vicious circle

when

as a

woman

a

she enters the circles of

philosophy and psychoanalysis where

"woman"

(if

Irigaray

is

correct) functions as a trope of female absence and negation to

constitute the figurative illusion of male presence and autonomy?
In

entering these circles, does Irigaray not,

philosopher/analyst, take this
universal

— symbolic,

women,

and, consequently,

being spoken
in

"woman"

too

ontological, historical

for, to a

like

mutism

like

the

literally

to be the

— (non)representative

of

the hysteric, resign herself to

of

other words, does irigaray not

miming an imposed femininity?

mime
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the philosopher/analyst as

a

woman who has been

speaks, forgetting that

In

Speculum of

displaced by the discourse that she

this

"woman" is

the Other

Woman

159
,

mime ? 158

also a

Irigaray offers us a reading of

the history of western theory (especially of the feminine) from an
alternative perspective

— that

which has been defined as object and

"other," rather than from the point of view of the traditional (male)

subject of representation. Thus Irigaray's central methodological

metaphor
which

in this

text

is

the image of the speculum, the curved mirror

reflects but distorts,

and which

is

necessary to the examination

(by male medical science) of the curved contours of

women's

genitalia.

This image of the speculum indicates Irigaray's understanding of the

importance of the perspective of the other
Irigaray

subsumes Harding's

for performing critique, thus

point about the necessity of an appropriate

(feminist) perspective. But already

in

the image of the speculum Irigaray

encodes more than Harding theorized. For the speculum
mirror capable of representing the

same

reality that the

is

not a

flat

masculine order

theorized (only incompletely, according to Harding's theory). The reality
itself will

would

be of another kind. Given this dependence on perspective,

like to interpret Irigaray's

postmodernism as an elaboration

I

of,

Dianne Chisholm, "Irigaray's Hysteria," in eds., Carolyn Burke, Naomi
Schor, Margaret Whitford, Engaging With Irigaray (New York; Columbia
158

,

University Press 1994).
159

Luce

Irigaray,

Speculum

of the Other

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
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Woman

,

translated by Gillian C.

Gill

rather than

in

perspective,

opposition to, standpoint theory. For Irigaray, the feminine

if

it

can be developed (and

this

is

a big "if," given her take

on the patriarchal nature of the symbolic), can provide an alternative to
the traditional order.
Irigaray's

speculum turns the tables on the

tradition, inserting into

the text of the western canon the instrument of reflection wielded by the
feminine, rather than the masculine, as subject. She thus simultaneously

reminds us that the traditional male story

is

also a representation or

reflection, and, as such, an interpretation rather than a direct perception

of reality. Furthermore, Irigaray

shows us

that the male-authored story

is

not the only possible one. Speculum can thus be seen as an example of

what Seyla Benhabib
the traditional story

calls "defetishizing critique ,"

is

cast

in

160

for the legitimacy of

doubt by the demonstration

of another

possible interpretation. This use of the metaphor of the mirror also
alludes to the style of Derridian deconstruction, as Irigaray,

like Derrida,

attempts to read the "tain" or other side of the standard mirror of
representation

161
.

Like Derrida, Irigaray will

examine the standard

operations of reflection to find their necessary ground

160

See Chapter One

in

that which they

which
thus refuting the assumption of

for the characterization of this type of critique,

merely lays out the possibility of an alternative,
necessary universality of the position being critiqued.

For a discussion of this image as it pertains to Derrida's method, see
Rudolf Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection ^
(Cambridge: Flarvard University Press, 1986).
161
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deny, repress, and oppose. Thus the male
culture's reading of female
sexuality will be exposed as necessarily dependant
upon female desire

and functions.

Irigaray thus begins

Speculum with

most contemporary and accomplished

theory, the

feminine that she critiques

in

a reading of Freudian

of the theories of the

the text, and ends Speculum with a reading

of Plato's parable of the cave,
original denial of the feminine

which she interprets as
on the part of reason.

the traditional chronological order,

in

a story of the

Irigaray's reversal of

"deconstructing" Freud

first

and

Plato last, can be seen as her attempt to "unravel" the metaphysical
theoretical tradition beginning with the already

present and pulling on a single thread
"stitch"

in

until

woven

tapestry of the

she comes to the

original

the complex image of the Platonic cave.

The Platonic

Womb

of Theory

Irigaray reinterprets Plato's

cave parable as a

flight

from the

maternal, thus demonstrating the radical reversal of meaning which can

be achieved via a switch of perspective. Furthermore,

in

taking on Plato,

Irigaray also critiques the entire philosophical tradition, for Platonic

philosophy
philosophy.

is

considered the beginning, the

And

origin,

womb

the

of

this point of origin for philosophical thinking, for

reason's evolutionary dialectic out of the darkness of

seen as encapsulated

in

Plato's parable of the cave.
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illusion,

Thus

can be

Plato's cave

parable functions for Irigaray
narrative s function for

in

a

manner

Odysseus

similar to the

Adorno and Horkheimer. The cave

is

the story of

the beginning of western reason. Irigaray thus reads
Plato's cave as a

metaphor

for the

("hystera"), but according to Irigaray, Plato

womb. The neck

inverts this

in

womb

womb

the front, and the opening out of the

significance of this inversion

as the true origin of
is

of the

life

is

clear.

is

at the back, the

womb

back wall

is

slopes upward. The

The dependence on the maternal,

(and of reason),

is

denied. Furthermore, the cave

revealed by Plato to be a place of copies, representations, and

simulacra which,
not

itself

inherent

the

like a

real.

conjurer's trick, mirrors and mimics reality, but

The concept

of reversal

is

again at play, as

it

is

the operation of a mirror to reverse the image. Thus, Irigaray

in

critiques not just Platonic idealism, but also the operation of

representationalism upon which the traditional philosophical quest for
truth relies.
This entrance to the cave takes the form of a long passage,
corridor, neck, conduit, leading

upward, toward the

sight of day, and the whole of the cave
this opening.

Upward— this

is

oriented

light or
in

the

relation to

notation indicates from the very start

that the Platonic cave functions as an attempt to give an
orientation to the reproduction and representation of something

that

is

is

always already there

in

the den. The orientation functions

by turning everything over, by reversing, and by pivoting around
axes of symmetry. From high to low, from low to high, from back
to front, from anterior to opposite, but
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in all

cases from a point of

view
back.

in

front of or behind something

Symmetry plays

a

lost

cave, situated

decisive part here — as

reflection, inversion, retroversion

have

in this

— and

you

will

your bearings as soon as you set foot

in

the

projection,

always already
in

the cave;

it

will

turn your head, set you walking on your hands, though Socrates

never breathes a word about the whole mystification, of course.
This theatrical trick

is

unavoidable

functioning of representation

Irigaray

economy

is

shows

based on

in this

a

(

you are to enter

if

into the

Speculum page 244 ).
,

essay that the Platonic representational

mimetic doubling and

a reversal of reality.

Furthermore, as Irigaray points out, the cave functions as a "theatrical
arena" for the action. Irigaray therefore reveals that the work of western
representationalism, far from being natural, has been "staged."
addition, this staging involves the control of

what the prisoners

In

are able

to see

and discuss. Thus, vision and speech are shown to be the primary

means

of circumscribing the real in the

economy

of Platonic metaphysics.

But even here, Irigaray shows us that the repressed feminine asserts
itself,

as she points out the necessity of a background of silence which

allows for the voices of the prisoners to echo. This background points
metaphorically to the necessity of the feminine principle which, insofar as

it

is

denied voice, serves as

silent

medium and

setting for the male

symbolic economy. Irigaray's deconstructive technique here reveals what
is

casually passed off as unimportant

remark that some of the prisoners

in

talk,
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Plato's account

(i.e.,

while other remain

the offhand

silent) to

be of

utmost importance

in

the

critical

task of mining that which has been

buried beneath the surface of representation.

Thus

Irigaray's deconstructive technique

is

simultaneously a

psychoanalysis of the metaphysical tradition. Like psychoanalysis, this
critical

but

is

method cannot be understood

solely as a theoretical intervention,

also essentially a therapeutic practice. Irigaray conducts therapy on

the tradition, and
to listen to the

like

any good therapist, one of her basic techniques

symptoms described by

symptoms — the

her patient. These

contradictions, gaps, and desperate attempts to cover

over that which has been repressed— thus

new
the

is

will

themselves supply the

standards, values and concepts which can then be used to structure

new economy toward which

Irigaray

is

working. These values

will

therefore include a return to the concrete, the dark and the earth, to find

what has been buried

Freud's Libidinal
Irigaray's

there, and to listen to the significance of silence.

Economy
development

of the female (feminist) perspective

elaborates a characterization of
the male tradition's theory of
attributes to

women

is

women

as a by-product of her reading of

women. The "essence" which

one which already belongs

to

women

Irigaray

according to

the masculinist tradition. Thus her "strategic essentialism" functions as

immanent

critique, for

it

works from within the already

178

existing theory.

Irigaray

uncovers and remarks upon the places

women where women,

the traditional theory of

in

even as defined by that theory, don't

fit.

Irigaray

thus reads the gaps and contradictions as symptoms of the repression,

and allows these places to become opportunities
different

it

is

economy

of desire

— of

understanding a

for

motivation, experience and pleasure. But

important to note that the possibility and structuring concepts of

economy

alternative

are already presupposed

in

the tradition's

unconscious. Thus, where the traditional Freudian theory
categorizes

terms of unity and

in

repressed, for she

contact with

is

duality,

woman must

neither one nor two. Her sexuality

two

her genitals comprise

itself, for

this

lips

explicitly

be denied and
is

always

in

which touch each

other.

.

.

.

woman's

autoeroticism

man needs

to touch himself,

body, language.

minimum

is

.

.

.

And
As

very different from man's.

order

In

an instrument: his hand, a woman's

this self-caressing requires at least a

woman, she touches

herself

in

and of

herself without any need for mediation, and before there

is

any

way

of activity.

for

to distinguish activity from passivity.

herself"

all

Woman

"touches

the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so,

for her genitals are

formed

Thus, within herself, she

is

of

two

lips in

already

continuous contact.

two — but

not divisible into

162
one(s)— that caress each other.

Sex Which

Not One, translated by Catherine Porter
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), page 24.
162

Luce

Irigaray, This

Is
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To the male, her
seen,

if

genitals yield the horror of a "nothing to be

yet this horror attests to the existence of an act of repression,
for

the feminine genitals were indeed simply nothing, there would
be no

horror. Thus, Irigaray reads "the blind spot" of Freud's theory,

which

is

understanding of the nature of the feminine. For Freud (and the entire

his

psychoanalytic tradition which he founded),

women

can only be

understood on the male model. This misunderstanding leads Freudian
theory into various contradictions and gaps, which Irigaray identifies.

These "gaps" include the following. 163 Because the male

economy

is

libidinal

the only one recognized by Freud, feminine anatomy can be

seen only as "lack" or deficiency; feminine desire can only be envy

for

the "superior" male organ; feminine sexual function can only be maternal.

True feminine desire and pleasure cannot be recognized or understood on
this

model, for they

differ radically

from the male "norm" which supplies

the categories, values and structuring concepts for the understanding of
sexuality

in

general.

Another basic contradiction
identifies centers

many
to

pages

Freudian theory that Irigaray

on the thesis of penis envy. Most obviously, and as

feminist theorists have pointed out,

assume

163

in

See
1 1

that the

Irigaray,
-1

little girl will

Speculum "The
.

it

seems absurd and unfounded

consider her genitals "inferior," rather

Blind

Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry,

33.
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,

than merely different. After

they give her great pleasure and should

all,

therefore be a valued part of her body.

presupposed valorization

It

only according to an already

is

of both the penis and the specular 164 that

feminine genitals could be considered less valuable than the male's.
Freud,

little girl's

But

betrays this presupposition and desire by attributing the

in fact,

alleged penis envy to the phallic phase of sexual development.

phase, according to Freud's theory, "the

in this

boy," that

is

exactly the

to say that the girl's libidinal

same

development

as the boy's, centered on the

simply the penis substitute.

Why

clitoris,

then should the

a

little girl is

is

little

at this point

which

for Freud

envy what she

girl

believes she already has? Irigaray sees the answer to this question to

not

in

the
Is

but

girl's desire,

lie,

Freud's.

in

the primitive, or most primitive, character of "penis-envy" not

an essential factor
In

is

in

establishing the primacy of the

making the phallus necessarily the archetype

primal sex?

And making

for

male organ?

sex? The

the penis the best representational

equivalent of the Idea of sex? There can only be one desire: the
desire to ensure domination by greed, by appetite for

appropriation.
girl's

If

anything were to contradict this desire— the

pleasures, for example — the whole

affects, and affectations,
is

difficult to predict

powers might

164

That the

a basic

theme

would have

where

is

which

And

it

a shift in the attribution of sexual

over-valued

of Irigaray's,

of sexual

to be reinterpreted.

lead. But the misprisions

visible

economy

little

is

needed to maintain the

the masculine representational system
lent support by the etymological
in

connection between "theory" from the Greek,

181

'

theoria'

and "vision

.

is

,

established order lead one to suspect that such an operation

might take us

far

(

Speculum

p. 58).

There are a number of additional contradictions that
identifies in Freud s theory. For

one

Irigaray

thing, traditional Freudian theory can

understand the activity of breast feeding only by assimilating
category of production. Quite obviously, this assimilation
captures a

woman's

in

to the

it

way

no

experience, which, according to Irigaray, involves a

great deal of pleasure.

Once

again,

women's

pleasure

is

not recognized.

This lack of recognition of female pleasure/experience

is

again reflected

in

Freud's notion of "passive aims." Although Freud claims to reject the

stereotypical active/passive distinction for sexual difference, he

reintroduces

cannot

fit

it

with his notion of passive aims. Since feminine sexuality

the male model,

it

is

seen as orientating

itself

toward passive

sexual goals, rather than as challenging the active/passive dichotomy.

Furthermore, the teleological nature of male sexuality

is

assumed

to apply

to female sexuality as well. Freud never considers the possibility that the

very notion of aims or goals

may

the feminine sexual experience
theoretical glitch

in

in

neither structure nor adequately capture

the

the Freudian story

evolution to femininity

is

way

it

does the masculine. Another

comes with

a "struggle," but at the

182

his claim that the

same

time, Freud holds

that the female

Why

constitution,

if

followed naturally, leads to femininity.

then the inevitable struggle? 165
All of

the above contradictions can be seen as presupposing the

masculine need for "sameness" and the
Irigaray

makes

inability to

recognize difference.

excellent critical use of this presupposition to identify a

characteristic of the male order that can only be received by that tradition

with horror. The masculine desire for sameness indicates a presupposed

homosexuality.

Thus Freud discovers — in

a sort of blind reversal of

repressions — certain variously disguised cards that are kept

preserved or stored

away and

values of the game, of

ego and, to put

homo.

.

.

(as)

in a

it

lie

beneath the hierarchy of

the games: the desire for the same, for

all

the self-identical, the self
alter

that

same, and again of the

nutshell, the desire for the auto.

sameness,

it

is,

is

a derivation of the

Speculum

,

now and

forever, determined within the project,

Irigaray's critical strategy involves the traditional critical style

we have

65

lrigaray

same

Mimesis

already seen

Adorno and Horkheimer)

1

the

pp. 26-27).

Irigaray's Strategy of

that

.

problematics of

the projection, the sphere of representation, of the

Thus

.

the male, dominates the representational economy.

"Sexual difference"

(

similar, the

,

in

critical theorists

(most

explicitly, in

of letting the contradictions speak for

Speculum "The
.

previous

Blind

Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry,"

pages 11-1 33.
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themselves. But there

is

also another

strategy operates. Irigaray

mimes

way

which

in

Irigaray's critical

She imitates and reproduces

her object.

at a higher theoretical level the very contradictions that

she finds. For

example, Irigaray's critique of Freud can be seen as a mimetic repetition
of

one aspect

of the psychoanalytic theory that she critiques. According

to the "castration

fear

complex" the

once he catches sight

genitals.

little

boy

is

overcome with

feelings of

of the "nothing to be seen" of the female

The boy experiences

this visual revelation as a threat to the

cathexis he has attached to his

own

genitals. This feeling of threat

experienced at the recognition of an alternative possibility for what had
previously been thought to be the universal condition can be seen as
similar to the condition

evoked by what

I

Benhabib, calling "defetishizing critique."

have been, following Seyla
In

analyzing this aspect of

traditional Freudian theory, Irigaray simultaneously points out the deep-

rooted reasons for resistance on the part of the male-centered symbolic
order.

She repeats

libidinal

at the theoretical level

an unveiling of an alternative

economy. Just as the boy's glimpse

traumatic for him, as

it

of the female genitals

was

indicated the possibility of castration, so the

glimpse of another possible

libidinal

economy, provided by

threatens the male-centered representational
as universal truth. This miming

is

a

economy

form of immanent

Irigaray,

in its

self-conceit

critique, for

Irigaray takes so seriously Freud's theoretical story that she raises

184

its

truth to the level of

what she

is

its

effect on her very capacity to speak, shaping

able to say.

The only way she can speak her feminine

alterity

within the existing theoretical traditions, and according
to the very theory
of that tradition,

is

to

mime

Freud.

The psychoanalytic

tradition has set

the terms for the discussion of female sexuality. But since
psychoanalytic

theory

is

self-contradictory, for

denies the feminine, to
Irigaray

hegemony

mime

it

simultaneously depends upon and

that theory

forced to use a mimetic

is

that masculine theory has

in

is

already to critique

critical

it.

strategy due to the

the realm of legitimate

discourses. The language which could adequately express feminine
sexuality does not yet exist. Thus, the only alternative to speaking

female sexuality within the terms
is

hysteria

manner

166
.

Irigaray therefore

of the hysteric

in

limited. Hysteria operates

laid

down by male

"mimes" the theory

order to

make

psychoanalytic law
in

the exaggerated

her point that the theory

by miming discourse.

Its

is

gestures, silences,

paralyses, and nonsensical utterances, imitate meaningful speech.

166

As

Irigaray puts

it:

"Why make

the

little girl,

the

woman,

fear,

envy, hope,

more or less the same terms as the little boy, the man? And
why does she comply so readily? Because she is suggestible? Hysterical? But
now we begin to be aware of the vicious circle. How could she be otherwise,
even in those perversities which she stoops to in order to "please" and to live
hate, reject, etc.

in

up to the "femininity" expected of her? How could she be anything but
suggestible and hysterical when her sexual instincts have been castrated, her
sexual feelings, representatives, and representations forbidden? When the father
forces her to accept that, while he alone can satisfy her and give her access to
pleasure, he prefers the added sexual enjoyment to be derived from laying down
the law, and therefore penalizes her for her (or his own?) "seduction
fantasies"?" (Speculum, pages 59-60).

185

Furthermore, hysterical miming, according to the authoritative terms
of
the psychoanalytic discourse, conveys an "excess" which, although not

expressed, constitutes a latent potential meaning. According to

explicitly

Irigaray,

.

.

.

[the "neurotic pathology" of hysteria]

signifies at the

it

back, kept

same time

is

that something else

other words, there

in reserve. In

ambiguous, because

is

both a reserve power and a paralyzed power.

always already repressed, by

is

being held

always,

in

A power

hysteria,

that

is

virtue of the subordination of

feminine desire to phallocratism; a power constrained to silence

and mimicry, owing to the submission of the "perceptible,"
"matter," to the

And

"pathological" effects.

the possibility of another

and

lingual; but this

reserve yet to

and

intelligible

come

mode

.

.

?

(

to

two

different

Irigaray,

at the

same time

of "production," notably gestural
in

latency. Perhaps as a cultural

Irigaray's

as a strategy of "mimetic hysteria" which
167
.

is

This Sex, page 138).

Thus Dianne Chisholm reads

to the possibility of resistance

Which occasions

discourse.

hysteria there

maintained

is

.

in

its

is

miming of Freudian theory
intended ultimately to lead

She backs up

forms of mimesis which she sees as operative

and which

Irigaray

According to Chisholm,

167

in its

by appealing

this reading

borrows from

Plato.

There

is

reproductive and a productive type of mimesis described

mimesis,

of

Irigaray

both a
Plato.

in

can be seen to be using the

exaggerated repetition of traditional theory,

Dianne Chisholm, "Irigaray's Hysteria."
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in

first

in

sort of

order to

pave the way

for the

we

Chisholm,

second kind of mimesis. Thus, according to

can read Speculum as an instance of reproductive mimesis;

while This Sex

,

with

its lyrical

poetic expressions of feminine desire, can

be seen as an instance of the second type. The former type of
(reproductive) mimesis leads to a possible resistance which

expressed

in

is

then

the latter ("utopian" according to Chisholm) type. Thus to

repeat Freud's words about feminine sexuality emphatically and

exaggeratedly, to adopt them as true of oneself, and to take them
seriously

is

already subversive, for

which makes possible the attitude

it

presupposes that excess of meaning

of ironic

and strategic acceptance of

the discourse being mimed. Irigaray's strategy of mimesis simultaneously

expresses and creates space

for the feminine subject position that the

psychoanalytic discourse, at the

level of

meaningful theoretical content,

denies. Feminine hysterical mimesis offers a sort of pragmatic refutation
of the masculine theory

Miming Metaphor

for

which denies

to

women

the subject position.

Metonymy

The above described mimetic feature

of Irigaray's critical

touches upon several interrelated themes: the relationship

method

of the

sexed

body to language; metonymy and metaphor (displacement and
condensation, or contiguity and
as a

woman.

In

similarity);

and parler

femme

or speaking

order to evaluate the effectiveness of Irigaray s
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critical

strategy,

necessary to understand the traditional theory's
explanation

is

it

of the relation

between the sexed subject and language.

according to traditional psychoanalytic theory, that
to language

different from

is

men's? According

Why

women's

is it,

relationship

to Freudian theory,

it

is

the resolution of the Oedipus complex that allows for the
development of
the superego, and hence the entry of the

human

subject into the world of

symbolic order and language. Since the Oedipus complex

boys and

differently for

the boy,

girls,

in

its

products. The

resolved

renouncing the mother as the

original object of desire, sublimates this desire

creating culture and

is

girl,

by using language and

however, never completely

resolves the complex, and never completely renounces the mother, for

she realizes that the mother

is, like

has no incentive to give up her

her, castrated. Furthermore, the

original preoedipal desire, for

girl

she can

never hope to obtain the desired object (the phallus) by ultimately

possessing a

woman

own

of her

possesses the mother. Thus, the
boy's, nor

168

in

the

girl's

way

which the father

superego

her ability to sublimate as great

is

in

168
.

is

not as strong as the

In

Lacan's

the Oedipus complex escapes the fate which it
be slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or
cannot evade the
its effects may persist far into women's normal mental life.
notion (though hesitate to give it expression that for women the level of what
is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their superego is never so
inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require
it to be in men. Character traits which critics of every epoch have brought up

According to Freud,

meets with

in

boys:

it

".

.

.

may

I

I

against

women— that

less ready to

influenced

in

they

show

less

sense of justice than men, that they are

submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often
their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility — all these

188

reinterpretation of Freud, according to his linguistic understanding
of the

unconscious,

it

is

the symbolic "name of the father" (rather than the

concrete individual father) that enters into the boy
relationship with the mother, and impels the

superego injunction against incest. But
has the greater

ability to

of

women's

immanent

relation to

development

imaginary

of the

both Freud and Lacan, the boy

use language, for the representational order

arises out of his renunciation of the
Irigaray, as

for

s preoedipal

critic,

mother

169
.

begins from the psychoanalytic story

language or the symbolic economy. However,

within that story, Irigaray finds and expands a space for the

representation of a feminine economy. Irigaray both identifies the
possibility of feminine

speech from
positions of

the

way

in

speech within the theory, and elaborates that

a position outside the

male order. She works from both the

immanence and transcendence.

which she accomplishes

which constitute the female

is

can see an example of

this in her figure of the

genitalia.

often-used figure of Irigaray's

We

"two

According to Diana Fuss

a basic reason for the

lips"

170
,

this

charge of

would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their
superego which we have inferred above" Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality,"
The Pelican Freud Library, Vol.7, On Sexuality (Penguin, 1977), page 342.
For a clear and concise elaboration of this aspect of psychoanalytic
theory in both Freud and Lacan, see Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1990), chapter 3.
169

Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism. Nature
York: Routledge, 1989), Chapter 4.
170
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&

Difference

(New

essentialism so frequently levelled against her. Irigaray cites
the

two

lips

as a basis for the alternative feminine economy; for the
unity-in-duality of

woman's anatomy and
over

plurality, activity

pleasure challenges the male assumption of unity

over passivity, similarity over contiguity, and

metaphor over metonymy

171

Most readers

.

of Irigaray see her as

challenging the male system by attempting to valorize the neglected
poles of the above dichotomies. However,

expanding on Fuss, that

I

would argue, following and

Irigaray deconstructs the

themselves, showing the ways

which the male-valued poles

in

presuppose and carry with them

dichotomies

their

complements

according to Fuss, the figure of the two

lips

in

the feminine. Thus

functions as a "metaphor for

metonymy."
One wonders

to

"two

something other than

lips" as

what extent

it

is

truly possible to think of the
a

metaphor.

I

would argue

that, despite Irigaray's protestations to the contrary, the figure of

the "two lips" never stops functioning metaphorically. Her
insistence that the

two

a particularly clear

example

lips

inevitability of "reentering a

we

claim to escape from

it"

escape metaphoricity provides us with

what

of

system
.

.

..

Man

Paul de

identifies as the

of tropes at the very

But,

what

important about

is

Irigaray's conception of this particular figure

moment

is

that the

"two

lips"

operate as a metaphor for metonymy; through this collapse of
boundaries, Irigaray gestures toward the deconstruction of the

metaphor over metonymy is so uncontroversial that a
standard reference text, The Oxford Companion to the English Language,
defines 'metonymy' as a species of metaphor. See The Oxford Companion
edited by Tom McArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), page 653.
171

The

prioritization of

,

190

classic

metaphor/metonymy binarism.

her

In fact,

work

persistently attempts to effect a historical displacement of

metaphor's dominance over metonymy; she "impugns the
privilege granted to

(which

is

metaphor

much more

(

a quasi solid) over

closely allied to fluids)"

(

This Sex,

Furthermore, this use of metaphor to open space for

my

contention that Irigaray's essentialism

is

metonymy
1

10).
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metonymy supports

strategic rather than

ontological or biological, for her project to construct a feminine speech

based not on a

literal

reading of

women's anatomy,

(although not entirely symbolic, for

it

is

is

but on a figurative

metonymical as well as

metaphorical) relation of the body to language.
Irigaray thus

makes use

of

metaphor

in

order to

make

and to the male representational economy the alternative
female economy based on contiguity and
of

metonymy

exists

is

In

(metaphorically) by Irigaray

in

possibility of a

and figured

rather than metaphor. That this alternative

shown

Speculum.

fluidity,

clear within

in

the trope

economy indeed

the central section of

the essay "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been

Appropriated by the "Masculine"," Irigaray makes use of metaphorical

imagery

in

order to describe the relationship of the feminine essence to

the male economy. The

title

makes

clear that Irigaray

theory as the object of her critique, rather than a

themselves. Traditional male theory sees

172

women

Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking page 66.
,
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is

reality

dealing with

about

women

as lacking self-

in

consciousness; as "inert" matter which serves as the support

male subject. This subject,

in

continually distances

from the material substratum.

metaphor that

itself

for the

order to achieve and preserve dominance,

Irigaray here echoes,

men

are the sun and

In

a classic

women

are the

earth. But the earth, according to Irigaray, and unsuspected by the male
solar subject,

is

not

inert,

but also self-relates.

As things go now, man moves away
in

order to preserve his stake

in

the value of his representation, while

woman

counterbalances

with the permanence of a (self)recollection which

And which,

as such.

itself

the self — and

its

special

continue to support the

upon which he

in

And which,

is

in

unaware

economy

will

illusion that

need to be located — can

the object

is

inert.

"Matter"

ever and again return to plant his foot

will

of

the recurrence of this re-turn upon

to spring farther, leap higher, although he

nature that

is

is

in

order

dealing here with a

already self-referential. Already fissured and open.
her circumvolutions upon herself, will also carry off

the things confided to her for re-presentation. Whence, no doubt,
the fact that she

is

said to be restless and unstable. In fact

quite rigorously true that she

is

The
is

fact that Irigaray

indicated

in this

male economy

will

is

is

never exactly the same. Always

whirling closer or farther from the sun

and sends curving to and

it

whose

rays she captures

fro in turn with her cycles.

infiltrating

the male

173

economy from

essay. For here she describes the lengths to which the

go to insure

itself

against contamination by the

encroaching feminine. As Irigaray points out, with the advent of

173

Irigaray,

within

Speculum page 234.
,
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psychoanalytic theory,

woman

has been discovered to

unconscious. But of course this discovery
fought against. Irigaray's task

is

will

lie in

men's

be denied, repressed and

to block this repression and to bring to

consciousness that which the male economy wishes to remain repressed.

She continues
positions

in

to

do so through her readings of various philosophical

the middle section of Speculum.

For instance, her essay on Kant continues this attempt

174
.

She

reads Kant as conducting a very sophisticated salvaging of the male
subject's primacy and sovereignty over a nature which has begun to
assert

its

independence

understanding over

mother

is

in

the realm of theory.

sensibility,

sacrificed.

However,

As Kant elevates

according to Irigaray, the relation to the
this relation

continues to assert

itself in

the mind's desire for such ideals as the sublime and the moral law. These

aspects of nature indicate male reason's recognition of that which
lacks,

lack,

and

its

it

attempt to come to grips with, to deny and to control

by positing

limiting

concepts (such as a te/os

in

this

nature and morals)

that function to bring the unfathomable under the control of reason.

the repressed other cannot be completely tamed, and continues to
its

appearance

Still,

make

at various places within the theoretical tradition.

Furthermore, there

is

one area of the

traditional theoretical story that

completely gives up the attempt to swallow up and hide the feminine.

174

Luce

Irigaray,

"Paradox

A

Priori," in

193

Speculum pages 203-214.
,

Thus mysticism

exists within western metaphysics as the one

that belongs essentially to the feminine, as the one place

have had

its

is

the place where consciousness

extreme confusion,

and flames. This
if

where women

a voice.

This
to

movement

is

it

is

no longer master, where,

sinks into a dark night that

the place where "she"-and

is

also fire

some cases

in

he,

he follows "her" lead — speaks about the dazzling glare which

comes from

the source of light that has been logically repressed,

about "subject" and "Other" flowing out

into an

embrace

of fire

that mingles one term into another, about contempt for form as

such, about mistrust for understanding as an obstacle along the

path of jouissance and mistrust for the dry desolation of reason.

Also about a "burning glass." This
of the

West

in

which

woman

is

the only place

in

the history

speaks and acts so publicly

(Speculum, page191).
Irigaray thus sees mystical discourse as bearing witness to the alternative

nature of feminine desire. She finds
fire,

in

burning, jouissance, and ex-stacy

mysticism the feminine values of
(in

the

literal

sense of being

outside oneself). This feminine realm of discourse demonstrates for
Irigaray the possibility of the feminine

economy and ontology

that she

seeks to develop. And although the mystical has always been the place
of unreason, for Irigaray, the challenge will be to find and develop

own

inner logic.
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its

An

Alternative

Economy

As we have seen,
critical

philosophizing

theory which

Irigaray

makes use

of the standard technique of

both remaining within, or immanent

in

the object of her critique, while at the

is

to, the

same time

attempting to develop values, standards, and concepts that are not

acknowledged by the

existing tradition.

from without. One aspect

She works both from within and

of Irigaray's critique

which allows her

simultaneously to "mine" these buried or repressed feminine principles,

and to "mime" the male discourse about the feminine,
psychoanalysis.
blind spot of the

way

In

her interpretation of

western metaphysical

to present that tradition with

embeddedness within the
tradition,

it

its

women

is

her use of

as the "unconscious"

tradition, Irigaray

has found a

"other," without denying her

tradition. Since that other

is

own

latent within the

can supply standards and values which are both

simultaneously immanent within and transcendent to that tradition.

Moreover, Irigaray's application of the insights of psychoanalysis to the
feminist critical practice can be seen as making progress over Harding's
inability to get

beyond

a

modern

scientific notion of objectivity to

which

she merely tacked on the requirement of value interestedness. For
Irigaray, the feminist subject

epistemology, a

split or

is,

like

the subject of standpoint

bifurcated consciousness that sees both the

traditional representation of reality

and a beyond that

195

is

denied a voice.

But for Irigaray, the psychoanalytic approach locates
this bifurcation not
only

in

the individual feminist subject's psyche, but

in

the symbolic

structure of language which determines the "objective" reality

Thus, Irigaray

able to avoid the dualism

is

we

have

identified in Harding.

Furthermore, Irigaray's psychoanalytic strategy grants her

access to the repressed unconscious of

some means

this bi-leveled reality (e.g.,

"therapies" as mimetic repetition, hysteria, and reading the

and gaps), and therefore the
element

new

into a

essentialism, "

in

itself.

of

such

"symptoms

"

possibility of developing this repressed

representational order. Irigaray's "strategic

developing the subjective side of the knowledge

equation, simultaneously elaborates a reality which no longer accords to

the structuring concepts of traditional objectivity.

There
to be an

is

another

way

advance over that

in

which

Irigaray's

achievement can be seen

of Harding. Since Irigaray's strategy of

psychoanalytic deconstruction enables her to uncover what
there, only hidden and buried, she has, to a certain extent,

the obstacle of the

critic's

is

already

surmounted

dilemma, by avoiding each "horn." Her new

standards already exist within the tradition; yet they are beyond anything
that has been explicitly recognized and instantiated. However, Irigaray's

achievement

is

not complete, for she

rational, theoretical

argument

fails to

provide a fully-developed,

for the applicability of

feminine values to the metaphysical tradition.
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It

is

these repressed

not yet clear that what

has been repressed can ever be expressed

anything more than a

in

lyrical,

poetic, figurative, nonrational sense. Furthermore,
since psychoanalysis
itself

not only a theory, but, perhaps more importantly, a
practice,

cannot

fully credit Irigaray

critical

dilemma. Like the other theorists

we

with finding a theoretical solution to the

we

have studied,

Irigaray

seems

to "do" critique, without being able fully to explain or to justify her
activity.

Thus the ground

is

for the possibility of her critique

own

remains

elusive, appealing instead to the possible results of her critical

work

in its

founding a specifically feminine discourse ("parler femme"). However,
since this feminine discourse

will itself

operate according to alternative

(feminine) standards and values, perhaps

it

should look to find the ground for Irigaray's
Irigaray, as

with other immanent

circularity, for the

justified will only

critics,

we

is

to these standards that

critical activity.

we

Thus, with

encounter a certain

standards by which her work can be judged and

come

into being at the conclusion of the

"proof' apparently can only be found

What then has

Irigaray

in

work. The

the "pudding."

accomplished by bringing to the fore that

which has been forgotten, silenced, and denied within the male
metaphysical economy of representation? What are these

new

standards which can serve to ground an alternative economy?

(feminine)

We

have

already seen that Irigaray uncovers hidden feminine principles underneath

the male metaphysical tradition. Furthermore, these principles, as earth
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and ground

male representational order, have nurtured that order

for the

as the object of

from which

it

repressed desire and motivation, and as the origin

its

flees. In

uncovering these feminine standards, values, and

structuring concepts, Irigaray not only offers a challenge to the male
tradition, but also points the

way

to further development.

Irigaray's critique of representationalism focuses

of identity

on the concepts

and sameness as basic to the patriarchal symbolic order. This

economy has

therefore been incapable of encoding the

feminine — allowing the feminine entry into the system only as an object
that conforms to
to laws of

its

own

principles. Since this order operates according

exchange (which provide the

and equivalence),

women

telos for the values of identity

too are given value only insofar as they

function for the exchange relation. Thus,

women
men

175
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serve primarily as commodities

An

alternative symbolic

in

in

a

the current symbolic system,

system

economy must

principles other than identity and

of

exchange between

therefore be structured by

sameness. These

will

include the (more

feminine, according to Irigaray) concepts of difference and plurality;
fluidity (rather

metonymy

^ For a

than

solidity); contiguity;

touch (rather than

(rather than metaphor). Furthermore, as

brilliant

and

lucid analysis of the

exchange

I

of

sight);

have been arguing,

women

as

fundamental to the patriarchal order, see Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women:
Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex," in Alison M. Jaggar and Paula S.
Rothenberg, editors, Feminist Frameworks: Altern a tive Theoretical Accounts of
the Relations Between
Hill,

Women

and Men, second edition (New York: McGraw-

1984).
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these alternative values are grounded not essentially

anatomy, but

in a critical

and careful reading,

a

feminine

in

psychoanalytic

deconstruction, of the repressed presuppositions of the
male symbolic
order. Irigaray's suggestions

an alternative symbolic

— underdeveloped,

economy

already existing symbolic order

in

though they may be — for

are derived from and

grounded

in

the

the sense that this order carries with

it

an unconscious underside — the feminine — which contains the repressed
alternative.

Since, therefore,

we must

reject a simple essentialism of

bodies as grounding the activity of Irigarayan critique and the
representational

we

economy toward which

are left with?

it

points,

Can the negative — that which the

as nonbeing — serve as adequate ground of a

economy,

or are

we

we

left

new

women's

new

need to ask what

tradition has denied

epistemological

with the theoretical impasse that has haunted

our attempts thus far throughout the dissertation? The hints that Irigaray

has given us have been considerable, but
But as

we

again,

in Irigaray,

still

insufficiently developed.

have seen, the mimetic strategy of immanent

other theorists

more closely

formed the basis

we have

at the

of her

method, as

previously examined. Perhaps

it

it

critique has

has
is

in

once

several

time to look

concept of mimesis which has shadowed the

metaphysical tradition as the constantly repressed complement, and dark
underside to the

light of

reason. Furthermore, as

199

we have

seen, the

activity

and attitude of mimesis, as well as the

political

commitment

to

extending power to the oppressed, has structured the performance of
critique in both its

immanent and transcendent aspects, thus suggesting

that our search for a theoretical, rational ground for critique and the
radically critical

knowledge provided by feminist theory, can no longer

ignore the necessary nonrational elements of political

mimesis.

I

therefore intend to explore these elements and their

applicability to the

last

two

power and

problem of grounding the

chapters.
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critical

perspective

in

the

CHAPTER
THE CRITIC'S GROUND

We

THE POLITICAL: FOUCAULT AND ARENDT

IN

have seen that the

critical

completely theoretical solution
For this reason,

begun

many

5

theorists

in

in

dilemma appears

the theorists

to elude a

we have examined

the post-modern

examine two such

In this

in their

human

critiques.

More

specifically,

which they

I

will

at first

glance

common

turn to the

existence as the ground of their

both Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt

conduct critique by bringing to
interpretation

attempts

in

theoretical orientations, can be seen as

sharing an important methodological tactic and a
practical/political realm of

chapter,

who, although apparently and

theorists,

appear to be worlds apart

work.

light

the excluded possibilities of

find at the origin of their objects of study.

Foucault offers an alternative understanding of the workings of

power, while Arendt gives

far.

movement have

to explore the possibility of alternatives to pure theory

at offering legitimation of their critical

so

a

Thus

political

theory of freedom which she claims

previously existed, but which has been abandoned and covered over.

Both theorists, therefore, practice a form of "defetishizing critique" which
delegitimates the status quo by showing

its

pretensions to universality

and necessity to be without ground. Furthermore, both Foucault and
Arendt manifest significant theoretical gaps
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in their

accounts which are

of great relevance for the question of grounding
critique.

These gaps,

believe, represent place-holders for future theoretical
work, and

to an elaboration of the possible

in

my

final

filling

of these

gaps that

I

it

will

I

be

intend to turn

chapter.

The Ground

of Critique in Political Power: Foucault

Michel Foucault's notoriously
position has elicited attacks from

relativist

many

(some would say

critics. His

"nihilist")

professedly "post-

modernist" stance has produced negative reactions ranging from

puzzlement to exasperation
values,

it

176

Because post-modernism

rejects

humanist

would appear that Foucault must abandon the quests

for either

.

truth or freedom. Furthermore, Foucault refused to be characterized as a
structuralist, thus rejecting the theoretical alternative frequently

embraced by the

intellectual

French Left of the

last several

decades

177
.

Foucault instead opts for a more humble theoretical stance then either
structuralism or a

humanism grounded

in

absolute subjectivity. His

position claims to be localized and perspectival, without recourse to a

theory of historical totality or universal truth.

176

See James Bernauer for several responses that find Foucault to be childish
and narcissistic. Bernauer, "Michael Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking," Philosophy
and Social Criticism, volume 12, Summer, 1987.
177

See Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michael Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),
chapter 3.
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But the
of

critical intent of

Foucault's work

seems

to belie this denial

access to trans-historical values. His painstaking "genealogical" and

"archeological" inquiries into the domains of

and subjectivity can succeed as

uncover

failings

and

work

is

critique only to the extent that they

injustices. But to identify injustice

acquainted with justice; to

unmasking

human power, knowledge,

criticize

untruth

is

of domination and deception, with

concerned, must see

itself

is

to be

to value truth. Hence, the

which much

of Foucault's

as contributing to a more truthful

understanding and a more realized freedom than exist currently. To
maintain, as Foucault does, that he
or totalizing intellectual

178
,

is

a "specific" rather than a "global"

whose work appeals

leads to the apparent paradox that one

is

offering

and one

it,

who

who

to nothing absolute,

denies the existence of truth

denies the reality of the individual

seeking

is

freedom.

When

Foucault argues that knowledge,

in its

modern

manifestation, "follows the advance of power," or that the modern
subject

is

risks the

179
he
an effect of the strategies of "discipline" and bio-power ,"

charges of self-refutation and incoherence,

for

how

are

we

to

Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Paul Rabinow, The Foucault
Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), page 73.
178

.

Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison translated
by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), and Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality volume 1, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Random
179

,

,

House,

1

978).
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own

take his

own

position

position

is

theoretical

is

pronouncements?

If

Foucault

correct, then his

is

merely another effect or strategy of power. But

if

an unmasking of the hidden operations of power, and

his

is

for

that reason an instance of a truth not subject to the control of power's

schemes,

it

must be

that his analysis of the

power/knowledge

relation

is

mistaken. For according to Foucault:

.

.

.

truth isn't outside power, or lacking

myth whose

history and functions

in

power: contrary to

a

would repay further study,

truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted
solitude, nor the privilege of those
liberating themselves. Truth

is

who have succeeded

a thing of this world:

it

in

produced

is

only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.

And

it

regular effects of power. Each society has

its

own

regime of

truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that

the types of discourse

which

it

is,

induces

accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and

instances which enable one to distinguish true and false

statements, the means by which each

is

sanctioned; the

techniques and procedures accorded value
truth; the status of those

counts as

It

true.

who

in

the acquisition of

are charged with saying

what

180

appears that Foucault must either give up the

power sets up "regimes
possible discourse, or he

of truth,"

must

relativist claim that

which then determine the

settle for a theoretical position

admits complicity with the power/knowledge system

in

which

functions, thus compromising his critical position. Thus, the

180

field of

Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power,"

73.
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in

which
it

critical

The Foucault Reader, pages 72-

dilemma

is

applicable to Foucault's

work

in a

clear

and profound way.

The demand seems straightforward enough. Foucault
must give us

a

general theory of the operations of power/knowledge,
and account for his

own ground
practice.

If

as the subject of a truthful discourse or a revolutionary

he

fails

these tasks, his

Thus, according to Michael Walzer,

critical project is

"We

are to

say, the truth of penology and then support
it

seems

me, Foucault's position

to

Or, as

Nancy Fraser

Whence,

is

.

.

denied legitimacy.

withdraw our
.

belief in,

what? ... At

this point,

simply incoherent ." 181

asks:

then, does Foucault's work, his description of 'the

carceral society', for example, derive

its critical

force?

.

.

Does

.

he presuppose some alternative metaphysic, say, one of bodies?

Or

is

his critique radically anti-foundationalist

sort of justification

can

it

lay claim?

and

if

what

so, to

182

But perhaps Foucault has developed the possibility of an alternative form
of grounding his activity of critique

critical

which does not succumb to the

dilemma. Flow does Foucault believe himself to avoid the

extremes of either

a nihilistic relativism or a foundationalist

absolutism?

Foucault's understanding of the relationship between power and

knowledge can help us

181

to achieve a deeper view of the

Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault,"

Reader, edited by David Hoy,

(New York:

in

way

in

Foucault:

Basil Blackwell, 1986),

which the

A

Critical

pages 353-

385.
182

Nancy

Rhetoric?"

in

A Post-Humanist
1985, volume 61, page 56.

Fraser, "Foucault's Body-Language:

Salmagundi.

Fall
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Political

critical

dilemma may be overcome. The

essential point here

Foucault sees the ground and possibility of his

from the very object of that

immanent

whose

critic,

own

"

strategy

is

by means of his genealogies
than reason.

modern

It

is

is

a

and

beliefs;

ground perhaps can give to

and

it

is

power, rather than reason, that
critical capabilities.

that

its

for Foucault,

make
will

for Foucault's critical

immanent

critique an

As we

shall see,

of the critical dilemma.

implications with knowledge, also
of

This reliance

power

in

cannot be analyzed on an either/or model

would accord with the terms

power — a resistance

I

his strategy of

of eluding the critical dilemma.

modern form,

terms of any

fundamental operation of power, rather

on the nature of power, rather than of reason,

its

in

Furthermore, what Foucault uncovers

should be seen as grounding Foucault's

way

an

then power, rather than reason, that grounds our

institutions

alternative

is

to reveal the origins of

the object of his critique, without evaluating those origins
criteria.

that

critique as arising

critique. In this respect, Foucault

"genealogical

absolute or transcendent

is

makes

which Foucault's

Thus power,

in

possible the resistance to

critique

makes

use.

In

order to

clear the rationale behind Foucault's attempt to elude the dilemma,

now

turn to a discussion of his historical methodology.

How

is it

that genealogy can be used as a critical tactic that escapes the either/or

extremes of

nihilistic relativism or a

transcendent absolutism?

206

Genealogy as Immanent Critique
Foucault's historical method

used by Nietzsche-genealogy
origin of an historical

in a

consciously modeled after that

Traditional historiography sees the

.

phenomenon

essence which then unfolds
original unity

183

is self-

as embodying a pure and pristine

continuous manner. This concept of

and purity encodes the historian's

essences behind

historical

belief in transcendental

development. Historical knowledge,

in

uncovering these essences, makes clear the meaning of the present as
the inevitable result of the operations of necessary laws. The effect of
traditional historiography

is,

therefore, a comforting legitimation of the

present, for the present appears as the culmination of a development

accordance with the dictates
In

historical

box

of

of a universal

and trans-historical reason.

contrast to the above "Platonic" view, genealogy sees

development only "the

iron

chance ." 184 Thus, genealogy,

in

hand of necessity shaking the
in

in

dice-

refusing to accept metaphysics as

the truth of history, searches for the errors and accidents, the lowly
details

and

ironic reversals, the disparities

and differences

at the

beginnings of historical phenomena. According to Foucault, "What

found

at the historical beginning of things

183

is

not inviolable identity of

Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"
The Foucault Reader, pages 76-100.
184

Nietzsche,

Dawn

,

quoted by Foucault

History," page 89.
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in

is

in

Paul Rabinow, editor,

"Nietzsche, Genealogy, and

.

their origin;

it

is

the dissension of other things.

therefore, laugh at the origins of

that truth

is

human

often born of error, that

disparity ." 185

We

can,

values and practices, as

we

find

we owe

It is

the concept of freedom to

the ruling classes, and that humanity evolved from the ape
function performed by this attitude of irreverence toward
is

obvious. The accidental nature of the present, and

186
.

The

human

critical

history

its irrational

and

contingent development out of absurd beginnings makes a mockery of
the self-congratulatory view which sees the present as the fulfillment of

past promises.
History

is

looked upon by the genealogist as the "body of a

development ." 187 The concepts "Entstehung" and "Herkunft"
therefore

more appropriate

to

genealogy than

is

are

"Ursprung," or "origin."

"Herkunft" means "stock," or "descent," and thus refers to the unique

and various factors and events out of which

arise the "traits," or marks,

the bodily peculiarities of a phenomenon. Thus, for example, our curious

modern

desire to probe into and to speak about our sexuality descends,

according to Foucault, from the Catholic confessional practices of
eliciting

sexual secrets

188
.

"Entstehung," which

is

also

commonly

185

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.

186

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.

187

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," page 79.

188

Foucault, History of Sexuality, volume
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1

translated as "origin,"

better understood, according to Foucault,
as

is

"emergence," the moment of

emergence, must avoid the

"arising ." 189 Genealogy, in analyzing the

pitfall

which sees the present as the
traditional historian

is

a

of the metaphysical historical

te/os of the past.

What emerges

puposefulness seeking realization

function. But the relationship

between

a historical

in its

method
for the

present

development and the

need which

it

answers

relationship

is

rather the result of a "series of subjugations ." 190 Thus,

is

not teleological. According to Foucault, this

genealogy de-legitimates and de-necessitates the present. The revelation
of conflict

beliefs

and power

at the origin of

cannot but help to make the status quo appear to be

unjustified by rational standards.

functions as a
for

it

fundamental human practices and

mode

of

Thus Foucault's

what we have been

radically

strategy

critical

calling"defetishizing critique,

offers an alternative possibility to our current understanding,

thereby delegitimizing the

belief that the current

The explanations offered by Foucault

for the

view

is

necessarily true.

emergence

of a

development which we regard as valuable and necessary

(for

example,

the prison system, or the worrisome nature of our sexual identities)

terms of accidental factors and disparate aims poses
to our self understanding.

a critical challenge

Genealogy thus speaks with

a critical voice

189

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, Flistory," page 83.

190

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Flistory," page 83.
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in

without appealing to trans-historical or absolute values.
that our current humanist conceptions of justice,
truth be confronted with their origins

in

It

human

is

quite

dignity,

enough

and

absurdity and the violence of

warring powers.

Power as the

Real Ground

The emphasis which genealogy places on
not,

however, unproblematic.

In fact,

it

raises

anew

Foucault's theoretical inconsistency. Foucault,
of

conflict

in

191
.

Also, as

we have

keeping with his denial
a nominalist with

seen, genealogy refuses to accept

emergence

teleological explanations for the

of historical developments.

Flowever, Foucault appears to give a functionalist account of the
disciplinary

power

to

dominance

account takes as basic certain

power

at the

end of the classical period

historical needs,

to expand. Discipline appears to have

economies

of

power because

it

institutions, its

among them

won

rise of

192
.

This

the need of

out over the old

offered the greatest opportunity for the

expanse of power. This was due

economic

is

the question of

access to trans-historical absolutes, professes to be

respect to power

and power

to

its infiltration

"embodiment"

in

of political and

the material historical

processes of the time. Thus power grew by answering to needs created

191

Foucault, Flistorv of Sexuality, volume

192

Fm ir.ault.

Discipline and Punish

,

1,

part two.
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page 93.

by other historical developments: the increase

growth

in

society's productive capabilities

conjuncture

required a

means

193
.

population, and the

in

This historical

to regulate the increasingly large and

mobile population to the change

the productive apparatus. These

in

needs were met by the newly emerging

scientific "disciplines,"

which

Foucault, the genealogist, describes as the “physics or anatomy,"
or the

body
for the

of

power

194
.

emergence

to the extent that

Far from being a straightforward Marxist explanation

of disciplinary

it

was

power

(that

is,

that discipline succeeded

functional for the growth of the forces of

production), Foucault's functionalism attributes as

much

explanatory

weight to the needs of power as to those of the economy.
In fact,

the

two processes— the accumulation

accumulation of capital — cannot be separated;

been possible to solve the problem

of the

of
it

men and

the

would not have

accumulation of

men

without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both
sustaining

made

them and using them; conversely, the techniques

the cumulative multiplicity of

accumulation of

capital.

.

.

men

that

useful accelerated the

Each makes the other possible and

necessary; each provides a model for the other. 195

Thus power

is,

according to Foucault, irreducible to either the scientific

disciplinary institutions, or the political/economic apparatuses within

193

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, page 218.

194

Foucault, Discipline and Punish

,

page 220.

Foucault, Discipline and Punish

,

page 221.

195
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which

it

functions and through which

a force in its

own

right, able to

it

is

make use

this

is

is

credited as

of material history, and thus

attributed with a significant explanatory role

But

Power

exercised.

in

Foucault's work.

an anthropomorphization of power?

understand power's apparent intentionally,

How

we

to enact

its ability

and "strategies," without taking power as either

are

a subject

to

schemes

endowed with

agency, or as a transcendent absolute guiding history? This aspect of
Foucault's genealogy

it

is

particularly troubling to Charles Taylor,

as a point of incoherence

strategies of

no account

is

196
.

power without

who

sees

According to Taylor, the notion of

a subjective intention

incoherent insofar as

is

offered which relates this broad pattern of non-intentional

purposefulness to the wills and intentions of historical actors. Taylor
believes that

who

some such account

is

necessary since

appear to compose the drama of history.

If

it

it

historical actors

is

to be

is

proposed that

the conscious intentions of

human

understandings, succeed

steering the course of historical development,

in

beings do not, contrary to their

an explanation must be given for the
action

196

is

subsumed

or overridden

way

in

which human intention and

by a greater force

Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth,"

editor, Foucault:

A

Critical

Reader (Oxford:
.

197
.

in

As Taylor argues:

David Couzens Hoy,

Basil Blackwell,

1986), page 83.

197

Taylor gives examples of the type of account he is looking for: accounts
which hold that the motivations of some human behavior cannot be
acknowledged, or "invisible hand" accounts such as Marxism and those variants

which see unintended consequences as a result of collective
Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," pages 86-87.
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action.

See

.

.

.

purposefulness without purpose requires a certain kind of

explanation to be

intelligible.

The undesigned systematicity has

be related to the purposeful action of agents
understand.

The reason

.

which we are

history,

human

.

action.

Where

not on purpose,

for this requirement

trying to explain,

is

there are patterns

we have

in a

in

why

to explain

is

way

that

we

to

can

that the text of

made up

of purposeful

this action

which are

action done under one

description on purpose also bears this other, undesigned
description.

We

have to show

how

strategic pattern cannot be just

the

two

descriptions relate.

A

hanging, unrelated to our

left

conscious ends and projects. 198

But Foucault appears not to accept this requirement,

for,

as Taylor points

out, Foucault not only fails to offer such an account, but he "doesn't

even
it

feel

seems

the need to start looking ." 199 Furthermore, according to Taylor,
as though

explanation

in

it

would be impossible

for Foucault to give an

terms of current models, without giving up some

fundamental aspect of

his theory

200
.

An

explanation

is

required according

to Taylor, but cannot be given without inconsistency on Foucault's part.

The Foucaultian Gap

What

I

inconsistency

198

1

would
in

like

to suggest

is

that, rather than entailing an

Foucault's genealogies of power, this unwillingness and

Taylor, "Foucault on

Freedom and Truth," page 87.

"Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," page 88.

200

Taylor, "Foucault on

Freedom and Truth," page 89.
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inability to offer the

type of explanation which Taylor seeks stems from

the necessarily incomplete nature of Foucault's

genealogy of power

saw

in

is

contemporary

implicational

critical project.

response to a deep inadequacy which Foucault

a

critical

theory. According to Foucault, an

network binds together the workings

and human subjectivity

Foucault's

at the

of

power, knowledge,

deepest levels of human

manifestation of this implicational system can be seen

reality

in

201
.

One

Foucault's

account of the relationship among disciplinary power, the "disciplines"
the

human

sciences, and the type of subjectivity — the docile bodies and

normalized individuals — which this power/knowledge regime produces

Another such embodiment

among

of

is

unearthed

in

202
.

the symbiotic connections

the power techniques of the Catholic confessional, the disciplines

of medicine, psychology, and law, and the sexual identity of the
individual

203
.

Indeed,

much

historical juncture at the

occurred

in

subjectivity

of Foucault's

work

is

modern

an analytic study of the

end of the eighteenth century when changes

these three fundamental aspects — power, knowledge, and

— of human

reality.

A

major contribution of Foucault's

201

See Biddy Martin "Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault," in editors, Irene
Diamond and Lee Quinby, Feminism & Foucault: Reflections on Resistance
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988) for a discussion of the
imp cations of this network for feminism's exploration of the relations between
sexuality, subjectivity, and power.
,

i:

202

203

See Foucault, Discipline and Punish

See Foucault, The

.

Flistorv of Sexuality
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volume

1

.

genealogy of the modern age

power

in

shaping

human

history.

particularly as manifested
failed to

in

the

bringing to light the role played by

The self-understanding

human

political

two models: Marxist

modernism,

sciences, has systematically

theory conceives of power

theory, which reduces

which reduces power

exchange these

We

terms of either of

in

power

various state and ideological apparatuses) or

creation.

of

recognize the irreducible nature of power, according to Foucault.

Thus, modern

its

is its

to the

economy

liberal political

theory,

by individual human subjects,

to rights held

rights within a legal/political

system

of their

(and

who

own

have, therefore, both an institutional and a Hobbesian

sovereign/rights model for understanding power.

One reduces power

the socio-economic structure, the other grounds power

in

to

human

subjectivity.

These options can be seen as
critical

(inversely) echoing the

dilemma. Power, as the object of

critique

is

terms of the

seen as either

transcendent to or immanent within the subject. But power

is

also, in a

sense, the subject of critique, (Foucault's critique of power thus echoes
the ambiguity of Kant's critique of reason) for Foucault as immanent
critic

cannot and does not exempt himself from power's reaches. Thus

power, as subject or agent of

immanent

critique,

is

also on these

models

either

to the subject (as a possession or right), or existing outside or

transcendent to the

critical subjectivity

215

which

it

determines. But Foucault

rejects both models, for neither can account for the possibilities

uncovered by genealogy that power
exchanged, or that power

arm

of the

is itself

is

exercised rather than possessed or

a relation of forces

economic apparatus. 204 This

Foucault's larger

rejection

critical project to critique

is

and not merely an

a requirement of

modernity from within. To

understand power either as structural-institutional or as a possession
or

on the model

of,

human

subjectivity

is

to participate

in

of,

the theoretical

discourse which belongs to the modern regime of power/knowledge,

which

is

precisely the target of Foucault's critical activity.

The modern

"regime" has excluded or ignored the possibility that power functions

in a

non-subjective but "strategic" manner. Thus to see power along the lines
of a Nietzschean

war

or "agonistic" model, as Foucault does,

to propose the possibility that the accepted

is

one way

models are inadequate

to

theorize power.

Foucault's genealogy of power can therefore be seen as his

attempt to retrieve an exclusion that occurred
period. Genealogy,

modern form,
visibility.

in

tracing the

power

modern

to punish to the beginning of

its

finds there a dramatic reversal with respect to power's

Power previously was exercised

"spectacle" of

at the origin of the

ritual torture.

205

in

the social arena as a

But the exercise of the power to punish

204

Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power,"

205

See Foucault,

Discipline

in

and Punish part one.
,

216

in

Rabinow Reader, page 220.

the modern period

is

obscured, as

it

takes place

in

prisons and under the

guise of the need to reform the criminal or to protect society. Power
hides
that

according to Foucault, for

itself,

mask

it

it

"is tolerable

only on condition

a substantial part of itself ." 206 But this description of

power

should not be taken as a metaphysical absolute to which Foucault
illegitimately appeals. Rather,

it

is

appearance

a description of the

of

modern perspective. From within the regime

socio-political reality to the

structured by disciplinary power,

we

tend not to see

it.

Foucault's

genealogies therefore seek to open the closed regime of disciplinary

power/knowledge

to a possible interpretation, a possible truth about the

working of power which had not yet been considered.
Foucault can be seen as engaged

we have

seen

in

way,

the type of "defetishizing" critique

previous theorists. But unlike the previous theorists

have examined, Foucault
critical

in

In this

descriptions. Fie

is

is

we

quite explicit about the truth status of his

not claiming absolute truth or certainty, the

status of law or general principle, but merely offering an alternative
description.
T. Carlos

Foucault's

206

Jacques offers

critical

practice

207
.

a similar reading

and

justification of

Jacques sees Foucault as working only

Foucault, History of Sexuality, volume

1

,

page 86.

Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak? A Study of Foucault's
Genealogy," Philosophy and Social Criticism, edited by David M. Rasmussen,
325-345.
(Boston: Boston College, 1991), volume 17, number 4, pages
207

T. Carlos

217

immanently within

a particular historical situation, so that his genealogies

are localized rather than universal or absolute.
situation

the

which Foucault works,

in

smug

And

within the local

his critiques function to delegitimize

belief in the universal validity of the received

to the equally plausible

view by reference

views that have been excluded.

This gives us a clearer idea of what the genealogist challenges,

and what he or she refers

to, in

doing so. Not only

the aim to

is

upset the self-certainty of contemporary practices, but more
specifically, the self-certainty of universalistic theory

reflects the

mechanisms

accomplished

in

the

of disciplinary power.

name

oppositional knowledges.

of,

refutation

is

to, local

this

is

subjugated

208

Jacques argues that the mistake
Fraser, Walzer,

by appeal

And

which

of critics of Foucault (such as Taylor,

Habermas, and others) who charge him with

self-

to believe falsely that critique requires theoretical ground

order to be rational. But according to Jacques, this requirement
"empirically false," for

we

frequently engage

in

critique

in

is

on the basis

of

the "differing practices existing within the domain of dominant
practices."

209

And

this kind of practical critique in the

has been oppressed

Thus

to

is

sufficient

demand, as does

name

of that

and legitimate.
Taylor, that Foucault give us a

theoretical account of the operations of

power which would be

208

Jacques, "Whence Does the

Critic

Speak?," page 336.

209

Jacques, "Whence Does the

Critic

Speak?," page 338.
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which

consistent with the discourse that reduces power
to the intentions of
individual subjects

is

to miss the point that Foucault's provocative
thesis

about the strategic nature of power

the

in

modern period

is

a self-

conscious rejection and critique of the entire sovereign/rights
model.
Taylor's advocacy of the humanist values of truth and freedom,
as

necessary presuppositions of Foucault's theses on power, does not
appreciate the extent to which the discourse of
in

humanism

is

implicated

the regime which Foucault wants to critique. Thus from Foucault's

perspective, a discursive practice basing
of the individual

disciplinary

not sufficient to challenge the operations of

is

power

210
.

Since Foucault
theoretical ground

that Foucault
critique

is

is

on the rights and freedom

itself

is

is

rejecting the philosophical presupposition that a

necessary for legitimate

not engaged

in

critique,

philosophical critique

localized genealogical history, so he

Jacques believes

211
.

Foucault's

does not confront

his

philosophical critics on their terms, but avoids or dissolves the

requirement of transcendence by refusing to make universal and absolute
claims. But

I

believe that this interpretation misses the point that

Foucault's historically situated and localized genealogies do contribute to
a philosophical

and theoretical position, namely the denial of the

210

ln fact, Discipline and Punish describes how the discourse of the humanist
reformers contributed to the emergence of disciplinary power. See part two.
211

Jacques, "Whence Does the

Critic

Speak?," page 337.
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universality of the particular theoretical

power

that

is

models that they

a possession either of the subject's sovereignty or of socio-

political institutions).

Although Foucault makes no positive theoretical

pronouncements, nor does he claim universality
descriptions, the upshot of his

philosophical
theoretical

critique (e.g.,

work

is

to cast doubt on the established

wisdom. Furthermore, Foucault's

pronouncements

enables him to

make use

is itself

or necessity for his

refusal to

make

positive

philosophically strategic, for

of theoretical tools that he

does not,

in

it

any

ultimate or absolute sense, endorse. Thus, as a strategic practice,

Foucault can appeal to the modernist concept of
suits his

purpose

in

a specific case. For

example,

human
in

rights

when

it

an interview given

shortly before his death, Foucault invokes the notions of truth and rights

as a

means

of criticizing the polemicist. According to Foucault "... a

whole morality

is

at stake, the morality that

truth and the relation to the other ."

It

is

is

all

not a

nihilist.

But neither are

why

currently held values to be contaminated with

Foucault has attempted to adopt a more modest

stance than that of the "totalizing

212

is

humanist values invocations of trans-historical absolutes.

Foucault believes

power. This

for the

212

therefore evident that Foucault

his appeals to

concerns the search

Michel Foucault, "Polemics,

critic."

Politics,

Reader, pages 381-390.
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Power

is

seen as strategic

and Problemizations," Rabinow

in

order to do battle with

new

on

it

ground. However, at times

wish to use old weapons. Truth and freedom belong to
their

use poses the

genealogical/critical tactic
for

what he

calls

As

risk of co-optation.

to create

is

I

see

it,

make

which

Foucault's

space within dominant discourse

that the perspectives of the criminal or the insane

to

this arsenal, but

"subjected knowledges." But Foucault

paradigmatic knowledges for a

new

we may

is

become

not advocating
the

regime. Rather his strategy attempts

a space, a difference, or "interstice," within the standard order

will

allow the entry and perhaps the

infiltration of

what has been

previously excluded. This manner of critique does not profess to
all,

or to

know

maintains a

for sure,

critical

and therefore repudiates absolutes. But

know
it

distance, a degree of transcendence, by appealing to

differences and exclusions, by opening "interstices" within which powers

may

battle

and domination may be exposed.

In this

we have

way

seen

Foucault's

in Irigaray,

method

for both

of critique

is

similar to that

attempt to bring to the fore the

excluded other which exists underneath and within the current
In

which

tradition.

order to do so, Irigaray draws upon psychoanalytic and literary

methods, while the ground upon which Foucault draws
workings of power and the

political

lies in

the

exclusion of groups and knowledges.

Neither philosopher has supplied a rock- solid theoretical ground which

can exempt

their positions

from the contaminations, biases, and

221

determinations that they critique. However, the

work does not seem

to require this. Like

the dilemma that learning

is

critical

Meno's paradox which poses

impossible on either of

two apparently

mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives (that
are completely ignorant), the critical

efficacy of their

dilemma

is

we

either

know

or

beginning to look more

and more to presuppose an impossible and unnecessary
demand. Perhaps
the theoretical ground of critique can be found

immanent
establish

critique

answer,

more

we now

how

attempt to justify

The Ground

this

is

critique

is

If

turn to

one way

explicit

the actual practice of

the actuality of which should be sufficient to

its possibility.

not whether, but

in

of

perhaps the question to be asked

so,

is

possible. For the beginnings of an

Hannah Arendt, who can be seen as making
filling in

the gap

left

open by previous

theorists'

critique.

of Critique in Political Freedom: Arendt

Hannah Arendt proclaimed

her thinking to be a "thinking without

bannisters," by which she marked her rejection of such foundations as
tradition, religion, or other authority.

with the problem of justification.

some

of the

ways

in

human

the following

I

intend to explore

which Arendt’s thought, without the safety net

foundationalist grounding, has
theorizing the

In

As such, she necessarily grappled

come

situation, in

its

to

terms with the problem of

relevance for what

222

of

I

see to be the

problem of legitimation. Although Arendt does not philosophize

critic's

out of the intimately personal, she does begin her theorizing
immanently
in

the concrete. For her, the most urgent theoretical and practical-political

challenge of her time

was

to understand the possibility and

of totalitarianism. All of Arendt’s

challenge and as such, shares
political

work can be seen as

many concerns

a

mechanisms

response to

this

with other theoretical and

movements which seek an understanding

of oppression

and

a

path to freedom. Arendt's thought focuses explicitly on the problem of

freedom, which she believes has been mistakenly placed by the
philosophical-political tradition

locus

is in

the

political.

Thus

freedom and, therefore, also
lies in

there

for Arendt, the true

a

fundamental

when

its

actual

ground of human

of the possibility of critical transcendence,

the political dimension of

is

the metaphysical realm,

in

political

human

existence. According to Arendt,

dimension of

life,

of

which the modern

tradition of political philosophy has lost sight. Arendt's entire corpus

motivated by a desire to retrieve

this

covered over sense and experience

of the political and to bring to light an interpretation of

which requires the
try to

show

is

political

is

as the space for

its

human freedom

development. What

I

will

that Arendt's conception of political freedom can be seen

as beginning to

fill

in

the gap

left

by previous theorists, by beginning to

formulate an explanation and justification of the possibility of the

freedom. Thus, the ground of the

critic's

223

necessary freedom

will

critic's

be

located

in

the

political, rather

than the purely theoretical realm. Both

philosophical critique and political action are grounded

in,

presuppose,

and attempt to instantiate human freedom. Furthermore, an
ontological

between

relation

elaborated

in

theoretical critique and the practical-political can be

terms of the paradoxical structure of human freedom as

Arendt theorizes
interpretation of

it.

I

show

intend to

that her idiosyncratic and original

freedom offers provocative

possibilities for the

understanding of both theoretical and practical human

reality,

particular, for the critic's capacity to transcend the reality in

embedded,

The

in

in

Arendt begins The

which she

its

recognized

Human

Condition 213 with a prologue stressing

apparent obviousness, has been, for the most
in

part,

a

fundamental axiom of theory— that theory

product of earthly beings

who

is

what

a

are necessarily tied to nature and to each

other as a condition for survival and for meaningfulness. By
conditions," Arendt does not

in

little

philosophical writing. Arendt's reminder alerts us to

must be taken as

213

is

"The Human Condition"

the essential connectedness of humanity to the earth. This lesson,
spite of

in

order to propose alternatives.

Immanence

Critic's

and,

mean "human

nature," the possibility of

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago:

Press, 1958).
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"human

University of Chicago

which she

rejects, but rather necessities

which are conditional upon our

earthly existence. Thus, Arendt's existential
structures of

human

existence are not transcendent absolutes or "essences."
Rather, she
seeks, as did Kant, for the necessary pre-conditions
for what she takes
as "given." However, her given

is

not the self as a disembodied knower

or thinker, but as a concretely situated,

human
life

embodied being. Thus, her

conditions are contingent upon her phenomenology of a concrete

world. Arendt's The

Human

Condition

is

an existential analysis,

in

the

Heideggerian sense of fundamental ontology, of the concrete

human

presuppositions of

What Arendt
human

condition

is

"being-there."

finds by

means

of her existential analysis of the

that our fundamental connectedness with others

constitutes us as political beings, beings

who

interact

in a

context of

shared values and meaningful articulations of these values. Arendt's

conception of the

political

presupposes

fundamental ontological condition of

a relation to others in the

plurality.

Furthermore, this

fundamental existential structure of relationship does not determine
necessarily hostile or antagonistic master-slave model of

human

a

relation,

nor even one which begins from an isolated self which then reaches out
to

communicate with

"the

human

others. For Arendt, relationship

lies at

the heart of

condition." Selves are never atomized on Arendt's view, but
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are fundamentally

modern
first

in relation

liberal political

and foremost

relatedness

is

a sphere of

political

definition, for

political,

of

is

in

speech

relatedness. Furthermore, this

means

at stake,

is

what makes man

power

of

what

rise of

political

for

is

it,

political

a political being ." 215

Thus

speech already places theoretical

we've

to Arendt,

the modern age. The

has overshadowed the

of

matters become

and not merely epistemic, realm of

However, according
realm

human

political is

phenomenon — speech. As Arendt puts

speech

for Arendt, the critic's

the

contrast to the traditional tendency of

theory toward atomization, Arendt's

"Wherever the relevance

in

In

consolidated and developed by

Arendt a basic

by

214
.

critique

life.

lost sight of the political

society and the social

human

being

as the proper sphere for public

interaction. Arendt argues that this usurpation of the political by the

social

is

due to the ascendancy

of instrumentality as the basic

our rational comportment with the world. This ascendancy,

be traced to the
of a

life

historical

in

scheme
turn,

of

can

appearance and the philosophical acceptance

deep distinction between the

life

of action, the vita activa, and the

of thought, the vita contemp/ativa, and the corresponding

hierarchizing of contemplation over action by philosophical and religious

214

ln fact, for

215

Arendt, The

Arendt, one of the hallmarks of totalitarianism is that it
isolates humans and thereby cripples their capacity for political action and
distorts their fundamental need and right for connection. See The Origins of
Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1951; 2nd ed. 1958).

Human

Condition

,

page

226

3.

thought. Arendt s argument

from action as important
highly valued

mode

in

is

that, within the historical transformation

Ancient Greece to contemplation as the most

of being,

and even throughout the reversal of

this

hierarchy accomplished by Hegel and Marx, the distinctions within
the

realm of action were lost

in

the shuffle. This loss entailed a diminution

the meaning of the concept of action, so that

modern

period, seen as action

in

concept and recognition of the

overshadowed, as instrumental

all

action was, by the

accordance with necessity.

possibility of free

human

In

action

short, the

was

rationality in the service of survival

world-making was taken as the guiding intelligence by means

human

in

of

action could be understood, interpreted, and evaluated.

this loss, the place for this possibility, the political realm,

and

which

And with

had become

lost too.

many

Thus, Arendt's

critical

of the theorists

we

of that

method shares common

have already discussed,

characteristics with

who

which has been forgotten, repressed, excluded,

by the currently existing

tradition. Like

attempt a

retrieval

or covered-over

Adorno and Horkheimer, Arendt

returns to the Ancients for the original possibilities of the theory she

attempts to

and

critique. Like Foucault,

like Irigaray,

by the

tradition.

she appeals to excluded knowledge,

she attempts to reveal that which has been repressed

We

can therefore place Arendt

"defetishizing critics," for her basic

move
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is

in

the

camp

of the

to provide an alternative and

plausible interpretation for that

which has been already accepted as

understood. Furthermore, as a defetishizing

critic,

it

not necessary to

is

claim for her alternative theorization the status of absolutely certain or

necessary truth. She only needs to offer an account which

and provides an alternative. Thus, Arendt
possible

another

in

way

tells a

is

reasonable

story of the political as

than the tradition currently admits, but that

is

latently contained in the tradition as an alternative origin.

The Immanence and Transcendence

What then

is

of Political

Freedom

the political? According to Arendt,

in

the ancient

Greek pre-Socratic conception, the polis was set up as the space
power, defined as the potential

themselves as

who

"corresponds to

which
of us

the

216

humans

to distinguish and reveal

they uniquely were. The
the

human

political,

as Arendt puts

we

are equal yet distinct, and that each

capable of expressing our distinctness. Each of us

same time

species.

that

we

The condition

political;

it

is

it,

condition which Arendt labels plurality,

the irreducible fact that

is

is

"

for

of

share basic characteristics as

is

unique at

members

of a

of plurality thus entails a twofold structure of the

the realm of both performative expression and of

phrase to signify the peculiar relationship between a
structure, condition, or principle and its manifestation or effect. will further
discuss this relationship which attempt to understand as a type of "mimetic
216

Arendt uses

this

I

I

causality"

in

the following.
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collaborative solidarity

217
.

As expressive, the

political actor

appears

public space and aims at the manifestation of arete or excellence.
collaborative, the political actor

must

call

carrying through her deed, as well as

in

upon others

in

As

for assistance in

determining the meaning, and

judging the significance and degree of glory pertaining to the action. The
political is for

Arendt the place or dimension of

enacted. Thus the

cannot be

political

fully

life

where freedom can be

understood

in

Arendt's sense

without an understanding of what she means by freedom. As she herself
has summarized the connection, "The raison d'etre of

and

its field

of experience

The Defetishization

of

is

action ."

politics

is

freedom,

218

Freedom

The philosophical

tradition, according to Arendt,

has

lost or

covered over the concept of our authentic experiences of freedom, which

were recognized by the ancients. The current understanding
both philosophical and pre-theoretical

Freedom appears

is

problematic and paradoxical.

to be both necessary and impossible.

must assume freedom; yet upon

of freedom,

reflection, our actions

As agents, we
appear to be

217

Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves identifies this dual aspect of Arendt's
political and believes that previous commentators have failed adequately to
recognize either one or the other aspect, thus yielding a distorted view of
Arendt's political theory. See Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, The Political
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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Freedom?,"
York: Viking Press, 1954) page146.

Hannah Arendt, "What

Is

229

in

Between Past and Future (New

consequences

Thought

of either internal motives or external circumstances.

itself, in its

makes freedom

theoretical as well as

disappear.

1,219
.

..

For Arendt, freedom

attribute of action rather than of thought.

in

human

affairs, in

The

the

field

pre-theoretical form,

its

Freedom

of action

today, whether

and the fact that

man

we know
is

must always be present

it

a being

to our

life, is

which

we

freedom

and

potentialities of

human

the political

endowed with

mind when

life,

a

or not, the question

the problem of freedom; for action and politics,
capabilities

only alive and real

where freedom has always been known, not as

And even

of politics

primarily an

political.

problem, to be sure, but as a fact of everyday
realm.

is

is

we

among

the

gift

speak
all

of

the

are the only things of

could not even conceive without at least assuming that

exists,

and

we

can hardly touch

a single political issue

without, implicitly or explicitly, touching upon an issue of man's
liberty.

In fact,

220

the philosophical focus on freedom as a metaphysical topic

and problem came
philosophy

until

historically late.

There

is

no such concern

in

ancient

the time of Augustine and St. Paul. Arendt thus sees

inner freedom, the focus of the later metaphysical tradition, to be a

derived phenomenon, originally the result of alienation from the worldly

may be

experienced as a fact. Freedom of

political

realm where freedom

the

the kind recognized by philosophy,

will,

219

Arendt, "What

Is

Freedom?," page 145.

220

Arendt, "What

Is

Freedom?," page146.
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is

therefore something

like a

wish

fulfillment, a fantasy

freedom

221
.

Furthermore,

compensation

it

is

those denied

this identification of

on the part of the philosophical
identification of

for

real

freedom with

free will

tradition that led to the further

freedom with sovereignty,

for the attainment of inner

freedom was seen to be the way to escape from the control and
influence of others to

become

complete mastery. The

self-sufficient,

identification of

and to attain the

freedom with sovereignty,

according to Arendt entails a dilemma: either no one

completely sovereign; our sovereignty
requires domination over others.

that of the philosophical

we

critic

ideal of

is

is

free (for

limited by plurality), or

The structure

— either we

of this

no one

is

freedom

dilemma echoes

are completely determined or

are capable of a transcendence of a kind that Arendt believes to be

mistaken and

illegitimate.

The problem, as Arendt sees

it,

transcendence or freedom presupposed and desired by the

What Arendt

offers

is

is in

the kind of

tradition.

therefore an alternative interpretation of

transcendent freedom and an explanation of

its

possibility.

The

traditional

valorization of control, domination, mastery, sovereignty, self-sufficiency,

and separation are seen by Arendt to be especially pernicious, and to
prevent both the theoretical recognition and the political-practical
instantiation of the possibility of authentic

221

human freedom. Arendt would

Arendt sees this type of freedom, theoretically developed by the Stoics,
to be analogous to the kind of happiness claimed by the Christian martyrs. For a
slave to claim "inner freedom" is like a Christian martyr to claim happiness while
being roasted alive in the Phaleric Bull. See The Human Condition page 235.

231

like

to bring into philosophical focus (and indeed into

freedom which

practice) a kind of

According to Arendt,

will.

Within the conceptual framework of traditional philosophy,
indeed very

difficult to

or, to

freedom could have been given
non-sovereignty. Actually

because

of the fact of

how freedom and

understand

sovereignty can exist together

it

put

is

non-

another way,

how

the condition of

human non-sovereignty

group — only

he

sovereign.

.

.

as

it

is

dangerous

individual or as a

Under human conditions, which

man

are determined by the fact that not

freedom and sovereignty are so

earth,

it

as unrealistic to deny freedom

is

one can be free — as an
is

it

men under

to

to believe that
if

public

neither domination over others, nor

is

over even the self by the sovereign

common

but

little

men

live

on the

identical that they

cannot even exist simultaneously. Where men wish to be
sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must

submit to the oppression of the
with which
group.

If

I

will,

be this the individual

will

force myself, or the "general will" of an organized

men wish

to be free,

it

is

precisely sovereignty they

must renounce. 222

The Dual Nature

of Free Action

That Arendt's theory of freedom stresses
character can perhaps be seen more clearly
nature of free action. Again
of plurality

non-sovereign

her analysis of the dual

correspondence with the twofold structure

which determines both human connectedness and

free action on Arendt's

222

in

in

its

Arendt, The

Human

view encompasses two

Condition page 164.
,
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distinction,

parts. In keeping with her

methodological commitment to concrete everydayness and the
actual

world of praxis, Arendt returns to ordinary

where she

words

finds that both the Greeks and

which

is

in

antiquity,

different

conceived

in

two

the introduction of something entirely new,

is

and the second of which

usage

Romans had two

for action. In both ancient tongues, action

parts, the first of

of

linguistic

is

the carrying through, with the help of others,

what had been begun. Free

action

both spontaneous and

is

cooperative, for Arendt, both autonomous and relational. Thus an
elaboration of the fundamental

manifestation

in

the

political,

human

condition of plurality, through

points to

two other

which, for Arendt are equally as important as
natality, the fact that

narrativity, or the

into

which

we

"web"

we must

act

are born, and,

basic

plurality,

human

conditions

and these are

what Sela Benhabib

of preexisting meaningful

its

human

calls

relationships

223
.

Natality, according to Arendt,

encodes both the facts that

we

are

born into our historical situatedness as earthly and embodied beings, yet

we
is

are capable of free action as well. This freedom, according to Arendt,

expressed

in

this capacity to

the

human

capacity to begin something new. Arendt finds

be essential to both the Greek and

Roman

experiences of freedom. Turning to Augustine, Arendt

223

is

political

able to find an

Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge, 1992) pages

90-95.
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account of

this

Roman concept

freedom was not an

of

freedom as beginning. For Augustine,

attribute of will or the inner self, but

foremost a fundamental capacity of human
In

the Cjty of God, Augustine, as

life.

was

only natural, speaks more

is

an inner
in

human

the world.

better his
of

and freedom

of his other writings,

coming

freedom

in

not possess freedom so

into the world,

the universe;

and was so created
existence. ...

In

in

in

human and

existence

as he, or

is

a beginning

had already come

man

into

this initial beginning

is

each instance something new comes

an already existing world which
individual's death.

much

because he

free

after the universe

the birth of each

reaffirmed, because

be

is

human

equated with the appearance

is

man

Because he

will

is a

in

conceived there not as

is

disposition but as a character of

Man does

and

According to Arendt,

from the background of specifically Roman experiences than

any

first

into

continue to exist after each

beginning,

man can

to be free are one and the same.

begin; to

God created man

order to introduce into the world the faculty of beginning:

freedom.

Freedom as Mimesis

What
reliance on

assumption

are

it?

is

we

to

make

"Because he
that since

of this strange

is

we

a beginning,

argument and Arendt's

man can

initiate

is

."

The

we

ourselves have

something new, and to instantiate

freedom. Augustine's use of this argument
since he

.

are ourselves an instance of free action (a

product of God's freedom according to Augustine),
the capacity to act freely, to

begin.

is

perhaps not so strange,

able to provide a causal link to connect our existence with our

234

capacity for free action as one of our attributes. Since for
Augustine
are manifestations of God's freedom,

made

freedom. But Arendt, as a secular

gift of

in

His image,

political

He gave us the

philosopher,

entitled to appeal to this kind of supernatural causality,
nor

attempt to invoke

it.

Yet again,

in

The

Human

we

is

not

does she ever

Condition, Arendt appeals

to an apparent, but unexplained causal connection.

The fact that man

is

capable of action means that the

unexpected can be expected from him, that he

what

is

infinitely

because each man
uniquely

How

And

improbable.
is

new comes

this again

is

is

able to perform

possible only

unique, so that with each birth something
into the world. 224

does our being unique, something new, account

for our

possession of the capacity for free action? What causal mechanism

work here? There seems

to be a

gap

in this

account

225
,

perfectly reasonable to hold that, although each of us

have been pre-written

scripts

scientific causal

either

for

in

is

at

seems

it

unique, our

life

by God or by the laws of natural

determinism stemming

for our original characteristics.

What

causal "glue" could ground Arendt's contention that because each

of us

is

suggest

224

225

a beginning,

is

we have

the capacity to begin?

What

that this gap represents theoretical space which

Arendt, The

Human

I

would
is

like to

yet to be

Condition page 178.
,

Two

other commentators have made mention of the need for an
explanation here. See Gabriel Tlaba, Politics and Freedom: Human Will and
Action in the Thought of Hannah Arendt and B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the
:

Search

for a

New

Political

Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1981).
.
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adequately elaborated, but which Arendt’s work has
begun to explore

and which offers

a possible explanatory

to traditional forms of explanation,

attempts to legitimate our
tradition, as well as to

own

may

critical

to

its

is

action on "principle."

may seek

a goal); nor

motive (although motives may be implicated
is

which

in

is it

action).

It

is

not

reducible

To act on

not to be determined or motivated, but to be "inspired

from without." And to act on inspiration
principle

our

traditional theory.

goal (although action

principle, then,

critics in

voices with respect to the

Free action, according to Arendt,
its

be of use to

uncover and nurture instances of free action

which have gone unrecognized by

reducible to

concept which, as an alternative

is

to bring into being that

inspires you. Thus, according to Arendt,

into being only with free action.

It

is

neither an

freedom comes

immanent possession

of

the subject, nor a transcendent absolute that preexists the subject, but

something that

we

is

created by our attempts to imitate the beginning that

see ourselves to be. Thus freedom,

honor, glory, duty,

comes

like

such other principles as

into being only insofar as

according to our assumption of

its principle.

we

attempt to act

is it

determined by or reducible to any of our particular acts.
transcendently normative, as
it;

and

it

is

it

inspires us to act

also subject for

236

its

love,

This principle does not have

an absolute existence, independent of our actions, nor

conception of

is

in

It

completely
is

both

imitation of our

existence to our concrete

attempts to instantiate
intentional object,

yet

it

Freedom

it.

exists as

what we could

brought into being only as

we

call

an

actively presuppose

it;

exerts a causal-normative force over our ability to act. Yet this

causality

is

not reducible to a mechanistic, linear causality, and so

eludes articulation

in

it

current theoretical terms. 226

Storytelling, Rather than

Theory

This peculiar relationship of structural similarity between the

human
in

actor's natality and the capacity for free action

is

again expressed

Arendt's elaboration of the complementary existential structure of

narrativity,

which, as

action's necessary

becomes the
find

we

have seen,

human

is

the ontological condition for

interrelatedness. This

stuff of stories for Arendt,

and

it

is

human

interrelatedness

within stories that

we

expressed and preserved human freedom. Arendt's notion of the

relation

between an actor and

concept of the "who" which

when

his/her

is

life

disclosed

story revolves around her

in

action. According to Arendt,

a person acts, inserts herself into the world by

means

of action

226

Perhaps the only sustained theoretical attempt to analyze this typ of
causal connection can be found in structuralism, specifically Althusser's reading
of Marx's concept of "Darstellung," or structural causality. This concept refers
to the way in which a larger social structure (e.g., the relations of production)
that is brought into being by human activity has causal force over the
individuals whose actions created it. See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar,

Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, (New York: Pantheon, a
division of Random House, 1970). Also see Frederic Jameson, The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (New York: Cornell
,

University Press), 1981, for a discussion of Althusser's analysis.
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and speech, what

is

disclosed exceeds any concrete qualities or

attributes. Action

is

the

which

in

recount a

The

which every human attains an

in

based on the uniqueness

is

describe

way

who someone

speech

list

of

is,

which that

of qualities

each

individual.

may

specificity of the individual eludes us, and yet

specificity that guides our choice of

attempting to capture

in

The manifestation
is,

though

confounds

it

is

all

When we want

according to Arendt,
individual

identity,

we

inevitably

share with others.
it

is

this

unique

words as that which we

are

our description.

of

who

the speaker and doer unexchangeably

plainly visible, retains a curious intangibility that

efforts

moment we want

toward unequivocal verbal expression. The

who somebody

to say

leads us astray into saying

what he

is,

we

our very vocabulary

get entangled

in a

description of qualities he necessarily shares with others

like

we

to

is;

begin to describe a type or a "character"

in

him;

the old meaning of

the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes
us.

This

who

227

is

irreducible to the

who which makes
this

who

itself

story.

227

manifest

in

human

describe, yet

it

is

this

action and speech. Because

eludes the type of description appropriate to natural and

inanimate things, the
life in

what which we may

way

in

which

the absence of the actor

According to Arendt,

Arendt, The

Human

it

may

be

through the

is

we know who

Condition page 181.
,
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made

present or brought to

telling of

Socrates

is

the actor's

life

better than

we do

we

Aristotle, in spite of the fact that
his philosophical positions. This

which reveals to us

his

is

have Aristotle's writings expressing

because

we

have Socrates’

unique person as manifest

life

story,

the representation

in

of his actions and words.

The

specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the

implicit manifestation of the

agent and speaker,

tied to the living flux of action

so indissolubly

is

and speaking that

it

can be

represented and "reified" only through a kind of repetition, the
imitation or mimesis,
arts but

is

which according to

Aristotle prevails in

actually appropriate only to drama,

all

whose very name

(from the Greek verb dran "to act") indicates that play-acting
actually

is

an imitation of acting. 228

Furthermore, this
action,

is

who someone

as revealed

is,

in

speech and

not completely under the control of the subject of the action.

The actor reveals

this

who

to others, and to herself, only by

means

of

the action. Yet the action's meaning, significance, and consequences are

never entirely predictable. Action inserts
relations,

and as such

calls

itself into a

up other actions

in

response and

the meaning determinations of others. The actor
his or her

life

story, in the

same way

in

which

world of human

is

is

subject to

not the sole author of

a theorist believes she

control her theoretical output.

The disclosure

new

"who" through speech, and the

beginning through action, always

web where

228

of the

Arendt, The

their

fall

into an already existing

immediate consequences can be

Human

Condition

p.

1

87.
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setting of a

felt.

Together

may

new process which

they start a
life

story of the

those with

newcomer,

whom

affecting uniquely the

he comes into contact.

web

already existing

eventually emerges as the unique

of

human

It is

life

stories of

because

relationships, with

its

all

of this

innumerable,

conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves
its

purpose; but

alone

is real,

is

it

that

also

because of

this

medium,

"produces" stories with or without intention

it

as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.

the author or producer of his

The
totally

relation

its

my

story

in

in

some

.

.

Nobody

is

229

his or her life story

is

neither

of passive experiencing. Rather,

am

I

,

passive sufferer. This twofold structure

its

of action as well, for

human

action cannot be

terms of calculated, instrumental implementation of

means toward an end

effect of

story.

.

the twofold meaning of the term subject both

active source or cause and

understood solely

life

between an actor and

mimics the structure

a

own

one of authorship, nor one

the subject of

which action

in

or goal, nor as the necessary

and inevitable

motivation, whether the motive force be unconscious and

instinctual or the direct result of conscious and deliberate thought or will.

This

is

not to say that there

is

no element

or drive in action; only that action

is

these factors as sole determinations.

understood

in

not completely reducible to any of

Human

action cannot be fully

terms of instrumental-efficient causality. To so reduce the

significance of action

229

of will, thought, aim, instinct,

Arendt. The

is,

Human

for Arendt, to capture not action, but behavior,

Condition page 184.
,
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and with such

freedom

a behavioral analysis, the possibility of a glimpse of

To reduce action

is lost.

to motive or goal

is

human

to lose the

uniqueness of the individual, the contextualized significance of the action
for others,

and the

principle

which

existence by the action which

inspires.

it

Motives and aims, no matter
never unique;

created by and kept within

is

how

how

pure or

grandiose, are

psychological qualities, they are typical,

like

characteristic of different types of persons. 230

What

the connection between unique individuality and free

is

action? According to Arendt, freedom
attribute of the subject

Any accident

in

not reducible to a possession or

is

the manner of the substance/accidents relation.

or property of an individual subject could just as well be a

property of another. The unique identity of an individual goes beyond the

sum

of

will.

Theoretical attempts to ground freedom

all

her properties for Arendt. This includes the property of free

of subjectivity

this

have usually located

attempt has faltered, since

doctrine of free

is

actualized,

will is

freedom

is

it

it

the

the subject as a capacity

will,

but according to Arendt,

misguided. The problem with the

that once free

is lost,

in

in

will

enters the empirical world and

for the action, according to Arendt,

under the sway of material causal determinants. And

attempt to

insist

upon the

reality of

if

we

comes

further

freedom, while simultaneously

accepting the causal determination of our empirical actions, freedom

230

Arendt, The

Human

Condition page 206.
,
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becomes grounded

in

some

must remain necessarily
seif.

According to

this

kind of transcendental mystery of which

ignorant, as

in

we must assume

of our actions,

Kant's theory of the noumenal

type of salvaging of freedom, since

get "behind ourselves," so to speak, to
that

we

know completely

we

we

can never

the wellsprings

are free. This lack of

knowledge

gives us the appearance of freedom as spontaneity. However, viewed
this

way, that

knowing that we don't know, must

is,

in

entail a loss of

freedom, for freedom has traditionally been thought of as incompatible
with ignorance, and as involving control and mastery over the external

causes of our actions,

short, of

in

autonomy. But the mastery

of external

forces requires knowledge. The theory which equates freedom with

ignorance of the ultimate ground of our actions

is

therefore

unsatisfactory; for freedom strikes us as incompatible with ignorance.

If

Arendt

is

correct, this irreducibility of the

eludes theoretical articulation, for

it

freedom. The free human subject

is,

representable

in

the

life

Although

direction

view that

in its

I

in

action

human

however, represented and

story of an individual actor.

find the recent

revealed

requires the assumption of

theoretical account, narrates the sequence of a

231

who

231

life's

work by Bonnie Honig

A

story, unlike a

events as they

to be a

move

in

the right

disagree with her

appropriation of Arendt for feminist theory,
is no subject, self, or "doer behind the deed."
I

for Arendt, there

Arendt's subject is elastic, in flux and formation, and open to change and
believe, more in keeping with
definition through its actions, but this concept is,
existentialism's self-transcending subject than post-modernism's schizophrenic
non-subject. See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics
I

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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unfold and insert themselves into the larger text, the context, of
other

A

lives.

the

narrative, unlike a determinist theoretical explanation, preserves

moment

freedom

of

freedom

action, by resisting the reduction of this

in

either to an inevitable determinant or function of the subject's

sovereign

will or to

the mere play of events on which the subject's action

has no effect. Since action
only

is

a story, action

in

is

made manifest and

must be recognized as

We
his/her

life

rigid distinction

freedom preserved

essentially narrative. Action

fundamentally symbolic, meaningful, textual,

obscured by any

its

in

a

way which

between theory and

practice.

have seen that the relationship between an
story

suffering, but

is

is

is

individual

and

neither solely one of authorship, nor of passive

both active and passive subjectivity and subjection.

narrative bears the

same

bipolar and

ambiguous

does free action to the agent of action. For
conception of freedom

is

not grounded

in

relationship to

this reason,

a traditional purely theoretical

justifies her

we

gap

freedom but leaves open

account. The burden of legitimation

is

a

in

descriptive narrative of instances of freedom.

232

contention that

her theoretical

thereby placed

view can only be represented or imitated

hero as

Arendt's

manner. She never articulates a theory which
are capable of

its

A

(in

part)

upon her

Freedom, on Arendt's

narratively. In fact, Arendt's

See Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanoviceh,
1968), for examples of Arendt's narrative descriptions of the lives of free
232

.

actors.
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style

and method have themselves been characterized as
narrative.

According to Seyla Benhabib, with

whom

respect, Arendt's historiography

an exercise

is

I

wholeheartedly agree
in

the political act of

"storytelling," rather than the "nostalgic history of decline" for

frequently taken

233

Thus Arendt depicts instances

.

of

freedom

stories she tells of ancient politics. Benhabib sees Arendt's

membering," that

is,

a putting together the

in this

"members"

which
in

it

is

the

work as

"re-

of a whole, "a

rethinking which sets free the lost potentials of the past ." 234

Thus

Arendt's work functions as critique by demonstrating the possibility of an
alternative

mode

of both practical and theoretical political

Arendt's style of critique

escaping the

critic's

is

engagement.

one which thereby succeeds to

a

degree

in

problem of legitimation.

Forgiving and Promising as Aspects of Critique

The

intertextuality of

human

action, like the unique distinctness of

the agent of action, and the newness, unexpectedness, and
unpredictability of the action's occurrence, constitute action's basic

human

conditions on Arendt's view. Plurality, natality, and "narrativity"

are presupposed
of action imply

233

in

every

two other

human

action.

These ontological preconditions

inherent characteristics of action:

Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self page 92.
,

234

Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self page 92.
,
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unpredictability and irreversibility. Action
irreversible

—

is in

it

which she gives

unpredictable and

is

fact for Arendt "miraculous,"

to this

in

the precise sense

word, as interrupting automatic processes

235
.

Action breaks into causal deterministic chain of events, and
begins
processes. Because these

movement

continuing

new processes

are subject to causal laws, their

of implication and effect cannot be recalled.

Because these new processes

where action on the

new

insert

part of others

is

themselves

up

called

into a

in

human network,

response, they are

unpredictable. Unpredictability and irreversibility constitute the major
risks of action.

Action
of action,

and

is

risky as

everyone knows, but

for its recipients,

is

somewhat

capacities which Arendt analyzes as

this risk,

both for the agent

mitigated by

components

two human

of the political

life:

forgiveness and promising. Forgiveness stops the automatic chain
created by an action and inserts

new

beginning.

It

itself into actuality in

frees the actor from the

order to create a

consequences

of her action, as

well as the forgiver from the automatic behavior of simple reaction.

Forgiveness
the

human

is itself

an action, according to Arendt, and

condition of natality

which serves

to avert the risk

236
.

Promising

which

Arendt, "What

236

Arendt, The Fluman Condition page 237.

Freedom?," page 169.
,
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i

another

grounded

political

in

capacity

free action poses. Promising

235

Is

is

is

attempts to
off

stabilize the uncertain

by action.

It

also helps to

and uncontrollable consequences set

tame the

"unreliability" of

"who never can guarantee today who they

will

human

beings

be tomorrow ." 237

Promising and forgiving are aspects of the miracle of

human freedom,

and, as such, are political acts according to Arendt.

we

If

see these two features of

understanding of the practice of
of

its

sting.

Thus, the

action by engaging

in

be missed by

dilemma loses some

embraces the

risks inherent in free

an activity which she knows

As such, the

its

as applicable to our

critique, the critic's

critic's practice

theoretical justification.

likely to

political action

critique's transcendent

who may

recipients,

may be without

attempt to deny

legitimacy, either by interpreting the critique as nothing

characterizing

horns of the

it

critical

dilemma constitute

perhaps

we

we

is

can both forgive the

must make use

Arendt, The

by

is

to

fail

must

two

take.

to allow for the

accept the possibility of Arendt's type of freedom,
critic

her

immanence and seek the

critique.

Furthermore, the

of forgiveness and promising

object of critique. The critic's

237

or

free political action of the sort that Arendt

transcendent promise implied by the
herself

a risk that the critic

with either horn

critic

possibility that critique

If

new

is

its

as an unrealistic and utopian pipe dream. Thus the

But to charge the

describes.

moment

Human

in

immanent embeddedness

Condition

,

page 244.
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critic

her relation to the

in

that which she

critiques requires of her an attitude of forgiveness,
herself, as

if

she

is

to allow

she must, to use some of the very terms, values, and

standards which she critiques. But the

critic is also implicitly

promising

the possibility of something better. As

we have

in

already seen

Chapter

One, every critique includes a utopian moment, such that the
understanding of a problem, untruth, or injustice

and a promise

is

already a positive act

for the future.

Arendt's vision of

understand and allow

political

freedom

is

one which can help us to

for the possibility of the

immanent

critic's

transcendence. This type of freedom allows the embodied,

human

situated, causally determined

new and
Arendt

historically

actor to begin something radically

to bring into existence the principle of freedom. This freedom,

is

correct, cannot be

grounded

theoretically, for

it

if

necessarily

eludes the reductionist terms of theory. But to accept this type of

freedom as
of

its

a political principle of action allows for the

we engage

being, as

seen

in

their

work

the theorists

But these

is

we have

is

critics

raised.

seem

it

stories about

it

is

it.

calling

up

As we have

critical

force of

renders the status quo questionable.

to falter

Perhaps

tell

previously discussed, the

apparent insofar as

same

justification

action and

in

mimetic

when

the question of theoretical

time to give up the quest for

theoretical certainty and to recognize, as does Arendt, that the

247

human

actor

is

capable of freedoms that the purely
theoretical mind cannot

adequately grasp or account
causality,

which

for.

Furthermore, the concept of mimetic

links the actor to her

offer a possibility of

freedom

expanding the notion of

too narrow confines of the purely theoretical.
dissertation with a

summary

rational

I

of this possibility.
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of action,

can be seen

to

ground beyond the

intend to conclude the

CHAPTER 6
PRAXIS, MIMESIS, TRANSCENDENCE
Throughout

this dissertation,

I

have argued that the

activity of

critique eludes a theoretical grounding or justification. In cases

object of critique

is

a totality of

which the

critique

necessary transcendence cannot be accounted

have examined

for.

between the two terms

oscillate

Adorno and Horkheimer,

for

is itself

a part, the

The various

Odysseus). Instead they point out the

in

dialectical intermixture of

between estranged nature and instrumental reason
cannot be theoretically

account, transcend

its

in

reason

for a reconciliation

relies

on a

justified, since

immanence

force at

their analysis of

and myth that governs Western thinking. Their hope

their

I

example, cannot adequately envision an

the origins of Western thought (as exemplified

on

critics

of the critical dilemma.

alternative type of rationality to the instrumental one they find

dialectic. This faith

where the

faith in the

theory cannot,

in this dialectical

relation that

necessarily contains both the barbaric and the rational elements.

Kant

similarly, in

the author of the

focusing on the subjective-critical perspective as

critical

capacity, cannot theoretically justify the

transcendence required to engage

in

a critique of reason. Kant, like

Adorno and Horkheimer, sees reason as bifurcated — comprising both

a

transcendent and immanent pole. For Adorno and Horkheimer, reason
both mythical and instrumental; for Kant,

249

it

contains both the

is

transcendental-critical perspective, and that of the empirical

consciousness. Kant

s

strategy

is

to adopt,

in

turn,

each of these

perspectives and to attempt to use them to legitimate each other.

argued that this attempt

fails.

I

have

For the transcendence required to establish

the legitimacy of the empirical perspective cannot be upheld within the
restrictions that structure the empirical perspective's capacity for

knowledge; nor can the restrictions placed upon the empirical perspective
(which Kant argues are responsible for the legitimacy of the empirical
perspective's epistemic capacity) be maintained from within the

transcendental perspective.
perspective

becomes

If

transcendence

illegitimate

capable of achieving knowledge.

when taken
If

is

possible, the empirical

as the sole perspective

the empirical perspective

is

indeed the

only appropriate epistemic perspective, the transcendence required
itself illegitimate.

Kant's strategy oscillates between the

is

two

perspectives, both of which are necessary, but neither of which can be

maintained.

A

concrete example of this oscillation

refuting the charge of subjective idealism; he

is

Kant's attempt at

"dodged" the issue by

taking the charge of idealism to apply only to the empirical perspective.

Hegel, too, places the possibility of the transcendence required for
critique in the structure of cognitive consciousness. His attempt at

conducting a critique of the stages of knowledge that

fall

short of his

goal of the Absolute proceeds by following out the self-development of

250

each of these forms. However

procedure cannot constitute a

this

theoretical justification of the ability of consciousness to
achieve total or

absolute knowledge without already presupposing an acquaintance
with
the Absolute as implicitly existing
Hegel's critique
ability of

is

circular

and

each stage of consciousness.

in

relies for its

the dialectic to self-overcome

truth. Furthermore, this attainment

success on a

until

it

has reached absolute

cannot be evaluated

the end of the dialectical journey has been reached.

Hegel's contention that

spirit is

currently

faith in the

in its final

If

or justified until

we do

stage,

not accept

we have

access to the transcendent point of view required to evaluate

no

his

achievement.
For Harding and the standpoint epistemologists, the transcendence

out of the patriarchal order which constitutes the object of their critique
is

grounded

in

the dual consciousness of the feminist subject. The

standpoint epistemologists offer a theory that casts this consciousness
as bifurcated and capable of developing norms, standards, and values not
already operative

in

the male-centered tradition. However, the theoretical

basis for this bifurcated consciousness

claim that the feminist standpoint

Thus Harding's arguments

stems from her

is

not sufficient to justify the

superior to the traditional standpoint.

are structured

presupposes the superiority she
of superiority

is

is

in

a circular

manner; she

trying to establish. This presupposition

political-ethical
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commitment

to the

liberation of

women

as an oppressed class. Theoretically, the

epistemology she develops succumbs to the
in

the superiority of the feminist standpoint

exemption

of the feminist bias

render a masculinist bias
objectivity

is

from the

inferior,

critical

is

dilemma. Her

belief

based on an unfounded

critical

considerations which

and her strengthened concept of

merely the traditional concept with the feminist bias tacked

on. "Strong objectivity"

is

not sufficient to the task of grounding a

feminist (as opposed to any other) standpoint — her presuppositions

regarding the proper subject of knowledge can only support a
perspectivist relativism, not the superiority of the feminist point of view.

I

argued

in

Chapter 4 that Irigaray's "post-modern" feminism

represents an advance over the standpoint theorists

in

that she offers the

beginnings of a theoretical explanation for the possibility of

transcendence arising out of the immanence of the male-centered
tradition. Irigaray's psychoanalytic deconstruction of the tradition's

theory of the feminine points out the
as

its

way

in

which the

tradition harbors

latent other the repressed feminine principle. Furthermore,

Irigaray's

use of a psychoanalytic method of reading the "symptoms" of

the tradition's repression of the feminine — the gaps and contradictions

in

the traditional theory — gives her a technique whereby she gains access to
the latent and unconscious feminine principles and values. Thus Irigaray,
like

the previously discussed theorists, makes use of both a transcendent
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and an immanent point of view. She mimics the feminine as
currently understood

— via

"hysterical" expression

in

it

is

her use of "reproductive mimesis" and

its

an exaggeration of essential feminine

difference; and she productively attempts to develop the alternative

feminine principles which she has uncovered

in

unconscious. Irigaray thus represents

positive, constructive

a

more

of the activity of critique than the theorists

However,

this positive

aspect of her work

the tradition's

form

previously discussed.

I

is still

insufficiently

theoretically developed, and, as with the feminist standpoint theorists,

the feminine values she upholds cannot be established to be superior or

more

true to reality

— only

to

complement those already espoused by the

tradition. Irigaray therein also relies

feminism

for the legitimacy

Political

whose

critical

commitment
goal

is

on

a political

and force of her
is

more

commitment

to

critique.

explicit in the

work

professedly the creation of room

of Foucault,

in traditional

discourse for the positions of the oppressed, excluded, and marginalized.
Foucault's genealogical strategy functions
Irigaray's

use of psychoanalysis;

values which are immanent
political

to,

it

in a

manner

similar to

uncovers the excluded principles and

but covered over by the tradition of

philosophy. The effect of Foucault's

critical

enterprise

is

to

delegitimize the tradition's pretensions to universality and necessity by

presenting,

in

the manner of a "defetishizing
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critic," a plausible

alternative. Since Foucault denies
critical

elaborations, he

critical

dilemma

is

any status of absolute truth

able, in part, to elude the

view which

for a point of

is

demands

for his

of the

epistemically superior to the

object of his critique. Nonetheless, the theoretical requirement for a
justification of the implicit

hope that the

tradition will

acknowledge the

legitimacy of the viewpoints of the oppressed and excluded-as well as

Foucault's radically alternative theory of power — remains

Without

this theoretical justification, there

but

is

position of

its

force.

no reason for preferring

is

Foucault's alternative over the tradition which

from

in

it

is

meant

hegemony. Thus Foucault engages

to displace

in critical

practice,

unable theoretically to justify this practice without an appeal to

political

his

commitment.

Arendt

explicitly proclaims the political

human freedom.

be the ground and source of
of the critic and

relations

and

freedom

is

human

actor

in

the concrete

historical situatedness

to be possible.

It

is

is

dimension of human
For Arendt, the

life

world of

life

to

immanence

human

not an obstacle to be overcome

the very precondition of free action. The

transcendent freedom required by the

critic

requires an acceptance of our

earthly being according to the principles of natality, plurality, and

narrativity.

theory of

Arendtian theory points to the possibility of elaborating

human freedom which can account

transcendence. Thus,

I

if

for the critic's

a

immanent

have analyzed Arendt as beginning to offer an
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account of the type of situated or immanent freedom
necessary to the
activity of critique.

Although

Arendt, her positive contribution

account

may come

action. Since this

account remains underdeveloped

this

was

into being in the

gap

to identify the place

gap between

exists, Arendt's

natality

in

where such an
and free

view of freedom must also be

found to be theoretically without ground, and to point to the necessity of
a political

commitment

to further theoretical

to the possibility of freedom.

work more completely

Freedom must always be seen
practical, rather

rational

framed the problem

Thus

rational critique

appears

in

in,

it

mind to be impossible; yet

crisis of

reason. Reason has lost

has increasingly been

shown

to be

and determined by the nonrational.

itself

always to be nonrationally motivated

nonrational determination presupposes

it.

a

Chapter One, the dilemma of critique

and determined. Paradoxically, the very

factors which determine

Thus

political.

foundation and autonomy, since

historically situated, implicated

life.

Arendtian terms, must broaden the

critique, in

can be seen as an instance of the larger
its

to elaborate this freedom.

to be an attribute of the political and

concept of reason to include the

I

therefore remains

than the purely epistemic, dimension of

grounding of

As

It

ability of critique to

its

see this

own transcendence

out of the

Critique appears to the purely theoretical

this impossibility
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is

obviously achievable.

The

solution

to give up an attempt at purely theoretical

is

justification in the already existing

terms of the philosophical

and to recognize the

transcendence as immanent to our

embeddedness

in

possibility of

human

the

the dissertation have

all

The

situation.

understood

theorists

their inability to

I

have examined

immanent. Although

in

we

of theoretical ground,

same time

by self-consciously remaining

critique

we have

in

escape completely

the confines of the tradition they were critiquing; yet at the

they were able to engage

tradition

seen these attempts

cannot deny that these

falter

on the question

critics practically

attained a critical force, rendering the objects of their critiques less firmly

established than before the critiques were conducted.

have discussed — whether
ideological, or political

which the

their targets

— engaged

in a

self-certainty of the status

I

quo was shaken by

the theorists

I

how

to

their

account

work.

for

its

it.

by drawing out of some of

have discussed the potential and promise
in

critique," in

sufficient to establish

this question

which could be further elaborated
critical

is

problem becomes

have begun to answer

we

were purely epistemological,

form of "defetishizing

Since this practical actuality of critique
possibility, the theoretical

the critics

All

of

new concepts

order to provide a rational ground for

transcendence. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer point to and

suggest the possibility of an enlargement of the concept of reason to
include

what the

tradition

This enlarged reason

will

deems

to be

its

opposite-myth and mimesis.

constitute a reconciliation with nature — its
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estranged other — in such a

way

that such traditional attributes of

instrumental reason as domination and oppression

Although

this vision

Horkheimer,
calling for

it

is

is

never

fully or theoretically

be eliminated.

will

developed

there as a potentiality, and as such,

it

in

Adorno

or

should be seen as

development.

Kant's promise of the possibility of

critical

transcendence leaves

the theoretical, epistemological realm altogether, and places this
possibility in the transcendental preconditions of

necessary positing of the existence of

a

knowledge and

noumenal agent. Kant's

in

the

critical

philosophy as a whole (comprising the three "critiques") locates the

freedom

crucial to the

noumenal agent

in

the ethical, rather than the

epistemological realm. But the autonomy of the three spheres Kant

proposes (the epistemological,

ethical,

and aesthetic) cannot be

maintained, for the epistemological must

freedom which
Kant,

is

it

of the capacity for

alone cannot ground. Practical reason therefore, for

"higher" than theoretical reason, and so the epistemological

critique of pure reason

much

make use

must be seen

to be an ethical

as a theoretical, activity. To this extent Kant's

supports

my

contention that critique

component. The challenge

between the

practical

why Kant thought

it

is

itself

and

practical, as

critical

philosophy

necessarily has a practical

to articulate this necessary connection

and theoretical aspects of reason, and to determine

necessary to keep them separate.
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Similarly, feminist theory

engages

in

the positive, constructive task

of elaborating the norms, values, methods, and principles

new ways

Harding, for example, points to the need to

critical vision.

new epistemology

determining the
Objectivity

political

itself,

sufficient to the task of normatively

biases that lead to increased knowledge

however,

will

need to be recast more

abandoned

knowledge

is

in

order to account for the

constructed

in

accord with

way

in

will

political biases. Irigaray is

on values that the patriarchal theoretical

tradition

new metaphysics

It

is

the

new

for future

has neglected.

Irigaray,

to

fully this alternative

work.

the concept of mimesis, as

Horkheimer,

more

brought into being on the basis of feminine

experience. The theoretical task to develop more

metaphysics remains

of

economy bases

These values — fluidity, contiguity, touch, metonymy — may serve
structure a

need

which the object

productive than Harding. Irigaray's alternative feminine
itself

238
.

radically than

Harding has done; the subject/object dualism she presupposes
to be

offer

of theorizing the alternative reality that will ultimately justify

the feminist

develop a

which

I

and Arendt, that

conceptual directions that

I

have uncovered
find to be the

we may

take

in

it

in

Adorno and

most promising

of

theorizing a

Richard Rorty believes that epistemology must be abandoned altogether,
since it is inherently foundationalist in a no longer supportable way. He sees the
new philosophical paradigm which will replace epistemology to be hermeneutics
and to be concerned primarily with edification rather than contributing to
knowledge. See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princton, New
238

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1079).
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transcendent freedom accessible to immanently situated rational beings.

Mimesis functions,

in Irigaray,

failure of patriarchal

to

as a

critical

strategy for expressing the

theory to capture the feminine principle

know. Mimesis serves as

refutation

in Irigaray.

it

pretends

Her mimicking of

patriarchal discourse about the feminine functions to refute the position
of that discourse

dominated

women

on the subjectivity

tradition of both

of

women. According

to the male

metaphysics and psychoanalytic theory,

are insufficiently ethically developed to speak meaningfully or to

author the products of culture. Furthermore, according to these
traditional theories,

way

women's experiences can never be

other than the

they are described by male-authored norms. Irigaray's mimesis

repeats the male tradition's pronouncements on

demonstrates

their absurdity

and

women, and thereby

bias; the act of

exaggerated repetition

performatively reveals the author of such repetition to be a subject with
her

own

point of view. Mimesis and hysteria convey an "excess" of

meaning beyond what the words
subjectivity

is

whose

signify; this

hysteria conveys her entrapment

revealed as insufficient to express her

Arendt's use of mimesis
Irigaray's.

excess points to a trapped

is,

full

in

a discourse

meaning.

of course, quite different

Arendt advocates the use of mimesis as

from

a methodological

strategy capable of capturing the freedom of the political actor

which

is

impossible for

political

which

in

a

way

and philosophical (metaphysical) theory.
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Storytelling

is

endorsed and used by Arendt as

traditional theoretical explanation. But

new

kind of theoretical explanation

I

for

argued that the possibility of a

present

is

replacement

a

Arendt's work. Arendt

in

appeals to mimesis as an explanatory concept crucial to her theoretical
position on the nature of freedom. Thus,

I

have analyzed Arendt as

outlining a theory of "mimetic causality" that can account for the
relations

among

the existential structure of natality, the principle of

freedom, and the actions of the human agent. This mimetic causality
explain the

way

which freedom comes

in

uniqueness of each individual. Freedom
"intentional object," for

enacted

239
.

— the

human

agents.

fact that each of us

It

239

we

have called an

I

it

is

presupposed and

each represent.

is

not a faculty of the

will or a

an expression of the subject's

it

is

is

born into the world as a

anew

beginning. Thus our ability to begin

beginning

what

exists only insofar as

possession of the subject. Rather
natality

into being as a reflection of the

freedom, according to Arendt, comes into being only

Political

with the actions of

it

is

will

is

a

new

mimetic repetition of the

When we engage

in

action,

we

express this

may

capture what Foucault means by power being
not an object possessed by individuals or
subject to its
institutions, for Foucault. Rather it can only be expressed, in which case it
becomes a force in its own right. Thus power has eluded adequate theoretical
analysis, according to Foucault. This type of existence may also be applicable to
the problem in the Platonic theory of the Forms. According to Plato, the
This type of existence

expression. Power

particulars imitate the

however the
in

mode

is

Forms (which

why

is

of this imitation has

they are ontologically inferior);
remained problematic and controversial

Plato scholarship.
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aspect of ourselves

in

such

a

way

as to escape the confines of

mechanistic determinism. Action for Arendt
such, cannot be predicted, controlled, or

is

fully

"miraculous," and, as

expressed

in

the terms of

current political theory. This type of causality suggested by Arendt

remains to be developed, but to see

it

as a form of mimetic repetition

a

is

start.

My
critical,

contribution

in this

dissertation has been primarily negative and

rather than constructive.

I

have analyzed ways

in

which the

theorists studied have failed to provide a purely theoretical grounding for
their critical philosophies.

exercise

evident

in critique,

in

these

legitimacy. But

As such,

crisis of critique.

activity of critique

is

activities

— even

inextricably implicated

critique,

and indeed of

continually

in

failures

own

I

will

fill

in

the space opened by what

believe wholeheartedly

beyond the dilemma

in

in

all

it

of legitimation.

The
a political

stands, can no longer play a foundational

our activities as thinkers and knowers — are
our

political biases.

The

political

aspect of

knowledge production, must be kept

view; our attempts to understand our cognitive activities
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I

the possibility

never entirely theoretical, but always also

enterprise. Pure theory, as

Our

been an

have also attempted to offer some preliminary directions

of doing critical philosophy

role.

itself

attempts to establish their

toward a positive elaboration that
see to be the

has

which has pointed out the contradictions and

critical theories'

I

this dissertation

must draw upon our

political

selves for the development of the

concepts and standards adequate to
philosophy,

need of

if

it

is

to outflank the

new modes

this challenge.

dilemma

discourse obeys a fundamental

it

is

Or,

if

you

rule,

prefer: its rule

is

namely that

that

what

is

at

precisely this difficult task of the construction of

lies

and of reason,

of justification and normativity. But this

".

its rule.

Contemporary

of critique

should be. As Jean-Francois Lyotard reminds us,

new

.

.

is

as

is in

it

philosophical

must be
stake

in

is its

search of
rule."

240
It

new standards which

before us now.

240

Jean Francois Lyotard, "The Sign
the Question of History page 163.

in

,
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History,"

in

Post-Stru cturalism and

.
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